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Abstract 
 
Deforestation is a well-recognised global threat to biodiversity and ecosystem function, and the 
conversion of forests to productive lands is responsible for the majority of world-wide deforestation. 
These patterns are mirrored in Queensland, Australia, which has exhibited some of the highest 
deforestation rates around the world in the last three decades. In response, the Queensland 
government enacted the contentious Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999 to regulate the clearing 
of remnant (i.e. old-growth) trees on private lands across the state. Since its inception, however, the 
policy has spurred heated debate from the agricultural sector, with landholders arguing its lack of 
transparency, inconsistency, and ignorance of economic impacts on the agricultural sector. To date, 
no robust, objective investigations have been made into the direct and indirect roles of the VMA in 
changing tree clearing behaviours. Yet if we want to develop relevant and effective policy instruments 
to create sustainable change in tree clearing, it is imperative that these instruments are tailored to 
reflect the drivers of clearing across all relevant dimensions. In this thesis, I explore the biophysical, 
political, and cultural dimensions of tree clearing in Queensland to highlight how landholders have 
responded to policy intervention, uncover the potential perversities of its implementation, quantify 
its effectiveness, and understand its influence within the cultural landscape of tree clearing. 
I begin with an exploration into the underlying factors driving changes in historic tree clearing 
patterns, where I use principal component analyses to monitor changes in the biophysical, 
socioeconomic, and property characteristics of clearing events across Queensland during 1989–2015 
(Chapter 2). These patterns are compared between key bioregions of interest and between key 
periods along the vegetation management policy timeline, revealing spatially and temporally dynamic 
clearing preferences—from the consistent profitability- and availability-driven patterns in the 
Brigalow Belt South bioregion, to the opportunistic patterns in the Great Barrier Reef catchment that 
fluctuate with policy changes. These drivers of tree clearing are further explored using spatial 
longitudinal analyses (Chapter 3), where I quantify the influence of a suite of traditional 
deforestation drivers on both net forest cover change and remnant forest loss in Queensland since 
1991, with particular emphasis on quantifying the influence of the broad-scale clearing ban of 2007 
and peak periods of policy uncertainty along the political timeline. Importantly, I identify a positive 
effect of the clearing ban yet a negative effect of policy uncertainty on forest cover. Particularly for 
remnant forests, the negative effects of policy uncertainty were large enough to negate most forest 
cover benefits provided by command-and-control regulation. 
Given the prevalence of perverse clearing outcomes amidst policy intervention, I perform the 
first robust causal impact analysis of the VMA to determine if the policy has successfully reduced 
remnant tree clearing in the Brigalow Belt South beyond two counterfactual scenarios (Chapter 4). 
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Overall, I find the VMA had limited effectiveness; the maximum amount of remnant trees saved is 
less than 5% of the total amount cleared since 2000. Interestingly, the indirect effects of the policy 
may be more effective than its direct effects, as it is evident that landholders have since redirected 
their clearing efforts away from protected vegetation even when given legal opportunities to do so. 
These potential social effects are further investigated using the responses obtained from a state-wide 
survey of landholders that recorded their tree clearing behaviours, as well as numerous psychosocial 
factors related to tree clearing and vegetation management policy (Chapter 5). I identify five 
psychosocial typologies and four clearing typologies of Queensland landholders and determine the 
underlying demographic, socioeconomic, and psychosocial characteristics describing each typology. 
I then discuss how these heterogeneous groups of landholders can help us identify targets and 
strategies for promoting positive clearing behaviour change while minimising potential perversities 
that top-down regulation can provoke. 
Finally, I discuss the significance of these results for informing the following key components 
along the policy intervention cycle: design and implementation, monitoring and enforcement, impact 
evaluation, and communication (Chapter 6). A more diverse suite of policy instruments should be 
employed to combat ongoing clearing, and their design should be informed by greater communication 
with landholders, which will promote knowledge exchange and trust-building. Monitoring the 
absolute clearing rates and their characteristics at smaller spatiotemporal scales will also allow the 
government to monitor how landholders are differentially responding to intervention, including 
identifying early warnings of perverse outcomes. There must be a shift from an overarching reliance 
on impact indicators to more robust causal inference analyses, and policy instruments will need to be 
designed to make these inferences accordingly. Lastly, greater regulatory compliance could likely be 
achieved using more strategic communication approaches that emphasise the stewardship values of 
landholders and target messages to the most prolific clearing communities. Ultimately, greater 
consideration for top-down and bottom-up approaches will be needed to ensure sustainable land 
management behaviour change can be achieved in Queensland. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Tackling conservation issues 
 
The majority of terrestrial biomes across the planet are experiencing a crisis in biodiversity 
conservation and ecosystem service provision (Newbold et al. 2016). As the planet experiences 
unprecedented extinction rates (Pimm et al. 2014; Ceballos et al. 2015), land use change and habitat 
loss are the dominant drivers of species decline in many areas (Murphy & Romanuk 2014). These 
changes are primarily the result of human modification of the environment (Song et al. 2018). 
Agricultural expansion represents one of the greatest threats to biodiversity; it is responsible for a 
significant increase in the global human footprint (Johnson et al. 2017), and the coverage of 
agricultural landscapes is expected to increase 18% by 2050 (Tilman et al. 2001). This expansion is 
the most commonly cited proximate driver of deforestation (Barbier & Burgess 2001a; Hosonuma et 
al. 2012), and it is estimated to account for 80% of global deforestation activities (Kissinger et al. 
2012). Despite recent global forest cover gains, net forest loss continues in tropical regions (Song et 
al. 2018), resulting in severe habitat fragmentation (Haddad et al. 2015) and subsequent species 
decline (Betts et al. 2017). As these negative effects of deforestation are likely to be exacerbated by 
future climate change (Segan et al. 2016), it is imperative that nations take effective action to mitigate 
rapid land use change and conserve remaining habitats, including already highly-fragmented 
landscapes (Di Marco et al. 2015; Wintle et al. 2019). 
Global recognition of this precarious state of the environment has launched a number of 
international agreements, such as the United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (UN 
2015) and the Convention on Biological Diversity’s 2020 Aichi Biodiversity Targets (CBD 2010). 
From voluntary, aspirational goals to national strategic action plans, more than 100 countries are 
increasingly committed to protecting the health and function of ecosystems in order to achieve 
environmental sustainability and, consequently, improved human well-being (Bertzky et al. 2012; 
Pogge & Sengupta 2015). Despite growing efforts, however, previous targets of the Millennium 
Development Goals and Aichi 2010 Targets were largely unaccomplished (Le Blanc 2015; Waldron 
et al. 2017), and there are mixed expectations for reaching the current targets (Bertzky et al. 2012; 
Tittensor et al. 2014; Johnson et al. 2017). For example, despite increasing protected area coverage 
around the world (Aichi Target 11), the most important sites for biodiversity remain unprotected 
(Bertzky et al. 2012), and conservation efforts on farmlands (Aichi Target 7) are frequently 
unsuccessful due to high costs or the displacement of agricultural activities elsewhere (Johnson et al. 
2017). As governments strive to implement conservation policy interventions to meet their 
approaching sustainability targets, it is essential that the appropriate policy instruments are used, 
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knowing that some alternative approaches may be more successful in certain contexts (Butchart et al. 
2015). 
 
1.1.1 Effectiveness of policy intervention 
 
Governments have a number of options for promoting conservation and minimising environmental 
degradation. The most common approaches include direct or ‘command-and-control’ regulation, 
market-based incentives, and voluntary (binding and non-binding) programs (Cocklin et al. 2007; 
Kamal et al. 2015). Direct regulation is the most popular tool at countries’ disposal, and this approach 
has been used around the world for national and international initiatives ranging from individual 
species protection (Lueck & Michael 2003) to land use change (Bos et al. 2017) and trade bans 
(Rivalan et al. 2007). Similarly, the establishment of protected areas is another common instrument—
partly due to Aichi Target 11—that typically places strict land use restrictions inside the protected 
area (Barnes et al. 2018). Such command-and-control approaches, however, can be polarising, 
inflexible, and may reduce the public’s motivation to protect the environment (Smith & Vos 1997; 
Dresner et al. 2006; Jordan & Matt 2014). Incentive-based schemes and voluntary agreements have 
thus become popular alternative instruments, including forest certification, payments for ecosystem 
services, conservation covenants or easements, and local extension-based programs (Jack et al. 2008; 
Kamal et al. 2015). The use of these policy instruments, however, does not guarantee success. For 
example, voluntary approaches may be more flexible, collaborative, and promote understanding and 
collective action (Lockie 2009; Ives et al. 2010; Ens et al. 2013), yet compared to strict regulations, 
they may be less impactful, require the public to be knowledgeable of environmental complexities, 
and are less ‘comfortable’ than applying strict laws (Santos et al. 2006; Kollmann & Schneider 2010; 
Jordan & Matt 2014). 
Impact evaluation is crucial to the political process, as it guides political development forward 
and can illuminate successes and failures of previous policy instruments (Bovens et al. 2006; Pawson 
2006). Despite its pivotal role in shaping future regimes, thorough evaluations of environmental 
policy interventions are scarce due to a number of difficulties, including the degree of subjectivity, 
time and resource availability, and its translation into policy recommendations (Bovens et al. 2006; 
Howlett et al. 2009; Marsh & McConnell 2010; McGrath 2010; Perche 2011). Yet a number of studies 
in the last decade have undertaken this demanding effort, determining the effectiveness of direct 
regulations (e.g. Assunção et al. 2012), protected areas (e.g. Joppa & Pfaff 2011), and payments for 
ecosystem services (e.g. Calvet-Mir et al. 2015). Despite some success stories, many instruments fail 
to create significant change or result in unintentional ‘perverse’ outcomes (Miteva et al. 2012). For 
example, regulations may only result in short-term impact if activities are poorly monitored or 
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enforced (Azevedo et al. 2017), financial incentive schemes may fail if they are poorly designed to 
inspire compliance or participation on at-risk properties (Lockie 2013; Moon 2013), and protected 
area targets can create a perverse incentive to focus on protection quantity over quality (Barnes et al. 
2018), resulting in spatial selection biases towards areas that are under minimal threat (Joppa & Pfaff 
2011; Miteva et al. 2012). 
Direct regulations, perhaps counterintuitively, are highly susceptible to ineffectiveness or 
perverse outcomes because they are reliant upon behavioural compliance and the support of the public 
and political regime. Environmental regulations are particularly volatile due to the dynamic nature of 
policy: they affect and are affected by social norms and their trends, they may be promoted or 
denigrated based upon politicians’ desires for support from their party, constituents, or donors, and 
they are susceptible to frequent adaptation and, in some cases, complete repeal (Zohlnhöfer 2009; 
Kollmann & Schneider 2010; Bauer & Knill 2014). While this is an inherent part of politics, problems 
arise as the number and intensity of policy instruments increase over time, especially for 
environmental policies with significant impacts on property rights and land management (Knill et al. 
2012). Controversial policies complemented by high political instability, legislative ambiguity, and 
frequent regime changes have been known to provoke perverse reactions from landholders, leading 
to increased deforestation rates over time (Deacon 1994; Barbier & Burgess 2001b; Brown et al. 
2016). Thus, command-and-control approaches to conservation have the potential to create 
substantial positive or negative environmental outcomes; which outcome, however, is dependent 
upon the behavioural responses of those targeted for intervention and the multi-dimensional factors 
influencing those behaviours. 
 
1.1.2 Dimensionality of conservation behaviour 
 
Creating desired behaviour change is a significant challenge for researchers and practitioners, both in 
theory and practice (van der Linden 2015). More than 100 theories of behaviour change have been 
proposed by researchers around the world (Kwasnicka et al. 2016), illustrating the complexity of 
generalising decision-making in different contexts. Historically, the majority of theories and models 
of decision-making have been based on economic ‘rationality,’ where linear processes are driven by 
the expected profit- and utility-maximisation strategies of individual actors (Hargreaves 2011; 
Groeneveld et al. 2017). Mounting evidence, however, suggests that this approach will not adequately 
represent the myriad of social, psychological, and contextual factors shaping individual preferences 
(Lynne et al. 1988; Howley et al. 2015). Behaviour is influenced by internal and external factors, 
which may fluctuate in dominance or act synergistically through complementary goals or motivations 
(de Snoo et al. 2013; Steg et al. 2015; Kwasnicka et al. 2016). If policy instruments are to create 
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effective behaviour change, Kok et al. (2016) assert that the relevant determinants of the behaviour 
must be identified and changed, and the intervention needs to produce practical applications that can 
be embedded into the targeted culture.  
A number of external drivers of environmental behaviours have been identified in various 
contexts—from market signals (DeFries et al. 2010), to income (Barbier & Burgess 2001a), to 
biophysical constraints (Laurance et al. 2002). Internal drivers are becoming more prominent in these 
investigations, in large part due to the growing contribution of social science theory to environmental 
management, such as the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1985) and the value-belief-norm theory 
(Stern & Dietz 1994; Stern et al. 1999). Using these frameworks, as well as other individually-tailored 
behavioural models (e.g. Austin et al. 1998), studies have identified significant psychosocial 
modifiers of environmental behaviour, like social norms (Fielding et al. 2005), personality traits 
(Willock et al. 1999), values (Maybery et al. 2005), and sense of control (Price & Leviston 2014). 
Despite a number of success stories using these more inclusive models to predict behavioural 
intentions, predicting actual behaviour remains difficult (Bamberg & Möser 2007). This sobering 
realisation is of paramount importance to implementing conservation interventions, as numerous 
contextual, hidden, or unexpected factors may ultimately impede upon successful behaviour change. 
Environmental decision-making, in particular, is further complicated by the highly polarised 
nature of environmental policy (Lucas & Warman 2018). Environmental issues are becoming 
increasingly partisan (Karol 2018), are grounded in ethics and morality (Dickman et al. 2015), and 
provoke strong emotional responses (Wilson 2008; Recher 2017), which may profoundly diminish or 
even negate other factors driving behaviour. In some instances, the influence of one’s political or 
social identity can be so strong that they directly align their behavioural intentions or support with 
those of their own in-group, even if this contrasts with their own knowledge or attitudes about the 
issue (Unsworth & Fielding 2014; Mason 2018). This places environmental policy instruments in a 
precarious position; external factors may alter the underlying value orientations of those targeted for 
behaviour change, and this dynamic re-structuring of underlying values can affect other related 
behaviours (Crompton 2010). Complex temporal dynamics of environmental decision-making have 
also been observed. For example, farmers may be driven by intrinsic motivations early in life, which 
evolve into extrinsic motivations later in life (Farmar-Bowers & Lane 2009). Consequently, different 
policy instruments may be more appropriate for different sectors of the target population. This 
highlights the general consensus that successful environmental management demands more 
investigations into the different landholders that are ultimately responsible for pro-environmental 
behaviour, accounting for their demographic, economic, social, and personality characteristics 
(Emtage et al. 2007; Moon & Cocklin 2011; Moon et al. 2012). Overall, the cultural dimensions of 
environmental decision-making encompass this complex suite of individual and collective factors 
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reflecting beliefs about morality, tradition, and normative or acceptable behaviours, which have an 
influential effect on deforestation (Geist & Lambin 2002; Hoelle 2018). More interdisciplinary 
approaches, or at the very least, more diverse disciplinary approaches are likely needed to capture a 
more thorough understanding of the myriad of internal and external drivers of land management 
behaviour to develop effective conservation policy interventions (McGregor et al. 2001). 
 
1.2 An Australian case study 
 
Mirroring global biodiversity losses, the clearing of remnant (i.e. old-growth) vegetation due to 
agricultural expansion has significantly threatened biodiversity in Australia (Kirkpatrick 1999; Smith 
et al. 2013). In its relatively brief colonial history, Australia has seen agricultural development drive 
a reduction in forest coverage by nearly 15% since colonization, with 7.2 million ha (7%) of primary 
forests having been cleared in the last 40 years alone (Bradshaw 2012; Evans 2016). This rate of 
deforestation was so intense that it marked Australia with the sixth-highest annual deforestation rate 
in the world during 1990-2000 (Lindenmayer 2005). The impacts of tree clearing present significant 
challenges to the health, function, and sustainability of many Australian landscapes, including 
changes in soil fertility and nutrient loss (Graham et al. 1981; Dowling et al. 1986), salinity 
(Lindenmayer 2005; Ponce-Reyes et al. 2014), and water balance/runoff (Cowie et al. 2007; Thornton 
2012).  
Despite the federal government’s commitments to biodiversity conservation—with targets 
including national increases in protected/managed areas, restoration of fragmented landscapes, and 
improved ecological connectivity (NRMMC 2010)—as well as some recent reports listing Australia 
as the second-best country in reported annual net gain in forest area (FAO 2016a), remnant vegetation 
continues be lost, particularly in the State of Queensland. In some deforestation hotspots, like the 
Brigalow Belt South (BBS) bioregion, such intense clearing rates have reduced ecosystems’ 
vegetation cover to less than 10% of their historical extent, leaving the landscape severely fragmented 
with small, isolated patches of remnant vegetation (Dwyer et al. 2009; McAlpine et al. 2011), further 
increasing the potential for microclimate shifts, habitat degradation, and increased mortality risk for 
species within these patches (McAlpine et al. 2002; Lindenmayer 2005). Unfortunately, the 
ecological value of these remnant forests often cannot be easily substituted by recent reforestation 
efforts (Bowen et al. 2009). 
 
1.2.1 Queensland: the clearing state 
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In the last four decades, Queensland has lost 9.7 million ha of forest from land clearing, accounting 
for more than 60% of clearing in the entire country over this period (Evans 2016), and estimates 
suggest Queensland’s native vegetation cover has reduced by at least 50% over the last 200 years 
(ABRS 2010). A number of extensive reviews have illustrated the importance colonization and 
government incentives had on driving historic land clearing in Queensland (e.g. Seabrook et al. 2006; 
Bradshaw 2012). In an effort to raise economic prosperity in the developing country, the Queensland 
Government actively encouraged—or rather demanded—landholders to clear as much vegetation as 
possible in order to meet the needs of an international agricultural market (Braithwaite 1996; 
Bradshaw 2012). Particularly in Queensland, most forms of cropping were not considered to be 
profitable (unless they were used for fodder production) in many regions, so the majority of 
landholders were pastoralists, clearing land in which to graze sheep and cattle (Seabrook et al. 2006). 
The rate of land clearing began to increase significantly as the population grew, commodity prices 
became favourable and export opportunities increased (AGO 2000), and the government acquired 
mounting revenue (Seabrook et al. 2006). By the mid-20th century, clearing (and maintaining a 
cleared property) became much more feasible due to improved clearing technology (Fensham & 
Fairfax 2003). New bulldozing techniques expedited the removal of stubborn brigalow (Acacia 
harpophylla) stands more effectively than previous laborious techniques; this was shortly followed 
by blade ploughing, which proved to be a more effective method of preventing brigalow regrowth, 
providing for an increase in cropland development (McAlpine et al. 2011). It wasn’t until the 1990s 
that public opinion began to change regarding the value of this ‘nuisance’ vegetation, and the 
Queensland Government began shifting from a focus on incentivizing clearing to regulating clearing.  
 
1.2.1.1 Controversial vegetation management policy 
 
The public’s newfound appreciation for the value of native, remnant vegetation led to a new wave of 
policy reform in Queensland that followed in the footsteps of other states that had previously began 
regulating land clearing (Evans 2016) (Fig. 1.1). The first official recognition of biodiversity 
protection as a legislative objective came about with the Land Act 1994, which placed stricter land 
clearing controls on leasehold and State lands (McGrath 2007; Evans 2016). As environmental 
concerns grew, clearing regulations were then extended to freehold lands with the enactment of the 
Integrated Planning Act (IPA) 1997 and the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. According to 
the VMA 1999 s 3.1: 
 
The purposes of this Act are to regulate the clearing of vegetation on freehold land to (a) preserve the 
following: (i) remnant endangered regional ecosystems; (ii) remnant of concern regional ecosystems; 
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(iii) vegetation in areas of high nature conservation value and areas vulnerable to land degradation; (b) 
ensure that the clearing does not cause land degradation, (c) maintain or increase biodiversity, (d) 
maintain ecological processes, and (e) allow for ecologically sustainable land use. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. The evolution of vegetation management policy in Queensland. Political timeline of pivotal 
legislation and regime shifts, categorised according to six policy periods between 1990 and 2016: 
unregulated, reform, regulation, interim, restriction, and relaxation (cf. Chapter 2). State elections 
of 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2009 where the centrist government maintained power are not shown. 
 
Together with the Vegetation Management Regulation 2000 that followed shortly thereafter, the 
VMA 1999 serves to (1) identify and define the different types of vegetation and their conservation 
value/protection status, and (2) outline the policy framework underlying clearing permits, which then 
guides the IPA 1997’s requirements for assessing and enforcing these permits (Productivity 
Commission 2004; McGrath 2010). After the VMA 1999 passed, its official proclamation was 
delayed until September 2000 amidst difficulties reaching agreements surrounding landholder 
compensation (Productivity Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), leaving a window of 
uncertainty amongst landholders as to what the future had in store for them and their ability to clear 
vegetation on their property. 
What followed in the infamous years after the passing of the VMA 1999 would eventually be 
described as a period of ‘panic clearing.’ This period, extending primarily through 1999 to 2003, was 
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characterised by peak clearing rates throughout Queensland stemming from landholders’ uncertainty 
of what exactly they would be permitted to do on their freehold land in the future, resulting in what 
many suggest were unplanned, pre-emptive clearings of vegetation (Productivity Commission 2004; 
Lindenmayer 2005; Taylor 2015). In light of these unforeseen clearing events, the Vegetation 
(Applications for Clearing) Act 2003 was enacted, placing a temporary moratorium on clearing 
applications until new reforms were set in place a year later with the Vegetation Management and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (McGrath 2007). Within several new objectives added to the 
VMA, the Act declared that ‘broad-scale’ clearing of remnant vegetation would be banned by the end 
of 2006.  
The new clearing restrictions, however, fell under a number of caveats. The Act only provided 
broad-scale clearing protection to remnant vegetation, defined as “the vegetation, part of which forms 
the predominant canopy of the vegetation, (a) covering more than 50% of the undisturbed 
predominant canopy, and (b) averaging more than 70% of the vegetation’s undisturbed height” (VMA 
1999, sch). Thus no protection or regulation was extended to non-remnant vegetation or (at that time) 
forms of regrowth vegetation. Further, broad-scale clearing—the only clearing to be prohibited—was 
particularly vague, defined as clearing that is “not for a relevant purpose under section 22A” 
(VMOLAA 2004, s 28.2). Some of the ‘relevant purposes’ included clearing for control of exotics, 
pests, or encroachers, public safety reasons, fodder harvesting, thinning (restorative), and ‘necessary’ 
fences, firebreaks, and infrastructure if there is no other suitable location. To ease potential 
transitioning burdens, the Act allowed for a total of 500,000 ha worth of broad-scale clearing permits 
to be issued and executed prior to 2007, and these were allocated through ballots across seven regions 
within Queensland. In addition, AU$130 million was allocated to provide financial assistance to 
landholders over the subsequent five years, and $20 million to provide incentives for landholders to 
retain high-valued vegetation on their property (Productivity Commission 2004; McGrath 2007). 
The years immediately following the ban of broad-scale clearing in 2007 saw few changes to 
the VMA 1999, save for the Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009, 
which extended the protection from broad-scale clearing to ‘high-value regrowth’ vegetation—
vegetation that had not been cleared since 31 December 1989—and regrowth in watercourse areas 
(VMOLAA 2009, s 20AB). Growing frustrations over the vegetation management regulations, 
however, began to reach a pinnacle, resulting in a shift in political regimes from the 2012 state 
election that placed the conservative (despite the name) Liberal National Party in power under the 
new Premier of Queensland, Campbell Newman. Shortly thereafter, the new government enacted the 
Vegetation Management Regulation 2012, which introduced new self-assessable vegetation clearing 
codes to reduce the number of permits needed for clearing, as well as the Vegetation Management 
Framework Amendment Act 2013, which removed protection of high-value regrowth and regrowth 
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watercourses and introduced ‘high-value agriculture’ as a relevant purpose for clearing; clearing for 
high-value agriculture constitutes “clearing carried out to establish, cultivate and harvest crops, other 
than clearing for grazing activities or plantation forestry” (VMFAA 2013, s 65.2). Accordingly, this 
legislation was seen as a victory for many landholders, yet presented a real setback for those 
emphasizing the destruction of land clearing. The return of the centrist Australian Labor Party in 2015 
was met with great promise by the party and new Premier, Annastacia Palaszczuk, to reverse the 
relaxations set in place by the Newman Government (Hough & McKillop 2015). After several years 
of heated debate, and a rejection of the proposed Vegetation Management (Reinstatement) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2016, the Palaszczuk Government successfully passed the Vegetation 
Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2018, which amended the VMA 1999 by 
reinstating former protections of high-value regrowth, extending protections into additional Great 
Barrier Reef catchments, and eliminating high-value agriculture as a relevant purpose for clearing. 
 
1.2.1.2 A demand for answers 
 
Land clearing in Queensland has recently been at the forefront of eco-political debate, and the future 
of land clearing has never been more uncertain than it is today. Native vegetation management 
encompasses biophysical, socioeconomic, political, and cultural dimensions that are astoundingly 
complex. Even more daunting, native vegetation management has become deeply embedded into the 
fabric of morality, transforming these seemingly simple tree clearing codes into profound issues 
surrounding landholder rights, public trust, political stability, and economic and environmental 
sustainability. In seeking pro-environmental change, there must be a shift from a constricted focus on 
emphasizing nature to an interdisciplinary focus on emphasising human behaviour. Considering the 
extensive policy “ping pong” (Maron et al. 2015) observed with the VMA in the last seven years, it 
bears questioning why such a policy may be so vulnerable to dramatic changes. Some of the major 
criticisms surrounding the VMA include a lack of clear and defined indicators with which to measure 
the policy’s impact, a lack of transparency and frequent uncertainty regarding the policy’s objectives 
and methodologies, and poor internal organisation and implementation of regulations (Productivity 
Commission 2004).  
Taken further, the overall effectiveness of the VMA warrants some investigation. The 
evaluation of policy effectiveness is by no means a new concept, yet it is infrequently tested despite 
its important implications (McGrath 2010). It is important to understand the different tools vegetation 
management policies may use, what a ‘good’ policy might look like, and what factors may drive the 
success or failure of these policies to produce their intended outcomes. At the bare minimum, it is 
obvious that vegetation management policies will need to deviate from the business-as-usual attitude 
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in Australia (Bradshaw 2012). If bottom-up approaches can be developed that emphasize the roles, 
knowledge, and rights of landholders, are open and adaptable to new information, and can adequately 
capture the complex dimensions of land clearing, then it is likely that landholders will become more 
responsive to policies, leading to less reactive clearing and minimal policy ping pong (Ryan & Deci 
2006; Cocklin et al. 2007; Lockie 2013). While it is no easy task, an understanding of relevant drivers 
of land clearing in Queensland can aid in the selection of appropriate policy instruments that may 
more effectively drive the success of future vegetation management policies. 
 
1.3 Thesis overview and structure 
 
This thesis answers the recent call to challenge the field of conservation science to become more 
integrative, comprehensive, and adaptable in our attempt to target, understand, rationalise, and inspire 
change in conservation behaviours (Reddy et al. 2016; Bennett et al. 2016, 2017). In the chapters that 
follow, I tackle the biophysical, socioeconomic, political, and cultural dimensions of tree clearing in 
Queensland through an interdisciplinary, behaviour-focused lens (Fig. 1.2). Chapter 2 explores the 
spatial and temporal patterns of historical tree clearing throughout Queensland—with emphasis on 
the unique clearing characteristics of four bioregions of ecological and political importance—amidst 
the background of a dynamic policy timeline. In Chapter 3, I provide the first statistical evidence for 
the existence of ‘panic clearing’ at the state- and bioregional-scale, and I develop a spatial 
econometric model of two different metrics of tree clearing, identifying a range of biophysical, 
socioeconomic, and political factors driving forest cover dynamics. Chapter 4 presents the first 
statistical analysis of the effectiveness of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 using robust causal 
inference techniques in order to estimate how well legislative protections have been able to 
successfully curb targeted clearing of remnant vegetation in the Brigalow Belt South. In Chapter 5, 
I apply psychosocial theories of behaviour to the context of landholders’ clearing decision-making, 
distinguishing two sets of landholder typologies, mapping their distribution in the landscape, 
identifying their unique demographic and psychosocial characteristics, and proposing multiple 
strategies to target relevant landholders for creating land management behaviour change. Each 
chapter investigates multiple dimensions of tree clearing, and the results provide important insights 
into the following factors that drive successes and failures of many policy interventions: design and 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement, impact evaluation, and communication. These lessons 
are expanded upon in Chapter 6, which provides a final discussion of the overall thesis for vegetation 
management policy in Queensland and similar environmental policies around the world. In this 
concluding chapter, I also highlight the contribution of the thesis to the interdisciplinary space 
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surrounding conservation science and policy, and I outline directions needed for future research to 
answer the remaining questions about tree clearing behaviour.  
 
 
Fig. 1.2. Outline of the content and structure of the thesis. Each chapter investigates a suite of 
economic, biophysical, political, and/or cultural factors influencing tree clearing behaviours, and 
highlights important lessons for four key issues determining the success of environmental policy 
interventions: design and implementation, monitoring and enforcement, impact evaluation, and 
communication. 
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Chapter 2: Spatial and temporal patterns of land clearing during 
policy change 
 
2.1 Abstract 
 
Environmental policies and regulations have been instrumental in influencing deforestation rates 
around the world. Understanding how these policies change stakeholder behaviours is critical for 
determining policy impact. In Queensland, Australia, changes in native vegetation management 
policy seem to have influenced land clearing behaviour of landholders. Periods of peak clearing rates 
have been associated with periods preceding the introduction of stricter legislation. However, the 
characteristics of clearing patterns during the last two decades are poorly understood. This study 
investigates the underlying spatiotemporal patterns in land clearing using a range of biophysical, 
climatic, and property characteristics of clearing events. Principal component and hierarchical cluster 
analyses were applied to identify dissimilarities between years along the political timeline. Overall, 
aggregate landholders’ clearing characteristics remain generally consistent over time, though 
noticeable deviations are observed at smaller regional and temporal scales. While clearing patterns in 
some regions have shifted to reflect the policy’s goals, others have experienced minimal or 
contradictory changes following regulation. Potential ‘panic’ or ‘pre-emptive’ effects are evident in 
the analysis, such as spikes in clearing for pasture expansions, but differ across regions. Because 
different regions are driven by different pressures, such as land availability and regulatory 
opportunity, it is imperative that the varying spatial and temporal behavioural responses of 
landholders are monitored to understand the influence of policy and its evolution. Future policy 
amendments would benefit from monitoring these regional responses from landholders to better 
assess the effectiveness of policy and the potential perversities of policy uncertainty. 
 
2.2 Highlights 
 
• Aggregate clearing analyses may ignore factors driving landholders’ policy response. 
• Land-policy uncertainty could elicit unintended intervention outcomes. 
• Identifying regional clearing patterns and drivers can orient more effective policy. 
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2.3 Introduction 
 
Deforestation, with its consequential effects of habitat loss, fragmentation, and degradation, is a well-
recognized threat to biodiversity and ecosystem function (McAlpine et al. 2002; Lindenmayer 2005; 
Bradshaw 2012). Environmental regulations and other policy instruments greatly influence 
deforestation rates around the world, whether directly or indirectly (Meyfroidt & Lambin 2011). A 
number of countries have directly reduced deforestation rates using conservation policies 
incorporating logging bans (Southworth & Tucker 2001; Mather 2007), mandated reforestation or 
afforestation (Klock 1995; Wang et al. 2007), and land use restrictions (Fox et al. 2009; Assunção et 
al. 2012). Other countries such as Costa Rica and India have experienced a decline in deforestation 
indirectly, due to economic and ideological pressures (Kull et al. 2007; Daniels 2009) and forest 
management decentralisation (Agrawal 2007; DeFries & Pandey 2010), respectively. Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz (1999) argue that policy instruments and macroeconomic variables represent the 
underlying causes of deforestation, and these factors will directly influence more immediate causes 
of deforestation, such as institutions, infrastructure, markets, and technology. 
Policy instruments can thus modify the dynamics of the human-environment system, but by 
doing so, may not always work as intended. Policies can even lead to the potential for perverse, or 
unintentional, outcomes to emerge (Miteva et al. 2012). Some conservation policy instruments have 
resulted in leakage effects, whereby deforestation is displaced from the regulated region into 
unregulated areas (Wear & Murray 2004; Oliveira et al. 2007; Gaveau et al. 2009). Other policies 
meant to indirectly curb deforestation, like those reducing agricultural rents or removing clear-to-
own property laws, may also result in accelerated clearing rates when they are poorly implemented, 
lack public support, or introduce high levels of legislative uncertainty (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; 
Angelsen 2009). 
Vegetation management policies directly affect the livelihoods of agricultural landholders, 
placing constraints on economic growth, property rights, and potentially tenure security (Alston et al. 
2000; Sant’Anna & Young 2010; Aldrich 2012). The link between deforestation and issues of 
property rights and tenure security has been most obvious in developing nations, where landholders 
clear forest to lay their claim on the land, prevent squatters from infiltrating, and receive financial 
incentives (as well as property legitimacy) from the government (Alston et al. 2000; Aldrich et al. 
2012; Brown et al. 2016). When this sense of security and autonomy is threatened by incoming 
policies dictating how landholders are permitted to manage their land, some may react by pre-
emptively clearing vegetation. If controversial policies are complemented by high political instability, 
regime changes, or legislative ambiguity, the reactions from landholders to this uncertainty can 
significantly increase deforestation rates over time (Deacon 1994; Barbier & Burgess 2001b). 
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Deforestation patterns in Australia are broadly reflective of the rapid rate of modern 
deforestation globally (Lindenmayer 2005). In its relatively brief colonial history, Australia has seen 
agricultural expansion reduce forest cover by nearly 15%, with 7.2 million ha (7%) of primary forests 
cleared in the last 40 years alone (Bradshaw 2012; Evans 2016). Since the 1970s, the State of 
Queensland has lost 9.7 million ha of total forest from land clearing, accounting for more than 60% 
of clearing in the entire country over this period (Evans 2016), with native vegetation cover reduced 
by at least 50% over the last 200 years (ABRS 2010). Like many developing countries, the first 
century of development in Queensland was marked by heavy governmental encouragement for 
landholders to clear as much vegetation as possible in an effort to raise economic prosperity 
(Braithwaite 1996; Bradshaw 2012). It was not until the end of the 20th century that public opinion 
began to change regarding the value of native vegetation, and the Queensland Government entered 
into a period of land clearing policy reform, which brought about the first strict regulations on 
vegetation management practices with the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Landholders in 
Queensland have since experienced considerable evolutions in state vegetation management policy. 
The most infamous period of land clearing in Queensland in recent history involved the rapid 
increase in clearing rates during 1999–2000 and 2002–2003, likely in response to the initial enactment 
of the VMA 1999 and subsequent stricter implementation in 2003—periods commonly referred to as 
panic clearing (Productivity Commission 2004; Lindenmayer 2005; Taylor 2015). The definition of 
panic clearing, however, is unclear; it has been used to describe rushed clearing activities (i.e. future 
plans that were expedited) or unplanned clearing activities (i.e. activities that the landholder had no 
future intentions of executing), though evidence of both types of panic clearing have been reported 
anecdotally in this case (Senate Inquiry 2010). Further, it is unclear whether panic clearing constitutes 
increased business-as-usual clearing (i.e. clearing locations similar to locations cleared in the past), 
increased atypical clearing (i.e. clearing locations dissimilar to those cleared in the past), or a 
combination of both. Identifying how these different characterisations of panic clearing contributed 
to the increased volume of clearing across regions is imperative to our understanding of how 
landholders make reactive, short-term land clearing decisions. One attribute of panic clearing remains 
consistent, however, which is that panic clearing is pre-emptive, due to expected clearing limitations 
imposed by future regulations (McIntyre et al. 2002; Productivity Commission 2004; McGrath 2007). 
Such perverse pre-emptive responses from landholders and stakeholders can also be found elsewhere 
in the conservation realm, following listings on the U.S. Endangered Species Act (Lueck & Michael 
2003) and trade bans under the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES; 
Rivalan et al. 2007). 
The convoluted introduction of strict vegetation management regulations in Queensland led 
to landholder uncertainty regarding future property rights and tenure security (Productivity 
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Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), which has also been observed in developing countries 
undergoing substantial policy evolution (Alston et al. 2000; Aldrich et al. 2012). Queensland thus 
serves as an important and relevant global case study to highlight how these clearing behaviours may 
change over time amidst continual (and sometimes contradictory) changes to a single vegetation 
management policy. Further, the availability of quality data on the characteristics of clearing in 
Queensland allows for more thorough investigations that may not be present in other cases. 
To date, the extent of state-wide vegetation clearing in Queensland has been widely publicised 
in the literature (e.g. DSITI 2016; Evans 2016), yet minimal attention has been placed on the 
characteristics of clearing over time in this case. This provides associative evidence of how 
vegetation management policy has affected aggregate landholder actions (i.e. the ‘what’), rather than 
using the characteristics of clearing to investigate the dynamic and differential behaviours of 
landholders (i.e. the ‘how’). Such temporal analyses have recently been used to assess global patterns 
of deforestation to identify drivers of clearing behaviour and forest transition (Hosonuma et al. 2012; 
Sandker et al. 2017), but these same concepts can be applied at finer scales. Previous investigations 
into the trends of land clearing in Queensland have also relied upon state- or national-level drivers of 
deforestation (e.g. Evans 2016; Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018), despite the global recognition of 
regionally dependent deforestation drivers and landholder responses (Geist & Lambin 2002). Thus 
these studies may produce generalised patterns and policy recommendations that may not adequately 
capture or identify regional landholders’ behaviours and potential motivations. 
This study investigates the underlying spatial and temporal characteristics and patterns of land 
clearing within the context of evolving vegetation management policies, using Queensland as a case 
study. Using a range of biophysical, climatic, and property characteristics to identify underlying 
patterns in clearing events across the political timeline, we analyse (1) how the observable 
biophysical, socioeconomic, and property characteristics of clearing events change over time, (2) 
what principle components can be derived from the spatial characteristics of clearing events, and (3) 
how these components differ between key policy periods. Further, we focus on periods described as 
panic clearing and assess how their clearing characteristics differ from previous years. To compare 
the potentially different spatial patterns, our analysis is undertaken at multiple scales: (1) an aggregate 
state-level analysis, (2) contrasting bioregion analyses, within a historical clearing hotspot (Brigalow 
Belt South), a relatively intact frontier for clearing (Cape York Peninsula), and an area of dense urban 
sprawl (South Eastern Queensland), and (3) a composite region of particular current environmental 
concern (Great Barrier Reef catchment). 
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2.4 Methods 
 
2.4.1 Study areas 
 
Queensland (QLD, 2.04 M km2) is the most climatically diverse state in Australia, with 50–3000 mm 
mean annual precipitation depending on the region, including equatorial, tropical, subtropical, 
temperate, grassland, and desert bioregions. We examined clearing patterns across the entire State of 
Queensland, Australia, with a focus on four subregions of interest (Fig. 2.1): the Brigalow Belt South 
bioregion (BBS), Cape York Peninsula bioregion (CYP), South Eastern Queensland bioregion (SEQ), 
and the Great Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC) as defined by the former Department of Environment 
and Resource Management (Rollason & Howell 2012). The BBS bioregion (267,000 km2), in south-
central QLD, is a subtropical (500–750 mm) biodiversity hotspot that has been extensively 
historically cleared for agricultural development, especially pasture expansion (Cogger et al. 2003; 
Fensham & Fairfax 2003). The CYP bioregion (131,000 km2), in contrast, is one of the most intact of 
the QLD bioregions, though interest in grazing is increasing in this tropical savannah and rainforest 
(1000–2000 mm) region (Crowley & Garnett 1998). SEQ bioregion (77,500 km2) is the most densely 
populated bioregion in QLD. This subtropical region is highly diverse in climate and production, and, 
despite being already one of the most extensively cleared in QLD, is currently experiencing 
substantial expansion of urban areas (Wilson et al. 2002; Peterson et al. 2007). The GBRC 
(388,000 km2) spans multiple tropical and subtropical bioregions (Rollason & Howell 2012), where 
the expansion and intensification of agricultural industries continues to cause concern for the health 
of the Great Barrier Reef (GBRMPA 2014). 
 
2.4.1.1 Timeline of vegetation management policy in Queensland 
 
Queensland’s entrance into strict command-and-control land clearing regulation began following the 
enactment of the Integrated Planning Act (IPA) 1997 and the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 
1999 (Fig. 2.2). The VMA 1999 serves to (1) identify and define the different types of vegetation and 
their conservation value/protection status, and (2) outline the policy framework underlying clearing 
permits, which then guides the IPA 1997’s requirements for assessing and enforcing these permits 
(Productivity Commission 2004; McGrath 2010). This controversial legislation was hastily 
developed, according to members of Parliament during debate (Kehoe 2009), and approved by the 
end of 1999, but the official proclamation of the Act was delayed by the Premier until financial 
assistance could be provided from the Commonwealth. By September 2000, the VMA was  
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Fig. 2.1. Current land use and remnant vegetation extent within the four study regions of Queensland. 
Excluded areas include national and regional parks, state forests, reserves, forest reserves, timber 
reserves, and water resources. Land uses are derived from the Australian Land Use and Management 
Classification system. 
 
proclaimed and the bulk of statutory provisions commenced (Kehoe 2009). This period between 
assent and proclamation provided a window of uncertainty amongst landholders as to what the future 
held for their ability to clear vegetation on their property, and is associated with peak clearing rates 
across the state. In an attempt to halt the rate of pre-emptive clearings, the centrist government passed 
an unexpected moratorium on clearing applications in 2003, followed by a pivotal amendment to the 
VMA in 2004, which declared that broad-scale clearing would be banned by the beginning of 2007. 
The following interim period (2004–2007) aimed to ease the transition for landholders prior to the 
broad-scale clearing ban, as the government offered some monetary compensation packages and 
allowed a transitional cap of 5000 km2 of broad-scale clearings to be carried out across the state before 
2007 (McGrath 2007; Kehoe 2009). The period following the ban saw additional amendments to the 
VMA, further restricting the clearing activities permissible on freehold and leasehold lands. In 2012, 
political power switched to the more conservative party, beginning a period of clearing policy 
relaxations in an attempt to reduce the burdens felt by landholders. Despite the return of a centrist 
premier in 2015, efforts to reinstate previous clearing restrictions in 2016 have been unsuccessful due 
to the party’s lack of majority representation in Parliament. 
 
2.4.2 Clearing data and characterisation variables 
 
Land clearing data were obtained from the annual Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS)  
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Fig. 2.2. The evolution of vegetation management policy in Queensland. Political timeline of pivotal 
legislation and regime shifts, categorised according to six policy periods between 1990 and 2016: 
unregulated, reform, regulation, interim, restriction, and relaxation. State elections of 2001, 2004, 
2006, and 2009 where the centrist government maintained power are not shown. 
 
dataset (QSC 2016h), for fiscal-year periods 1988–1991, 1991–1995, 1995–1997, 1997–1999, and 
annually from 1999–2000 to 2014–2015. We denote the fiscal year periods by their end year, and use 
a per year average for those spanning multiple years. The SLATS data are based on the supervised 
classification of multiple Landsat satellite images and digital terrain models at a resolution of approx. 
30 m (Macintosh 2007). We defined policy periods as (Fig. 2.2): unregulated (1988–1995), reform 
(1995–1999), regulation (1999–2004), interim (2004–2007), restriction (2007–2012), and relaxation 
(2012–2015). Each incident of clearing is coded according to the clearing type (see Scarth et al. 2008). 
To focus on private landholder-driven clearing, which represents 97% of total deforestation in the 
state during this time period, we excluded natural tree loss, as well as tree loss within natural resource 
management areas (national parks, reserves, state forests, forest reserves) and on aquatic tenures 
(ports, harbours, water resources). To estimate annual remnant vegetation clearing, the earliest and 
most accurate map of remnant vegetation was obtained from the Queensland Herbarium for 1997 
(QSC 2016g). Annual remnant forest maps were developed by first excluding the grassland 
ecosystems from the 1997 remnant extent, and then removing cells cleared in each period. High-value 
regrowth was not distinguished in this study. Because maps of remnant vegetation do not exist for 
the unregulated and early reform periods, we do not distinguish vegetation according to remnant 
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status for the subsequent pattern analysis in order to facilitate comparability between all policy 
periods. When discussing the extent of clearing (Section 2.5.1), however, we identify remnant 
vegetation clearing events for the period in which data are available (1997–2015). 
To characterise clearing events, nine temporally constant variables were selected: clearing 
type, slope, elevation, remoteness, rainfall variability, historical drought declarations, parcel size, 
tenure, and regional ecosystem threat status (Table 2.1). Henceforth, these variables are collectively 
referred to as the characteristics of land clearing. These variables represent biophysical, climatic, 
property, and legal characteristics that, together, describe suitability for agricultural conversion, the 
most common driver of deforestation across the globe (Joppa & Pfaff 2011; Busch & Ferretti-Gallon 
2017; Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018), including Queensland (Evans 2016). Parcel size was used as a 
proxy for property size, often identified as a correlate of deforestation (e.g. Pichón 1997; Geoghegan 
et al. 2001; Seabrook et al. 2007, 2008). Tenure was included as a property and legal characteristic, 
which designates the legislation and benefits of clearing and other property management practices 
(Turner et al. 1996; Fensham et al. 1998; Lindenmayer 2005). Regional ecosystem threat status 
provides a measure of the percent of clearing within each cell that falls on the pre-clearing extent of 
‘least concern’ regional ecosystems. Regional ecosystems (REs) are vegetation communities 
characterized by unique geology, soil, and landform combinations (Sattler & Williams 1999), and are 
designated a threat status of either ‘endangered,’ ‘of concern,’ or ‘least concern.’ This measure is thus 
a representation of both ecosystem rarity and vulnerability status under the VMA, as ‘least concern’ 
REs are most prevalent throughout the state and are under less pressure from traditional clearing 
trends. 
 
2.4.3 Data analyses 
 
2.4.3.1 Summarising clearing events over time 
 
The historical extent of land clearing was calculated in ArcGIS using SLATS clearing polygons for 
total clearing (1989–1997) and for remnant and non-remnant clearings (1998–2015) after removing 
natural tree loss (i.e. ‘natural tree death’ and ‘natural disaster damage’) and clearings within protected 
areas and other resource management areas (see Fig. 2.1). Annual clearing summaries were generated 
to report the proportion of clearing area consisting of the following clearing purposes identified by 
SLATS: pasture, crop, settlement, mine, infrastructure, timber plantation, and thinning. The 
frequency of clearing events per parcel of land was calculated by adding the number of SLATS 
reporting periods in which a given parcel experienced at least one clearing event, for a maximum of 
20 time periods. 
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Table 2.1. Variables used to characterise clearing events in the principal component analysis (PCA). 
Variable Description Source 
Clearing type Percent of clearing attributed to 
‘pasture’ 
SLATS clearing descriptions 
(QSC 2016h) 
Elevation Elevation (m.a.s.l.) QSC 2016d 
Historical drought 
declarations 
Percentage of time between 1963 and 
2011 in which the relevant Local 
Government Area was declared in 
drought by the State of Queensland 
QSC 2016a 
Parcel size Area (km2) of individual parcels of land, 
used as a proxy for property size 
QSC 2016c 
Rainfall variability Standard deviation of average rainfall 
from 1890 to 2013 
QSC 2016b 
Regional ecosystem 
(RE) threat status 
Percent of clearing on ‘least concern’ 
regional ecosystems 
QSC 2016e 
Remoteness Measure of a location’s proximity to the 
nearest urban centre (0 = highly 
accessible, 15 = very remote) 
Accessibility/Remoteness 
Index of Australia (ARIA), 
(ALA 2016) 
Slope Slope (deg.) QSC 2016d 
Tenure Percent of clearing on ‘freehold’ land QSC 2016c 
 
 
2.4.3.2 Comparing components of clearing spatial characteristics across policy periods 
 
The SLATS clearing polygons were converted to raster pixels with a 100 m resolution and attributed 
with the overlapping clearing characteristics for Queensland, resulting in over 9 million clearing 
observations (pixels) for the entire timeframe. The dataset was sampled without replacement in R 
version 2.15.3 (R Core Team 2017) using the package ‘kimisc’ (Müller 2014) giving 100,000 
observations for each of the QLD, BBS, SEQ, and GBRC case studies. The entire CYP region 
consisted of only 28,263 observations, so no sampling was performed. The validity and 
representativeness of the QLD sample was confirmed by comparing the variable distributions of the 
samples and populations, and testing that two independent samples produced equivalent results. 
 
2.4.3.2.1 Principal component analysis 
 
Principal component analyses (PCAs) were performed for the entire State of Queensland, as well as 
for each case study region, in order to identify principle components of the nine spatial characteristics 
of clearing events. These principle components represent key dimensions of clearing patterns. We 
apply this PCA only to the attribute space of the spatial data and do not adapt the analysis for effects 
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of heterogeneity or autocorrelation, as we are not producing spatial predictions (Demšar et al. 2013). 
Prior to analysis, Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Bartlett 1950) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test 
of sampling adequacy (Kaiser 1970) were applied to each case study to assess the usefulness of PCA 
for the datasets. Keeping with standard practice, we determined a PCA was acceptable for the dataset 
when KMO > 0.5 (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). Initial PCAs were performed using the R package 
‘FactoMineR’ (Husson et al. 2017). The number of principal components selected was based upon 
the commonly used Kaiser Criterion (Kaiser 1958) and verified by a scree test (Cattell 1966). In this 
analysis, we found that the scree test generally verified use of the Kaiser Criterion (Fig. C1), though 
we modestly extended the cut-off point (E > 0.98, Table C1). 
When variables produced significant contributions to more than one principal component, we 
applied varimax rotation (Kaiser 1958) to the selected principal components using the R package 
‘psych’ (Revelle 2017) to produce rotated components (RCs) with simple structure. Here, we use the 
term ‘rotated components’ in lieu of the more traditional term ‘factors’ in order to eliminate confusion 
between principal components and factors. In cases when variables exhibited cross-loading on two 
or more RCs, the variables were removed from the dataset, and the analysis was performed again 
until rotation produced the desired simple structure (Table C2). The final selection of RCs was made 
based upon interpretability and variable representation. While an RC with at least three high-loading 
variables is generally satisfactory (Costello & Osborne 2005), we selected RCs with two high-loading 
variables when the variables represented a similar conceptual construct, thus enhancing the 
interpretability of the components. 
The variables chosen for interpretation of each selected RC were based upon the strength of 
their loading according to the scale provided by Liu et al. (2003): strong (>0.75), moderate (0.50–
0.75), weak (0.30–0.49). We thus interpreted each RC according to all variables with moderate or 
strong loadings. Each RC was interpreted based upon the direction and strength of the characteristic 
variables’ loadings and defined according to the relationship of the variables within the component. 
We classify the final RCs as the components driving land clearing characteristics within the respective 
region, and compare annual scores across the RCs to identify temporal changes and patterns in the 
strength of each component on land clearing. For more detail on the PCA methodology, see Appendix 
A. 
 
2.4.3.2.2 Component score clustering 
 
To visually estimate how the influence of these components differ between key policy periods, we 
produced a hierarchical cluster scheme based on the values of each observation from their respective 
RC for each study region. Ward’s clustering method was used to maximise intra-group similarity and 
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analyse observations according to variance rather than distance (Ward 1963). Clustering was 
performed for all study areas by mean component score per policy period. To identify the final 
number of distinct clusters for each study area, we defined a dendrogram cut off height of 0.40, which 
was determined post hoc in an effort to select a moderate yet conservative height that was relevant to 
all study regions. 
 
2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 Comparative clearing characteristics across Queensland 
 
Land clearing has declined across the study period by approximately 61% throughout Queensland 
(QLD), from an average of 7425 km2 per year during 1988–1991 to 2922 km2 in 2015, though with 
considerable fluctuation (Fig. 2.3a). Similarly, the proportion of land clearing constituting remnant 
vegetation has decreased substantially since 1997 throughout the state, from 69% to 40%. Clearing 
trends at the state level are most similar to those of the Brigalow Belt South (BBS), which has also 
seen a 62% reduction in clearing and a larger reduction in remnant clearing (Fig. 2.3b). Trends in the 
Great Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC) are also similar to QLD and BBS, though this region has 
experienced a greater decline in clearing (76%) (Fig. 2.3c). South Eastern Queensland (SEQ) and 
Cape York Peninsula (CYP) are most dissimilar from other regions, with SEQ maintaining similar 
cyclical clearing rates over time and the CYP experiencing a 304% increase in remnant vegetation 
clearings (Fig. 2.3d,e). The uncharacteristic peak of clearing observed at the state level in 2000 is 
only reflected in the GBRC. For most regions, the interim and restriction periods saw a gradual 
decrease in clearing extent, though all regions experienced increasing clearing rates during the 
subsequent relaxation period. 
Clearing purposes within the BBS, GBRC, and SEQ have primarily been for pastures (Fig. 
B1). For all regions, the proportions of clearing for cropping was substantial during the unregulated 
and reform periods, but has since become marginal. Trends in the BBS have remained relatively 
consistent, though infrastructure and thinning purposes have increased slightly since restriction. The 
GBRC has also shown consistency over time, but clearing purposes are more diverse than the BBS, 
including a noticeable increase in mining clearance during 2005–2013. Given the population density 
of SEQ, this region has the highest clearance rates for settlements and consistent clearing rates for 
infrastructure. Initially moderate, pasture clearings in SEQ increased in dominance to peak rates 
during the interim period, beyond which the proportion of clearing for settlements and timber 
plantations began to increase, and the frequency of pasture clearing diminished. Clearing purposes in  
 
Chapter 2 24 
 
Fig. 2.3. Annual clearing extent across policy periods, broken down by remnant and non-remnant 
vegetation clearing (where data are available) for (a) the State of Queensland (QLD), (b) Brigalow 
Belt South (BBS) bioregion, (c) Great Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC), (d) South Eastern Queensland 
(SEQ) bioregion, and (e) Cape York Peninsula (CYP) bioregion. Data exclude natural tree loss and 
clearing within protected areas and other resource management areas. (*) Clearing extent represents 
an average annual estimate. 
 
CYP have seen mining replace infrastructure development over time, particularly following the 
interim period. Like SEQ, pasture clearings gained an atypical dominance during regulation. 
Historical clearing in the BBS consists of patchy hot- and cold-spots in the landscape, where 
some properties are responsible for a largely disproportionate share of the region’s clearing extent 
during this time (Fig. B2). This is in contrast to the GBRC, which exhibits a more homogeneous 
extent of moderate- to high-frequency clearings across the landscape, where more landholders have 
contributed more equally to the overall clearing extent. Few properties in SEQ have frequently cleared 
in the last 26 years, suggesting that many clearings are one-off events, as would be expected given 
the frequency of clearing for settlements and infrastructure in this region. Despite the small amount 
of clearing occurring in the CYP, a number of properties are clearing frequently. Though the greatest 
frequency of clearing is found on mining sites, most properties undergoing continual small-scale 
clearing regimes are in relatively natural landscapes, indicative of new pasture clearings or necessary 
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infrastructure. It should be noted that landholders will often need to re-clear previous areas due to the 
resilience of many tree species. While some regrowth is old enough to produce a height and biomass 
signature detectable by satellite imagery and classifiable by SLATS, we suspect the majority of 
regrowth is cleared before reaching such a state. Thus, it is expected that re-clearing of previous areas 
is continual, and largely unidentifiable, but some landholders clear new areas on their property more 
frequently than others. 
 
2.5.2 Principal component analyses and clustering 
 
2.5.2.1 State of Queensland 
 
The first rotated component (RC) produced a strong loading for remoteness (0.78) and moderately 
strong loadings for parcel size (0.73) and tenure (−0.71), indicating that high values on this RC reflect 
clearing events on more remote areas, larger parcels of land, and greater frequency on leasehold 
properties (Tables C1, C2). Thus we interpreted this first RC, which captures 24% of the variance, as 
a measure of property characteristics, deemed the Property Component. The second RC captures 20% 
of the variance and produced strong loadings for rainfall variability (−0.89) and drought declarations 
(0.76), reflecting clearing events in regions with more consistent rainfall patterns that are historically 
more prone to droughts, which we interpreted further as a Climate Component. The third RC (16% 
of variance) exhibited a strong loading for elevation (0.82) and a moderately strong loading for slope 
(0.73), reflecting geographic characteristics of clearing events (higher elevations and steeper slopes), 
interpreted as a Terrain Component. The fourth RC only exhibited strong loadings on RE threat status 
(0.91) and was thus removed from further analysis (Table 2.2). Cumulatively, the Property, Climate, 
and Terrain Components captured 60% of the variance in the data. 
When plotting the component scores by policy period, large overlaps between policy periods 
occurred across all RCs, with the most distinguishable deviations occurring during regulation/interim 
and restriction periods (Fig. 2.4). The restriction period was most distinguishable, scoring lowest on 
the Property and Climate Components and highest on the Terrain Component, indicating a greater 
proclivity toward clearing on atypical properties (those less frequently cleared in the past) that are 
under biophysical conditions more classically suitable for agriculture. This is most closely related to 
patterns during reform, but opposes the trends during regulation/interim periods, which saw a return 
to clearings on previously common properties but in slightly less optimal locations for agriculture. 
Unregulated and relaxation periods remained similar and scored more modestly along all RCs. At 
the state level, clearing patterns were thus largely consistent over time, though some dissimilarities  
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Table 2.2. Composition of each rotated component, ordered according to the variance captured (v), 
and subsequent interpretation of the components’ measurement. Composition is represented as 
variable (correlation with component, r). Variables are included when r > |0.34|. 
Region Component v Composition Interpretation 
QLD 1 24% Remoteness (0.78) Property Component 
Parcel size (0.73) 
Tenure (−0.71) 
2 20% Rainfall variability (−0.89) Climate Component 
Drought declarations (0.76) 
3 16% Elevation (0.82) Terrain Component 
Slope (0.73) 
BBS 1 37% Remoteness (0.88) Property Conditions Component 
Elevation (0.79) 
Drought declarations (−0.71) 
Parcel size (0.71) 
Tenure (−0.69) 
2 17% Slope (0.71) Pasture Expansion Component 
RE threat status (0.70) 
Clearing type (0.51) 
GBRC 1 29% Remoteness (0.85) Property Component 
Tenure (−0.78) 
Parcel size (0.78) 
2 18% Rainfall variability (0.81) Climate Guidance Component 
Clearing type (−0.77) 
SEQ 1 34% Drought declarations (0.90) Ecosystem Component 
Rainfall variability (−0.83) 
Elevation (0.79) 
RE threat status (−0.40) 
2 16% Tenure (0.83) Pasture Growth Component 
Clearing type (0.60) 
CYP 1 28% Remoteness (0.78) Pastoral Suitability Component 
Elevation (0.68) 
Parcel size (0.68) 
Clearing type (0.61) 
2 26% RE threat status (−0.74) Minority Features Component 
Slope (0.67) 
Tenure (0.67) 
 
 
can be identified. The cluster analysis confirmed this pattern, distinguishing only two clusters based 
on the mean component scores of the policy periods: (1) reform, restriction, and relaxation, (2) 
unregulated, regulation, and interim (Fig. C2). Periods composing the second cluster represent some 
of the highest clearing rates in the state, indicating that landholders have responded similarly 
according to how much they clear and where they clear. 
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Fig. 2.4. Mean component scores and standard deviation ellipses by policy period across the final 
three rotated components for the State of Queensland. 
 
2.5.2.2 Brigalow Belt South 
 
The first RC in the BBS represented the same relationships as the Property Component for QLD, with 
the additional influence of drought-prone locations and elevation. Thus we interpreted this component 
as a Property Conditions Component. High values along the second RC represented clearing events 
on steeper slopes, targeting of ‘least concern’ (unthreatened) vegetation, and conducted primarily for 
pastures. We interpreted this component as a measurement of landholders’ motivation and ability to 
clear, whereby landholders would be expanding their pastures to less-attractive locations (steeper 
slopes) without removing vegetation under VMA protection. We defined this RC as a Pasture 
Expansion Component (Table 2.2). 
The unregulated period was the most distinct in the BBS across the two RCs, scoring lowest 
on Pasture Expansion and highest on Property Conditions (Fig. 2.5a). As expected, clearing during 
this period was marked by unrestrained preferences, likely guided by choosing the most suitable 
locations regardless of the type of vegetation present. The period of reform signalled a noticeable 
decline along the Property Conditions Component, indicating an increase in the proportion of clearing 
in historically infrequent locations. Although regulation saw the first increase in Pasture Expansion, 
it continued to share common characteristics with the reform period. The remaining policy periods 
generally consisted of negative Property Conditions scores and high Pasture Expansion scores, and 
exhibited considerable year-to-year overlap (Fig. C3a). The cluster analysis confirmed this relative 
ambiguity between years, resulting in two clusters where only the initial unregulated period was 
distinguished: (1) unregulated, (2) interim, reform, regulation, restriction, and relaxation (Fig. C4a). 
Despite the high variation in clearing extent in the BBS (Fig. 2.3b), it appears that clearing 
characteristics since policy reform have remained relatively similar. 
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Fig. 2.5. Mean component scores and standard deviation ellipses by policy period across the final 
rotated components for (a) Brigalow Belt South (BBS), (b) Great Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC), 
(c) South Eastern Queensland (SEQ), and (d) Cape York Peninsula (CYP). 
 
2.5.2.3 Great Barrier Reef catchment 
 
Like QLD, the primary RC identified in the GBRC was the Property Component. The second RC 
was associated with clearing events for pastures in areas with more consistent rainfall patterns—a 
possible risk-management strategy; we interpreted this as a Climate Guidance Component (Table 
2.2). The unregulated, regulation, and restriction periods are the most distinct across these two 
components (Fig. 2.5b), representing a gradual shift from pasture clearings on typical rural properties 
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in more climatically stable locations, toward more non-pastoral clearings (such as mining and 
settlements) in areas with greater rainfall variability. While the majority of the regulation years scored 
highest along the Property Component (and neutral along the Climate Guidance Component), the 
years immediately following reform and preceding interim were less distinct (Fig. C3b). These 
distinctions resulted in three clusters: (1) unregulated and regulation, (2) restriction, (3) reform, 
interim, and relaxation (Fig. C4b). 
 
2.5.2.4 South Eastern Queensland 
 
The dominant RC for SEQ was interpreted as an Ecosystem Component, a representation of both 
climatic and topographic qualities influencing ecosystem characteristics (Table 2.2). Less influential 
was a Pasture Growth Component, a measurement of new pasture clearings on freehold properties, 
related to (though distinct from) the Pasture Expansion Component in the BBS. Prior to the broad-
scale clearing ban in 2007, clearing patterns gradually increased along the two RCs, signalling an 
atypical increase in the proportion of pasture developments on freehold tenures in higher and drier 
environments (Fig. 2.5c). Restriction brought about a return to declining Pasture Growth, as 
settlements and infrastructure development began to replace the previous pastoral clearings. This 
eventually led to the most distinct period, relaxation, which saw a stark decline in the frequency of 
pasture clearings on freehold lands in historically common ecosystems in exchange for increased 
timber plantations and thinning (Fig. C3c). These patterns produced three clusters: (1) relaxation, (2) 
unregulated and reform, (3) regulation, interim, and restriction (Fig. C4c). 
 
2.5.2.5 Cape York Peninsula 
 
Clearing patterns within CYP were distinguished by two final RCs (Table 2.2). The Pastoral 
Suitability Component included the properties most beneficial to pasture conversion (high 
remoteness, larger parcels of land, relatively higher elevations, and more pasture clearings). The 
second RC, the Minority Features Component, represented more clearing of threatened vegetation on 
steeper slopes, within primarily freehold properties. Because threatened REs, steep slopes, and 
freehold properties are less common in the CYP landscape, this RC captures landholders’ proclivity 
for clearing locations within the minority of the region’s spatial features. The reform, regulation, and 
interim periods are most distinct. Minority Features peaked during reform, when clearing for 
cropping was prevalent, and eventually declined to previous levels following regulation, when the 
dominant clearing purposes shifted from pastures to mining and infrastructure. Pastoral Suitability, 
however, continued to increase until restriction (Fig. 2.5d). Characteristics remained similar during 
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the unregulated period and the most recent periods, restriction and relaxation, indicating a largely 
cyclical trend in clearing characteristics over time, despite shifting clearing purposes (Fig. C3d). Four 
distinct clusters were identified: (1) regulation, (2) reform, (3) interim, (4) unregulated, restriction, 
and relaxation (Fig. C4d). 
 
2.5.3 Synthesis of regional findings 
 
Clearing during the unregulated years was characterised by ‘frontier’ clearing—carried out in large, 
remote areas with low drought risk, where rural landholders had the freedom to clear large areas of 
relatively abundant remnant vegetation. At most spatial scales, the reform period coincided with the 
beginning of a shift in the proportion of clearing occurring in locations less suitable for agriculture as 
more landholders cleared available vegetation on freehold properties now that leasehold lands were 
under new restrictions (Fig. 2.5). After assent of the VMA (regulation), all regions experienced 
atypical shifts in clearing characteristics, with most turning to larger, remote areas for their pasture 
expansions, largely irrespective of regional climatic constraints (though at the state level these areas 
were often in drier regions). These trends remained relatively similar in most regions during the 
interim period, though the allowance of some broad-scale clearing permits by the government likely 
facilitated regions like the BBS and GBRC to expand their pastures to property-level characteristics 
reflective of those during reform. 
The restriction period exhibited some of the most distinct changes in clearing patterns, with 
aggregate clearing events shifting toward smaller, more accessible freehold properties where climatic 
and terrain conditions were less extreme (Fig. 2.4). This state-wide trend is mirrored in the GBRC, 
though clearing patterns in smaller regions like SEQ and CYP exhibited their own unique deviations 
from previous norms. For example, restriction was characterised by a decline in pasture clearings on 
freehold lands in SEQ, which was uncharacteristic of the previous decade, and clearing regimes in 
CYP dramatically receded from marginal lands, beyond what had characterised the region’s clearing 
history since 1991. While the BBS continued to exhibit high inter-year variability, clearing 
characteristics of landholders in this region have remained generally consistent since regulation. With 
the notable exception of CYP, the reduction of pasture developments during this period is a likely 
result of the increasing policy restrictions, and more intensive land uses in private, semi-urban areas 
began to rise. Aside from SEQ, the final relaxation period was characterised by a return to more 
moderate characteristics (near-zero component scores), reflective of previous policy periods, in all 
regions. The aforementioned trends are most applicable to the large clearing hotspot regions of the 
BBS and GBRC, which are most representative of state-level patterns. 
 
Chapter 2 31 
2.6 Discussion 
 
2.6.1 Highlighting the heterogeneity of clearing patterns 
 
This study investigated the characteristics of spatial and temporal patterns of land clearing at state 
and regional levels amidst considerable policy development and uncertainty. The results highlight the 
importance of identifying regional-scale patterns across multiple facets of land clearing, as we 
observed some similarities, but also many regional differences in landholder clearing patterns relative 
to regulation, in terms of the extent, frequency, timing, and characteristics of clearing events. Overall, 
aggregate landholders’ clearing characteristics remain generally consistent over time—areas that are 
most suitable for pasture development and expansion are primarily cleared. Clearing in each region, 
however, is likely driven by different factors based upon their unique characteristics. The results of 
this analysis illustrate how landholders in different regions were differentially altering their clearing 
behaviours amidst policy change and what different factors characterised their clearing regimes. This 
improved understanding of state- and regional-level responses surrounding clearing regulation is 
likely to benefit future policy development, as goals and targets can be adapted to reflect the relevant 
clearing dynamics across the state. Conclusions drawn from these results thus present a cautionary 
tale for researchers and policy-makers around the world: using coarse measures to understand 
deforestation patterns and landholder responses to conservation policy may not result in the intended 
outcomes if they overlook more locally-relevant drivers of clearing. 
In the BBS and GBRC, clearing behaviours prior to regulation largely represented ‘frontier’ 
clearing, reflecting historical broad-scale clearing patterns driven primarily by targeting remote lands 
with greater agricultural suitability and potential profitability (Kirkpatrick 1999; Lindenmayer 2005). 
This apparent economic rationality diminished as new regulations developed, affecting these two 
clearing hotspots in different ways. The importance of potential profitability appears strongest for 
BBS landholders, yet the region’s extensive clearing history has reduced the number of profitable 
clearing options available. BBS landholders likely showed minimal variation in their clearing spatial 
characteristics in the years following policy reform due to their continued reliance on selecting the 
most profitable, available areas to compensate for growing policy restrictions and declining terms of 
trade (Seabrook et al. 2006). These landholders may thus be selectively clearing with a focus on the 
quality rather than the quantity of cleared land. Non-pastoral land uses in the GBRC, however, are 
less dispersed throughout the region and more vegetation is available for clearing (Fig. 2.1), allowing 
for pasture clearings to be less concentrated into hotspots (Fig. B2). Landholders in the GBRC thus 
are limited more by regulatory opportunity than spatial constraints; this is reflected in their tendency 
for frontier clearing prior to the broad-scale clearing ban and the subsequent shift during policy 
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restriction, where clearing for exempt or permissible purposes became more prominent, such as 
mining, settlements, and infrastructure. These motivations reflect documented testimonials in 
Productivity Commission (2004), which highlighted BBS farmers’ proclivity for targeting as much 
productive vegetation as possible, as well as GBRC sugarcane farmers’ unwillingness to conserve 
unproductive lands due to clearing bans on productive, vegetated lands. 
Because the CYP and SEQ, in contrast, are less representative of state clearing patterns in 
terms of extent and characteristics, we do not discuss their patterns at length. SEQ represents a region 
of dense urban sprawl surrounded by pastoral land, and thus landholders have responded by taking 
advantage of new pasture additions on their property until the broad-scale clearing ban, when pasture 
clearings dropped substantially and intensive uses like settlements and infrastructure became the more 
dominant purposes for clearing. Similarly, the CYP may have tried to capitalise on developing new 
pastures during the early years of regulation, which meant identifying rarer locations in the region 
that could prove suitable for these new developments. Following the clearing ban, clearing for more 
intensive purposes increased, such as mining and infrastructure—purposes less constrained by the 
influences of agricultural suitability. These regions’ tendencies to capitalise on pasture developments 
during early regulation may represent a perverse response to the VMA. Thus, even in regions where 
pastoral clearings are less common, the uncertainty of future property management restrictions may 
have provoked pre-emptive and atypical clearings typically seen in areas with greater reliance on 
pastoral and agricultural land uses, like the BBS and GBRC (Mendelsohn 1994; Zhang 2001). 
 
2.6.2 Landholder responses to policy: effectiveness, panic, and uncertainty 
 
The introduction and modification of vegetation management policy has had a significant influence 
on landholders’ clearing behaviours in the last 25 years, though the impact may vary substantially 
between regions. This impact can be characterised in two ways: the extent of clearing and the spatial 
characteristics of clearing. The strengthening of the VMA and the introduction of the broad-scale 
clearing ban coincided with a large reduction in remnant clearing extent across most regions, a 
reduction in pasture developments, and less frontier clearing. When coupled with the subsequent rise 
in total clearing extent following policy relaxation, some have argued that this presents (associative) 
evidence for the effectiveness of the restrictions set forth by the VMA (e.g. Maron et al. 2015; Evans 
2016). In relation to the clearing characteristics, however, this effectiveness may be limited. 
Landholders in regions like the GBRC and SEQ have changed their clearing behaviours in ways more 
reflective of the goals of the VMA (i.e. less pastoral clearing in historical locations), which is more 
reflective of successful forest conservation policies (Fox et al. 2009). Yet in the BBS, clearing 
patterns have generally been consistent following initial policy reform, and in the CYP, the immunity 
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of mining activities from VMA regulations has likely minimised the effectiveness of the policy. The 
VMA may thus have created general change in the extent of clearing events, yet its ability to change 
what landholders are clearing varies throughout Queensland. Indeed, this has recently been identified 
by Rhodes et al. (2017), who found the VMA to be ineffective at reducing clearing rates of the most 
threatened types of vegetation relative to non-threatened vegetation, despite an overall reduction in 
clearing events. 
Our results shed additional light on the perverse nature of panic clearing following the 
introduction of the VMA. While anecdotal evidence reveals unplanned clearing occurred 
(Productivity Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), our analysis suggests this is more reflected in 
the amount of clearing rather than the characteristics of clearing: clearing characteristics during the 
peak period of panic clearing (1999–2000) did not differ substantially from the previous years in all 
regions except SEQ (Fig. C3c). While these clearing events may not have been planned in the short-
term (Productivity Commission 2004), the lack of significant departures from previous clearing 
norms suggests landholders may have reasonably anticipated clearing these areas further in the future. 
Panic clearing may be best represented as a four-year period, in which landholders responded to 
anticipated regulations by immediately increasing previous clearing practices on their land, followed 
by a progression of selective pasture expansion into more available, potentially viable locations. 
Given the characteristics of panic clearing, we hypothesise that the initial panic clearing response 
may represent expedited plans by landholders, while the progression may represent unplanned 
clearings guided by landholders’ existing knowledge of potentially profitable locations for expansion. 
This behaviour is reflective of other pre-emptive behaviours immediately following the introduction 
of policies restricting property management rights (e.g. Alston et al. 2000; Aldrich et al. 2012). 
Despite considerable policy uncertainty still present throughout the timeline, similar incidences of 
panic clearing in Queensland have likely been avoided due to the implementation of more 
retrospective policies and amendments, though some amendments have continued to be rapidly 
ascended (Kehoe 2009). 
While the ongoing changes to vegetation management policy may have effectively produced 
a continuous blanket of uncertainty for landholders, we would expect peak uncertainty to occur 
immediately prior to (and potentially following) the introduction of new policies or political shifts—
or most notably at the transitions between policy periods. Particularly considering the haste with 
which the VMA 1999 and additional amendments were enacted (Kehoe 2009), effects of this 
uncertainty could result in dramatic short-term shifts in clearing characteristics during these two-year 
windows. The potential effects of peak policy uncertainty are most observable in the BBS, where (in 
addition to panic clearing) the frequency of clearing by leasehold landholders immediately dropped 
following the Land Act 1994, and clearings for pasture expansion dramatically increased in the lead-
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up to the new conservative government in 2012. This region is likely most sensitive to uncertainty 
given the importance of potential profitability and spatial limitations for expansion. Because policy 
uncertainty often results in increased deforestation (Zhang 2001), the effects of uncertainty in a 
hotspot such as the BBS have the potential to significantly diminish the effects of the VMA. SEQ and 
CYP also have frequent short-term deviations, but these may be due to the influence of outliers in 
these regions where significantly less clearing activity has occurred. The GBRC, in contrast, has 
experienced minimal changes surrounding peak periods of policy uncertainty, potentially due to the 
region’s suspected reliance on regulatory opportunity rather than availability. 
 
2.6.3 Implications for policy and future directions 
 
During the recent push by the centrist political party to reinstate previous land clearing restrictions, 
AgForce—Queensland’s primary lobby group representing beef, sheep, wool, and grain producers—
argued that the inconsistency of the VMA “severely impacts on the ability of landholders to plan and 
implement effective long-term property and business management decisions” (AgForce 2016, p. 2). 
When coupled with arguments of a lack of transparency in the VMA’s goals, inflexibility of 
assessment codes, and inconsistencies in landholders’ interpretations of the Acts (Productivity 
Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), it stands to reason that the degree of political and legislative 
uncertainty over the last 20 years may have dramatically affected landholder’s clearing regimes. This 
is most suggestive in the historical clearing hotspot of the BBS, where pastures have continued to 
expand despite suboptimal biophysical conditions—a trend that emerged after the first clearing 
regulations were introduced. 
To date, scientists and conservation groups have primarily relied upon the mere extent of land 
clearing to quantify the impact of the VMA. This measure, however, does not account for the large 
degree of complexity of ecological systems nor the behavioural responses of landholders (Dovers 
2005; Knill et al. 2011). In some cases, the change in clearing extent coincides with expected changes 
in clearing characteristics, such as in the GBRC during the restriction period. Other regions, such as 
the BBS, do not exhibit such similarities between extent and characteristics. Most notably, the large 
similarities in land clearing characteristics during regulation and pre-regulation are disconcerting, as 
landholders have continued to clear in areas where vegetation has been extensively cleared already, 
thus jeopardising biodiversity and increasing the potential for land degradation in these areas—two 
other purposes for which the Act was meant to address. In regions with such consistent clearing 
characteristics, initial attempts at regulating clearing were likely negated by both the large volume of 
panic clearing and the characteristics of the areas targeted. Indeed, numerous accounts from 
landholders and industry representatives have argued that the early impacts of the VMA were 
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negligible at the regional level due to panic clearing and market or industry conditions, such as the 
lack of expansion of the sugar industry (Productivity Commission 2004). Possibly more comforting 
is the degree of similarity between clearing during restriction and relaxation periods. That is, despite 
concerns over increasing rates of clearing since policy relaxation (Maron et al. 2015), landholders 
largely have not returned to targeting previous locations observed during pre-regulation, and the 
proportion of remnant clearing remains relatively small compared to previous years of similar 
clearing rates. Successful future policy amendments would thus benefit from explicit considerations 
and monitoring of these heterogeneous, spatiotemporal variations in landholder clearing behaviours, 
allowing for more accurate indicators of the successes and potential perversities of vegetation 
management policy. 
This study provides the first step in illuminating the complexities of land clearance, allowing 
us to identify regional patterns of clearing and develop hypotheses that can be tested at a finer scale 
and with more robust causal inference methods. While we focus on Queensland, the findings are 
relevant to other regions implementing legislation to regulate deforestation. This study outlines the 
patterns in the extent of land clearing across Queensland (the ‘what’) and provides the most in-depth 
spatiotemporal analysis of the characteristics of land clearing patterns to date (the ‘how’). However, 
the reasoning behind land clearing behavioural patterns (the ‘why’) is yet to be fully understood. 
Recognisably, a number of potential influential factors are not included in this analysis that may 
explain why landholders are expanding pastoral lands, why they may preferentially target marginal 
lands to clear, or why they continue to clear amidst unfavourable biophysical conditions. Using the 
spatially-constant biophysical and property variables as aggregate measures of agricultural suitability 
accounted for 47–60% of the variance in the data, depending upon the region. Additional factors must 
then contribute to a considerable amount of the variation observed in clearing locations, and these 
may include a number of demographic, economic, cultural, and personality characteristics that have 
noticeably influenced landholders’ environmental behaviours in Queensland (e.g. Seabrook et al. 
2006, 2008; Moon & Cocklin 2011; Emtage & Herbohn 2012). 
Some studies have investigated the various spatiotemporal drivers of deforestation in 
Queensland (e.g. Seabrook et al. 2007; Evans 2016; Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018), yet as is evident 
from this study, generalising drivers often misses important regional drivers of deforestation. Using 
coarse, state-level resolutions for pattern analysis may identify overarching trends, but important 
localised effects may go unnoticed (Dong et al. 2015). Future studies looking at regional- and even 
subregional-scale drivers of clearance would greatly benefit vegetation management policy, with the 
potential to guide local initiatives, programs, or interventions that may be more successful and 
sustainable. These finer scales have been the backbone of natural resource management programs in 
Australia (Hajkowicz 2009), where polycentric or multi-level approaches encourage positive 
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environmental outcomes at multiple scales (Ostrom 2010). An important piece to the land clearing 
puzzle also lies in the effectiveness of the VMA. Recent investigations have been made into the 
effectiveness of this policy by analysing the impact on threatened remnant vegetation (e.g. Rhodes et 
al. 2017), yet there is little account for the myriad of confounding factors that may be masking the 
direct causal link between regulation and observed clearing. Identifying causal linkages, however, 
requires a thorough understanding of regional patterns, their characteristics, and how much variation 
is captured by relevant confounding factors, and this study will provide the first step for such causal 
inference analyses. Future studies seeking more comprehensive evaluations of the causal impacts of 
historical vegetation management policy in Queensland will be crucial to developing new policies 
that can achieve greater long-term, bipartisan stability. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
Analysis of deforestation patterns based simply upon the extent of tree loss ignores the characteristics 
of deforestation and the factors that may be driving landholders’ responses to deforestation policies. 
In particularly large regions or countries, aggregate trends may not capture localised drivers of 
deforestation. When policies utilise these generalisations to implement regulations and restrictions, 
this could elicit uncertainties for landholders, who may not be able to reconcile these policies with 
their own motivations and rationales for clearing. More studies investigating the role of conservation 
policy, and particularly the consistency of such policies, are needed to enhance our understanding of 
the effectiveness of conservation policy instruments. Further, the effectiveness of these policy 
instruments needs to extend beyond the sheer numbers, where policy-makers can determine if the 
realised characteristics of clearing are aligning with the intended goals and objectives of the policy. 
If regional patterns and drivers of deforestation can be identified, more relevant and explicit 
interventions can be developed that may ultimately prove most effective and sustainable over time. 
 
2.8 List of Appendices for Chapter 2 
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Chapter 3 37 
Chapter 3 
 
Simmons BA, Marcos-Martinez R, Law EA, Bryan BA, Wilson KA. 2018. Frequent policy 
uncertainty can negate the benefits of forest conservation policy. Ecosystem Science and Policy 
89:401–411. 
 
Contributor Statement of contribution 
Author BA Simmons (Candidate) Paper concept (80%), model design and analysis (70%), 
wrote and edited the paper (60%) 
Author R Marcos-Martinez Paper concept (10%), model design and analysis (30%), 
wrote and edited the paper (15%) 
Author EA Law Paper concept (5%), wrote and edited the paper (10%) 
Author BA Bryan Wrote and edited the paper (5%) 
Author KA Wilson Paper concept (5%), wrote and edited the paper (10%) 
 
  
Chapter 3 38 
Chapter 3: Frequent policy uncertainty can negate the benefits of 
forest conservation policy 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
Policy-driven shifts from net deforestation to forest expansion are being stimulated by increasing 
social preferences for forest ecosystem services. However, policy uncertainty can disrupt or reverse 
the positive effects of forest transitions. For instance, if the loss of remnant (primary) forest continues, 
the ecological benefits of net forest gains may be small. We investigated how peak periods of 
uncertainty in forest conservation policy affected forest transition outcomes in Queensland, Australia, 
as well as a globally-relevant biodiversity hotspot in the state, the Brigalow Belt South (BBS) 
bioregion. Political, socioeconomic, and biophysical factors associated with net forest cover change 
and remnant forest loss from 1991 to 2014 were identified through spatial longitudinal analysis. This 
informed a Bayesian structural causal impact assessment of command-and-control regulation and 
policy uncertainty on remnant and non-remnant forest cover. The results indicate that forest cover 
was negatively influenced by increasing temperatures, food prices, and policy uncertainty, and 
positively influenced by strengthening regulation. Regulation during 2007–2014 avoided 
68,620 ± 19,214 km2 of deforestation (with 18,969 ± 10,340 km2 of this in remnant forests) 
throughout Queensland, but was ineffective on remnant forests in the BBS. For state-wide remnant 
forests, perverse effects from policy uncertainty (e.g. pre-emptive deforestation) were strong enough 
to negate regulatory impacts. This study reveals a cautionary tale for conservation policy: despite 
strict environmental regulations, forest transition can be delayed (or reversed) when political 
inconsistency or instability provoke unintended reactions from landholders. 
 
3.2 Highlights 
 
• Political factors are significant drivers of deforestation. 
• Regulation reduced deforestation inconsistently across forests types and regions. 
• Policy uncertainty increased deforestation, particularly in remnant forests. 
• Perverse outcomes delayed forest transition and may reverse further transition. 
• Focusing on forest gains will ignore biodiversity threats of remnant forest loss. 
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3.3 Introduction 
 
3.3.1 Deforestation and policy feedbacks 
 
Since 1990, over 185,000 km2 of forests have been converted to other land uses around the world 
(FAO 2016a), with others estimating a complete loss of 50% of global forest cover prior to the 21st 
century (FAO 2016b). Agricultural expansion is the most commonly cited proximate driver of 
deforestation (Barbier & Burgess 2001a; Hosonuma et al. 2012), and it is estimated to account for 
roughly 80% of global deforestation (Kissinger et al. 2012). However, despite a wealth of case 
studies, few generalizations can be made regarding the causes of deforestation (Allen & Barnes 1985; 
Deacon 1994; Busch & Ferretti-Gallon 2017). The drivers of deforestation often occur in complex 
feedbacks, operate at different scales, and are spatially and temporally dynamic; regulation of 
deforestation will likely not have homogenous effects on all stakeholders (Rudel et al. 2009; Seabrook 
et al. 2006). In many instances, the causes of forest loss in tropical deforestation hotspots can be 
linked to general characteristics of the countries’ development, including less secure property rights, 
political corruption, and desires for rapid economic growth (Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999; Barbier & 
Burgess 2001a,b; DeFries et al. 2010). Deforestation rates in developed countries receive much less 
attention and scholarly treatment. 
Evidence suggests that societal preference for forest conservation and expansion represented 
through policy could result in forest transition (Rudel et al. 2005). While significant environmental 
and socioeconomic benefits may be expected from sustained forest transitions, forest conservation 
policies place significant constraints on landholders by introducing restrictions on property rights, 
profitability, and tenure security in some cases (Alston et al. 2000; Aldrich et al. 2012). Such 
constraints could disrupt or reverse transition processes and outcomes, particularly when influential 
policies change frequently, as the threat of future restrictions may provoke unintended behavioural 
responses, such as pre-emptive deforestation (Brown et al. 2016). Further, if forest conservation 
policies fail, are poorly implemented, or provoke perverse responses, this can result in delays, 
inconsistencies, and reversals of forest transition (Barbier et al. 2010). Political timelines are 
significant drivers of policy change (Kingdon 2003; Pierson 2004), and fluctuations in the number 
and intensity of policies may provoke higher policy uncertainty for landholders, resulting in increased 
deforestation (Zhang 2001; Gasparri & Grau 2009; Knill et al. 2012). The frequent use of ‘command-
and-control’ regulations—i.e. direct regulations defining legal and illegal activities (McManus 
2009)—may also encourage negative feedbacks, as these tactics are often polarising, inflexible, and 
may reduce landholders’ inherent motivations to protect the environment (Smith & Vos 1997; 
Dresner et al. 2006; Jordan & Matt 2014). 
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3.3.2 Contentious forest policy in Australia 
 
Australia, and particularly the State of Queensland, represents an important and globally-relevant 
case study in the impacts of policy on forest transition and the differential effects on net forest cover 
and remnant forest loss. Global deforestation patterns are mirrored in Australia, where rapid 
industrialization and agricultural expansion resulted in the loss of nearly 15% of native forests, with 
7% of primary forests lost since 1972 (Bradshaw 2012; Evans 2016). Deforestation drivers in 
Australia may represent a suite of characteristics reflective of both developed and emerging 
economies, such as potential profitability of the land (Bartel 2004; Lindenmayer 2005), agricultural 
prices (Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Seabrook et al. 2006), remoteness (Geist & Lambin 2002; 
Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2), property characteristics (Turner et al. 1996; Seabrook et al. 2007), 
and command-and-control regulations (Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999; Assunção et al. 2012). Recent 
rates of deforestation marked Australia with one of the highest annual deforestation rates in the world 
during 1990–2000 (Lindenmayer 2005). While some reports have listed Australia amongst the top 
countries for reported forest area and annual net forest gain (e.g. FAO 2016a), remnant (i.e. primary) 
vegetation continues to be lost throughout the State of Queensland, Australia (Simmons et al. 2018b, 
Chapter 2), and the ecological value of remnant forests often cannot be easily substituted by recent 
reforestation efforts (Bowen et al. 2009). 
Deforestation in Queensland constitutes over 60% of all deforestation in the country in recent 
history (Evans 2016) and the state entered the forest transition phase as late as 2008, though recent 
spikes in deforestation since 2013 may signal a reversal of this transition (Marcos-Martinez et al. 
2018). These transitions have occurred in conjunction with the Queensland Government’s 
introduction of regulations on remnant deforestation on private lands via the controversial Vegetation 
Management Act 1999. Since its introduction, the policy has been fraught with debate over its design, 
implementation, and impacts on landholders (Productivity Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010). 
The policy has undergone considerable regulatory fluctuations over time. After placing a moratorium 
on clearing permits in 2003, Parliament entered a policy transition phase, allowing a cap of 5000 km2 
of ‘broad-scale’ clearing (large-scale clearing for crops and pastures). This was followed by a period 
of growing policy restrictions, including a complete ban on broad-scale clearing and protection of 
‘high-value’ regrowth (i.e. secondary) vegetation. Following a change in Parliament’s majority 
political party in 2012, amendments to the Act subsequently eliminated high-value regrowth 
protection, added new clearing exemptions, and allowed landholders to self-assess their clearing 
practices (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). Despite some evidence that the broad-scale clearing 
ban in 2007 resulted in reduced deforestation (Evans 2016) and greater net forest gains (Marcos-
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Martinez et al. 2018), this political inconsistency has produced some perverse outcomes, such as pre-
emptive or ‘panic’ clearing during policy introduction (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). 
This study investigates the influence of the broad-scale clearing ban and peak periods of 
policy uncertainty on deforestation rates alongside more traditional biophysical, socioeconomic, and 
property-based drivers frequently identified in the literature. We applied a spatial longitudinal 
analysis to distinguish significant drivers of net forest cover change from drivers of remnant forest 
loss. This allowed us to determine the role of various factors on two forest metrics with different 
ecological ramifications and at different scales. We then used Bayesian time series models to estimate 
the causal impact of the broad-scale clearing ban on deforestation trends under different conditions. 
To identify potential scale-specific effects, we apply these models to the entire State of Queensland 
and to the Brigalow Belt South bioregion, a historical biodiversity and deforestation hotspot within 
the state. We show that command-and-control regulation can spur forest transition, but its 
effectiveness can be limited or counteracted by frequent policy uncertainty. The results of this study 
highlight the importance of creating strong and stable deforestation regulations to avoid potential 
perverse responses from landholders during frequent political regime changes. 
 
3.4 Methods 
 
3.4.1 Study areas 
 
The State of Queensland spans 2.04 M km2 of diverse habitats, including tropical, temperate, and 
desert bioregions. Prior to significant deforestation, the state was dominated by eucalypt woodlands 
along the eastern coast, acacia-dominated open forests in the southern interior, and tussock grasslands 
in the west (Neldner et al. 2017). Today, however, much of the forests have been cleared, leaving 
highly fragmented acacia forests and eucalypt woodlands in the south-central bioregions (Fig. 3.1). 
The Brigalow Belt South (BBS) bioregion encompasses approximately 0.22 M km2 of south-central 
Queensland. The bioregion exhibits cyclic and highly variable rainfall typical of subtropical patterns, 
with an annual mean rainfall of 500–750 mm (Lloyd 1984; Crimp & Day 2003). The dominating 
vegetation types within the BBS include dry and alluvial eucalypt woodlands and acacia forests (e.g. 
brigalow, Acacia harpophylla) (Seabrook et al. 2006, 2008). These woodlands are frequently 
structured as ‘open’ woodlands or forests, containing a diverse composition of plant species and 
generally maintaining shrub- or low tree-layers (Lucas et al. 2014). This biodiversity hotspot provides 
habitat for 492 resident bird species, as well as numerous endemic and endangered reptiles, plants, 
and mammals (McAlpine et al. 2011; Ponce Reyes et al. 2016). 
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Fig. 3.1. Extent of forest cover in 2014 within the study area of Queensland and the Brigalow Belt 
South (BBS) bioregion. 
 
3.4.2 Forest cover data 
 
Our analysis relies on binary forest cover data (25 m resolution) generated through supervised 
classification of Landsat imagery for the Australian Government’s National Carbon Accounting 
System – Land Cover Change Program (NCAS-LCCP) (Caccetta et al. 2012). Forests in such 
datasets, and throughout this study, are areas of vegetation with potential to reach at least 20% or 
greater crown cover and 2 m of height (Macintosh 2007). Land cover estimates based on remote 
sensing data may, however, contain transition errors when temporal dependencies are uncontrolled 
for (Marcos Martinez & Baerenklau 2015). Thus, we used transition rules to control for illogical 
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forest cover changes in each year (t) relative to the conditions observed at t ± 1 and t ± 2. Because we 
do not have data for 2015, we do not include t + 2 for 2013, and we use the original NCAS data for 
2014. Additional details on the NCAS methodology can be found in Caccetta et al. (2012). 
To reduce the computational requirements to study net forest cover change over large areas, 
we define a forest cover index (FCI) as the proportion of 1 km2 cells with designated forest status for 
the entire State of Queensland. We limit the study area of Queensland to the regions where available 
forest cover data overlap for all of the following 17 years: 1991, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 
annually from 2004 to 2014 (see study area, Fig. 3.1). The excluded area mostly consists of semi-arid 
scattered vegetation. Further, deforestation events occurring on natural resource management areas 
(i.e. national and regional parks, state forests, reserves, forest reserves, and timber reserves) were 
excluded from the study area. The final dataset consisted of over 22 million FCI observations. 
To identify areas of remnant forest, we obtained the earliest map of all remnant vegetation in 
the state from 1997 (QSC 2016g) and overlapped the extent of remnant vegetation with the FCI of 
1998 to produce a remnant forest cover index (RCI) for 1998. Due to a lack of data, the RCI models 
did not include remnant data in 1991, 1992, or 1995. Because the NCAS data do not distinguish 
primary and secondary forests, areas of remnant forest loss can experience forest gains in subsequent 
years (i.e. secondary forest growth). To monitor remnant forest loss over time and exclude any 
secondary gains, RCI maps for subsequent years were generated by subtracting land clearing data 
from the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS) (QSC 2016h). SLATS quantifies the loss 
of all woody vegetation identifiable by Landsat imagery with a foliage projective cover above 8% for 
the following relevant fiscal-year periods: 1997–1999, 1999–2000…2013–2014). This dataset should 
thus be able to detect the loss of NCAS-defined forests. Because SLATS also identifies the purposes 
of clearing events, only human-caused clearing events were included (i.e. clearing for pasture, 
cropping, infrastructure, settlements, mining, thinning, timber plantations, and unknown clearing); 
natural tree loss purposes were thus excluded from the RCI change (i.e. natural tree death and natural 
disaster damage). For additional details on the SLATS methodology, see Scarth et al. (2008). 
 
3.4.3 Policy as a driver of forest cover dynamics 
 
We investigated the influence of 17 predictor variables on FCI and RCI for Queensland and the BBS, 
encompassing biophysical (9 variables), socioeconomic (4 variables), property (2 variables), and 
political (2 variables) parameters identified in the literature for their effect on deforestation (Table 
3.1). These variables were selected due to their historical significance in the literature for driving land 
cover change dynamics in the Brigalow Belt (Seabrook et al. 2006), Queensland (Evans 2016), 
agricultural zones of Australia (Marcos-Martinez et al. 2017), and global meta-analyses (Busch & 
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Ferretti-Gallon 2017). Dummy variables were incorporated to represent the political factors used in 
the statistical model: when broad-scale clearing was banned by the Vegetation Management Act 
(2007–2014), and periods of peak policy uncertainty. We represent policy uncertainty as a measure 
of the volatility of forest conservation policy (Aizenman & Marion 1993; Feng 2001), in which 
greater probability of policy change provokes greater uncertainty. For this study, we define periods 
of uncertainty to be one year before and one year after the enactment of pivotal vegetation 
management policies in Queensland. This window captures periods of campaigning and preliminary 
Parliamentary debate, which have been shown to represent peak uncertainty in other policy sectors 
(Baker et al. 2016), as well as the direct aftermath of policy change, where appeals were discussed 
and stakeholders had to rapidly adjust their land management regimes and gain sufficient knowledge 
of the new regulations (Productivity Commission 2004). 
 
Table 3.1. Variables included in the econometric model. Expanded descriptions in Table D1. 
Category Variable Type 
Forest cover Forest Cover Index (FCI) Spatial time series 
Remnant Forest Cover Index (RCI) Spatial time series 
Biophysical characteristics Elevation Spatial 
Slope Spatial 
Soil pH Spatial 
Soil clay content Spatial 
Soil bulk density Spatial 
Rainfall Spatial time series 
Rainfall variability Spatial 
Maximum temperature Spatial time series 
Drought frequency Spatial 
Socioeconomic 
characteristics 
Food price index Annual time series 
Potential agricultural profit Spatial 
Distance to protected areas Spatial time series 
Accessibility and Remoteness Index of 
Australia (ARIA) 
Spatial 
Property characteristics Parcel size Spatial 
Tenure 
 
     Freehold Spatial 
     Leasehold Spatial 
     Other Spatial 
Political characteristics Broad-scale clearing ban Annual time series 
Policy uncertainty Annual time series 
 
In order for a full year to be designated as a year of policy uncertainty, more than six months 
of that year must have been within the one-year window before or after enactment. The following 
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pivotal policy enactments, and their subsequent uncertainty windows, were distinguished for the 
policy uncertainty variable based upon the policy timeline of Simmons et al. (2018b, Chapter 2): 
Land Act 1994 (1994, 1995), Vegetation Management Act 1999 (1999, 2000), Vegetation 
(Applications for Clearing) Act 2003 (2002, 2003), Vegetation Management and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2004 (2003, 2004), Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
2009 (2009, 2010), and Vegetation Management Framework Amendment Act 2013 (2012, 2013). 
Recognisably, policy uncertainty likely undergoes considerable fluctuations over time and is not 
completely absent between peak uncertainty periods (Baker et al. 2016). Other events may also 
heighten political uncertainty, such as state elections or changes to federal environmental policy (e.g. 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999), but changes in political power 
often have marginal effects on policy uncertainty (Feng 2001), and state regulations have the most 
direct influence on Queensland landholders. 
 
3.4.4 Modelling forest cover dynamics 
 
To identify deforestation drivers, we applied a spatial panel error analysis akin to models previously 
used to identify national drivers of land use/land cover change in Australian agricultural zones 
(Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018). Under this approach, spatiotemporal forest cover changes are 
modelled as: 
ln(Y) = β′ ln(X) + u      (1) 
where ln represents the natural logarithm, Y is a vector of N FCI or RCI observations for all the T 
years during the study period, X is a matrix of spatiotemporal forest cover change drivers, β is a vector 
of marginal effects estimates, and u is a vector of disturbances. This error vector includes the effects 
of spatial error correlation, 
u = (IT ⊗ ρ W) u + ω      (2) 
unobserved heterogeneity, 
ω = (ιT ⊗ IN) µ + υ      (3) 
and random disturbances (υ) (Millo & Piras 2012). Here, IT and IN are identity matrices of dimension 
T and N, ιT is a vector of ones of size T, ⊗ indicates the Kronecker product, W is a spatial weights 
matrix of size N, ρ is the spatial error correlation parameter, and ω is a vector that captures unobserved 
heterogeneity (µ) and standard random normal disturbances (υ) (Kapoor et al. 2007; Millo & Piras 
2012). Four models were developed: (1) Net forest cover (FCI) in Queensland, (2) FCI in the BBS, 
(3) Remnant forest cover (RCI) in Queensland, and (4) RCI in the BBS. We performed 1000 iterations 
of each model for samples with 10,000 observations per year to estimate the mean, standard deviation, 
and 95% confidence intervals of β per model. 
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Most explanatory variables used to predict forest cover change exhibited negligible 
collinearity, though some significant correlations were observed for the temporally constant climatic 
variables (Fig. D1). For example, rainfall variability was positively correlated with annual rainfall, 
and drought frequency was negatively correlated with annual rainfall and maximum temperature. 
These relationships coincide with the longitudinal progression of Queensland’s climate, where cooler 
and wetter regions along the east coast progress to hotter and drier landscapes westward. However, 
multicollinearity was assessed using the R package ‘mctest’ (Imdad Ullah & Aslam 2018), and all 
variables exhibited a variable inflation factor (VIF) well within the accepted range for inclusion in 
regression analyses (Kutner et al. 2004; Sheather 2009) (Table D2). Thus all variables were included 
in the initial random effects models, and the most-correlated parameters were only used as control 
variables in the final fixed effects models, further eliminating any collinearity issues. The final 
regression results indicated stability of the coefficient estimates to different model specifications. 
Results from an iterative Hausman test (Hausman 1978) indicated that for most of the samples 
a fixed effects approach was recommended (Table D3, Fig. D2). Thus we focus the results and 
discussion of our analysis to the fixed effects model, while noting that results from random effects 
regressions were largely consistent, with the statistically significant variables having the same sign 
and roughly equivalent magnitudes (Tables E1, E2). To compute predictions for each model for all 
study periods, we followed the fixed effects spatial maximum likelihood estimation (FE-MLE) 
described by Baltagi et al. (2012). As a goodness-of-fit measure, we generated pseudo R-squared 
averages for each year, as well as global R-squared averages per model, by using the square of the 
correlation coefficient between predicted and observed FCI or RCI values described by Elhorst (2014) 
(see Appendix D for additional details on the methodology). Construction and analysis of the 
econometric models were performed in R version 3.4.1 (R Core Team 2017) using the packages ‘plm’ 
(Croissant & Millo 2008), ‘splm’ (Millo & Piras 2012), ‘RANN’ (Arya et al. 2017), and ‘matrixStats’ 
(Bengtsson 2018). 
 
3.4.5 Causal impact of regulation 
 
While spatial panel regressions are useful to investigate associations between forest cover change and 
relevant potential drivers, such methods are limited in inferring the causal impact of policy 
interventions (Brodersen et al. 2015; Law et al. 2017). We therefore applied Bayesian structural 
models on time-series data to determine the causal effect of the broad-scale clearing ban on forest 
cover change based upon an estimated counterfactual. The impact analysis was performed for all four 
models using the R package ‘CausalImpact’ (Brodersen et al. 2015), which generates a synthetic 
control based on the time series data to estimate the amount of avoided deforestation. Using 2007–
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2014 as the post-intervention period, the pre-intervention period was defined as 1992–2006 for net 
forest cover and 1998–2006 for remnant forest cover. Because of data-deficient years for both the 
NCAS and SLATS datasets, years for which no annual data of forest cover/loss are available were 
averaged into annual estimates. Variables from the fixed effects model (except the clearing ban) were 
used as covariates to control for confounding influences on the regulation’s impact; for annual spatial 
time-series variables, the state- or bioregion-wide average was used accordingly. 
Because the clearing ban was formally announced in 2004, it may also be reasonable to 
assume the early impacts of the ban began prior to its official commencement, as financial adjustment 
packages were implemented and transitional caps were set on broad-scale clearing permits (Kehoe 
2009); thus, we also determined the impact when the post-intervention period represented 2004–2014 
for comparison. The impact estimates of both post-intervention scenarios were compared to (1) 
estimates when the policy uncertainty variable was excluded, and (2) estimates excluding 2012–2014, 
when amendments to the Vegetation Management Act reduced previous restrictions of the broad-
scale clearing ban (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). If policy uncertainty significantly reduces 
forest cover, then its exclusion from the impact analysis should result in smaller impact estimates of 
the clearing ban. For additional details on the estimation of causal impacts using this approach, see 
Brodersen et al. (2015). 
 
3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 Deforestation trends 
 
During 1991–2014, Queensland experienced a net loss of 37,595 km2 (11.6%) of forests outside of 
protected areas, despite gaining 16,806 km2 (5.16%) of secondary forests since 2008 (Fig. 3.2a). 
Similarly, in the BBS, gains following the broad-scale clearing ban (3066 km2) were not enough to 
avoid a net reduction in 10.9% (5662 km2) of BBS forests since 1991. Unlike the rest of Queensland, 
the BBS experienced a net loss of forest in 2014, and the rate of remnant forest loss in the BBS 
(6.81%; 2914 km2) has been greater than at the state level (4.58%; 13,124 km2) (Fig. 3.2b). Remnant 
deforestation declined to its lowest levels across both scales during 2007–2014, when the broad-scale 
clearing ban was in force. Placed in the context of other SLATS woody vegetation clearing events, 
the clearing of remnant forests in Queensland and the BBS accounts for 23.6% and 18.2% of all 
anthropogenic clearing activities since 1998, respectively. Further, remnant forests account for 42.5% 
and 43.7% of all remnant vegetation clearing identified by SLATS during this period for Queensland 
and the BBS, respectively. In most instances, periods of peak policy uncertainty coincided with 
increased rates of deforestation, though some contradictory trends can be observed between scales 
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and forest types. Most notably, the long period of uncertainty during 2002–2004, when the 
moratorium was enacted, coincided with both a dramatic increase in remnant deforestation across 
Queensland and a large decrease in total deforestation in the BBS. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Annual rate of (a) net forest cover change and (b) remnant forest loss over time in 
Queensland and the Brigalow Belt South bioregion (outside of protected areas). Shaded areas 
highlight key policy uncertainty periods along the timeline incorporated into the analysis. Reliable 
data for remnant forest loss prior to 2000 are not available. 
 
3.5.2 Deforestation drivers 
 
The majority of deforestation during 1991–2014 occurred in the intensive agricultural regions 
throughout central Queensland, with most reforestation occurring in the southeast and in patches of 
central and northern Queensland (Fig. 3.3a). The spatial fixed effects model of FCI in Queensland 
explained a high degree of the variance in total forest cover during this time period (global 
R2 = 0.9015), with the greatest prediction errors occurring in these patches of reforestation in central 
Queensland (Fig. 3.3b). Similarly, the FCI model in the BBS had a high predictive power (global 
R2 = 0.8993), with greatest errors in predicting reforestation surrounding local protected areas. Most 
variables included in the fixed effects FCI models for Queensland and the BBS significantly 
influenced forest cover dynamics (Table 3.2). At both scales, maximum temperature, food prices, and 
policy uncertainty had an inverse relationship with forest cover, while distance to protected areas and 
the broad-scale clearing ban significantly increased forest cover. Rainfall had an insignificant effect 
on forest cover throughout Queensland, yet had a negative effect within the BBS. The sign and 
magnitude of the relationship of these variables were largely consistent with those generated in the 
random effects FCI models (Table E1), which also identified greater forest cover on steeper slopes, 
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in more remote areas, with greater rainfall variability, and on larger properties under leasehold tenure, 
consistent with results from previous studies (e.g. Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018; Simmons et al. 2018b, 
Chapter 2). The BBS dummy variable in the random effects model was positively associated with 
forest cover, indicating relatively greater forest gains compared to the rest of Queensland. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3. Net forest cover change in Queensland and the Brigalow Belt South bioregion. (a) Change 
in the forest cover index (FCI) over time. (b) Difference between predicted and observed FCI change, 
where 1 = complete overestimation of FCI in 2014, and −1 = complete underestimation.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Coefficients (b) of the variables included in the spatial fixed effects econometric model of net forest cover change. Coefficients represent 
the percent change in forest cover index (FCI) per 1% change in the explanatory variable. 
Variable 
Queensland  Brigalow Belt South 
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval  
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval 
Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound 
Biophysical characteristics            
     Rainfall (5-year moving mean) −0.0019 0.0708 −0.0063 0.0025   −0.8727 0.1095 −0.8795 −0.8659 * 
     Maximum temperature (5-year moving mean) −18.777 1.2128 −18.852 −18.702 *  −22.391 1.2367 −22.467 −22.314 * 
Socioeconomic characteristics            
     Food price index −0.7299 0.0760 −0.7347 −0.7252 *  −0.7080 0.0789 −0.7129 −0.7031 * 
     Distance to protected areas 0.0046 0.0037 −0.0044 0.0048 *  0.0153 0.0038 0.0150 0.0155 * 
Political characteristics            
     Broad-scale clearing ban 0.0953 0.0217 0.0939 0.0966 *  0.1125 0.0243 0.1110 0.1140 * 
     Policy uncertainty −0.1391 0.0093 −0.1396 −0.1385 *  −0.1662 0.0112 −0.1669 −0.1655 * 
Mean R2 0.9180      0.9355     
Global R2 0.9015      0.8993     
* Confidence interval excludes zero 
 
 
C
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Remnant deforestation was largely concentrated in south-central Queensland within the BBS 
and the Mulga Lands bioregion, which extends beyond the BBS’s western border (Fig. 3.4a). The 
fixed effects RCI model had an exceptionally high explanatory power for Queensland (global 
R2 = 0.9936) and the BBS (global R2 = 0.9925) with minimal prediction error (Fig. 3.4b). Like the 
FCI model, all variables significantly affected RCI, with maximum temperature, food prices, and 
policy uncertainty reducing remnant forest cover, and the broad-scale clearing ban reducing 
deforestation at both scales (Table 3.3). For the entire State of Queensland, the relationships of rainfall 
and distance to protected areas opposed those in the Queensland FCI model, resulting in a decrease 
in remnant forest cover. Again, the fixed effects results were largely reflected in the random effects 
RCI models (Table E2). Like the FCI model, the BBS dummy variable showed a positive relationship 
with remnant forest cover. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4. Remnant forest loss in Queensland and the Brigalow Belt South bioregion. (a) Change in 
the remnant forest cover index (RCI) over time. (b) Difference between predicted and observed RCI 
change, where 1 = complete overestimation of RCI in 2014, and −1 = complete underestimation.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Coefficients (b) of the variables included in the spatial fixed effects econometric model of remnant forest loss. Coefficients represent the 
percent change in remnant forest cover index (RCI) per 1% change in the explanatory variable. 
Variable 
Queensland  Brigalow Belt South 
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval  
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval 
Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound 
Biophysical characteristics            
     Rainfall (5-year moving mean) −0.00072 0.00065 −0.00076 −0.00068 *  −0.00049 0.00166 −0.00060 −0.00039 * 
     Maximum temperature (5-year moving mean) −0.13509 0.01403 −0.13596 −0.13422 *  −0.09428 0.01685 −0.09532 −0.09323 * 
Socioeconomic characteristics            
     Food price index −0.01996 0.00149 −0.02006 −0.01987 *  −0.02128 0.00146 −0.02137 −0.02119 * 
     Distance to protected areas −0.00011 0.00005 −0.00011 −0.00011 *  0.00004 0.00010 0.00004 0.00005 * 
Political characteristics            
     Broad-scale clearing ban 0.00244 0.00033 0.00242 0.00246 *  0.00215 0.00037 0.00213 0.00217 * 
     Policy uncertainty −0.00190 0.00016 −0.00191 −0.00189 *  −0.00201 0.00018 −0.00202 −0.00200 * 
Mean R2 0.99377      0.99285     
Global R2 0.99360      0.99252     
* Confidence interval excludes zero 
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3.5.3 Regulatory impacts 
 
Despite the broad-scale clearing ban primarily targeting the protection of remnant vegetation, the ban 
had a significant impact on all forests, increasing forest cover by 8262 ± 2992 km2 (area ± std. dev.) 
in the BBS and 69,918 ± 19,246 km2 throughout Queensland during 2007–2014 compared to the 
counterfactual (Fig. 3.5). These impacts did not significantly change when policy uncertainty was 
unaccounted for, and though excluding the period of policy relaxation (2012–2014) reduced the 
amount of avoided deforestation, the significant impact was consistent with the trend observed for 
the full time period (Table F1). The impact on Queensland forests was also significant when setting 
the intervention period to 2004, the year the broad-scale clearing ban was officially announced, 
though the amount of avoided deforestation was reduced by approximately 50%. In the BBS, 
however, this change in the intervention date resulted in insignificant impact estimates (3344 ± 3360 
km2). 
 
 
Fig. 3.5. Causal impact of the broad-scale clearing ban on net forest cover change in Queensland (a,b) 
and the Brigalow Belt South (c,d), after controlling for the influence of temporal variables. 
Cumulative impact estimates of (b) and (d) are statistically significant (p < 0.05). Vertical dotted line 
separates pre- and post-intervention periods, where the intervention begins in 2007. 
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The clearing ban also had a significant impact on remnant forests in Queensland during 2007–
2014, avoiding 18,969 ± 10,340 km2 of remnant deforestation compared to the counterfactual (Fig. 
3.6). When the influence of policy uncertainty was uncontrolled in the analysis, however, there was 
no longer a significant impact from the clearing ban (6483 ± 4504 km2) (Table F1). Under all 
scenarios, no significant impact was found for the clearing ban on remnant forests in the BBS 
(94 ± 1502 km2). Again, excluding the influence of policy uncertainty reduced the estimated impact 
on remnant forest cover even further (−323 ± 1376 km2), suggesting a more negative effect from the 
clearing ban. While excluding 2012–2014 from the analysis increased the ban’s impact, the result 
remained insignificant. The significance of regulatory impacts on remnant forests starting in 2004 
were the same as those for all forests. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Causal impact of the broad-scale clearing ban on remnant forest cover change in Queensland 
(a,b) and the Brigalow Belt South (c,d), after controlling for the influence of temporal variables. 
Cumulative impact estimate of (b) was statistically significant (p < 0.05), but (d) was insignificant (p 
= 0.41). Vertical dotted line separates pre- and post-intervention periods, where the intervention 
begins in 2007. 
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3.6 Discussion 
 
This study identified a number of deforestation drivers consistent with pressures typically identified 
in other tropical deforestation hotspots, punctuated with some disconcerting evidence of potential 
perverse influences of uncertainty associated with forest conservation policy. While the broad-scale 
clearing ban facilitated forest transition in Queensland, the negative effects of frequent policy changes 
and associated uncertainty diminished or negated the benefits of regulation on remnant forests—the 
most threatened and ecologically significant forests—depending upon the spatial scale. Some 
consistencies were found between trends in net forest cover change (FCI) and remnant forest loss 
(RCI), but the two metrics will yield different implications for biodiversity, habitat quality, and 
ecosystem function. The results highlight the importance of strong and consistent deforestation 
regulation and aligned reporting at different spatial scales. 
 
3.6.1 Drivers of forest cover change 
 
Overall, the majority of drivers considered in this study produced consistent relationships with net 
forest cover and remnant forest loss. Thus it is likely that these two metrics of forest cover change 
are capturing similar conditions of deforestation throughout the state. Increases in temperature and 
food prices were associated with deforestation across all metrics and spatial scales, which is consistent 
with previous econometric models of deforestation (Byerlee et al. 2014; Marcos-Martinez et al. 
2018). While protected areas may directly prevent deforestation within their borders, some studies 
suggest that protected areas may indirectly increase clearing rates in the surrounding buffer zones due 
to the displacement of clearing opportunities within the protected area (Ferraro et al. 2011; Miteva et 
al. 2012). Potential negative spill-over effects of protected areas were only identified for state-wide 
remnant forests. Particularly in the BBS, a large proportion of forest gains were near these protected 
areas, which contrasts with national trends (Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018). Greater rainfall 
significantly decreased FCI in the BBS and RCI across all scales. Favourable rainfall conditions have 
been known to influence spikes in Queensland deforestation prior to policy reform (Macintosh 2012), 
and the promotion of grass growth from greater rainfall increases the carrying capacity of livestock, 
further incentivising and providing the capital for pasture expansion to increase short-term 
profitability (Rolfe 2000). 
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3.6.1.1 The influential roles of policy 
 
The broad-scale clearing ban significantly reduced forest loss across all metrics and spatial scales 
(Tables 3.2, 3.3), but its causal impact differed between forests (Figs. 3.5, 3.6). The broad-scale 
clearing ban in 2007 primarily regulates deforestation of remnant vegetation, yet total forest cover in 
Queensland and the BBS was positively impacted by the ban. This may represent indirect, positive 
spill-over effects from the clearing ban, whereby increased regulation of the most threatened 
vegetation added perceived public value to all vegetation, reducing the economic and social 
incentives to clear forests and/or increasing reforestation incentives. Additional indirect effects on 
deforestation from environmental regulations, such as altering international market demands, have 
also been observed elsewhere (Larson & Bromley 1991; Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999). This effect 
may also be reflective of concurrent changes in the Vegetation Management Act or other policies that 
more directly affect secondary forests at the state level (e.g. Vegetation Management and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2009, Queensland Biodiversity Offset Policy 2011, 2014) or national 
level (e.g. Australia’s Native Vegetation Framework 2012, EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy 
2012) (Evans 2016). 
The impact of the broad-scale clearing ban on its primary conservation target, remnant forests, 
was limited. State-wide remnant deforestation was successfully reduced by the ban, reflecting more 
direct impacts of similar deforestation policies around the world (Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999; 
Assunção et al. 2012). In contrast, the counterfactual projection for remnant deforestation in the BBS 
was too similar to the observed rates to identify a significant impact. These mixed effects are likely 
due to inherent differences between aggregate state-wide deforestation behaviours and those in 
historical deforestation hotspots like the BBS. For example, Simmons et al. (2018b, Chapter 2) 
identified differential clearing patterns along the political timeline between different regions of 
Queensland. Clearing patterns in the BBS suggested landholders were driven by the agricultural 
suitability of the land but limited in the amount of suitable land still available for clearing. The authors 
also found that other regions of the state, like the Great Barrier Reef catchment, showed greater 
deviations in clearing patterns after policy intervention, suggesting landholders were more responsive 
to restrictive regulations. The greatest value of the clearing ban may thus be its ability to avoid 
increased remnant deforestation in atypical or relatively intact landscapes—which would inherently 
have a relatively low risk of deforestation—rather than protecting fragments of remnant forests in 
extensively cleared regions that need protection. 
While peak periods of policy uncertainty significantly reduced forest cover across spatial 
scales, its impact on remnant deforestation was most pronounced. For remnant forests throughout 
Queensland, the perversities resulting from policy uncertainty were large enough to render the broad-
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scale clearing ban ineffective at reducing remnant deforestation beyond the counterfactual. In the 
BBS, policy uncertainty appears to have resulted in deforestation levels far surpassing the positive 
benefits of the intervention (i.e. the combined effects of policy uncertainty and implementation 
resulted in increased remnant deforestation). In contrast, the influence of policy uncertainty had an 
insignificant effect on the clearing ban’s impact on net forest cover change. This discrepancy between 
FCI and RCI may largely be due to the relevancy of the Vegetation Management Act, wherein 
heightened policy uncertainty regarding future restrictions on remnant forests may not jeopardise 
future clearing plans for secondary (unregulated) forests. There are also likely to be different 
responses from different stakeholders; the threat of regulatory relaxations or anti-environmental 
regime shifts can also provoke unexpected pro-environmental behavioural responses, which may 
increase the expanse of forest regrowth. For example, the election of Ronald Reagan and his 
administration’s anti-environmental agenda in the United States sparked a pro-environmental 
movement, leading to the creation of new land trusts from landholders and environmental 
organisations (Johnson 2014). 
 
3.6.2 Achieving a forest transition in Queensland 
 
This study confirms that Queensland entered a forest transition in 2008 for remnant forest and total 
forest cover, the latter of which has previously been identified in other analyses (Marcos-Martinez et 
al. 2018). Regulatory relaxations introduced in the Vegetation Management Act since 2012, however, 
may be reversing this transition, as recent rates of remnant forest loss are increasing and net forest 
gains are diminishing. Overall, the broad-scale clearing ban was influential to achieving forest 
transition in the state, but in the BBS, the commencement of the Act’s regulations in 2000 may have 
been more influential in spurring a trajectory toward remnant forest transition earlier than the rest of 
the state. Additional state and federal policies on offsets during 2011–2014 also likely played an 
important role in achieving a forest transition, particularly for promoting secondary forest gains. 
Moving forward, it is crucial that future deforestation regulations are strengthened to target the most 
threatened forests in the landscape, as the results of this study support previous evidence that 
regulation has been comparatively less effective at protecting threatened vegetation in Queensland 
(Rhodes et al. 2017). 
Peak periods of policy uncertainty significantly reduced forest cover, inevitably delaying 
transition for all Queensland forests. This is especially true for remnant forests, which are more 
directly affected by changes (and perverse responses) to the Vegetation Management Act. In light of 
the concerns over the degree of uncertainty and inconsistency in the Act’s political timeline (Senate 
Inquiry 2010; Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2), it is important to recognise that policy is inherently 
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dynamic, and some degree of uncertainty will always be prevalent. While this process is important 
for the adaptive management of natural resources, policies must adapt without provoking perverse 
responses from stakeholders. Perception is a key instigator for policy change, whereby original goals 
can evolve and previous ‘successes’ can be deemed ‘failures’ (Bovens & ‘t Hart 1996; Ens et al. 
2013). These perceptions come from all stakeholders, and the influence of landholders is especially 
important. The observed declines in forest cover surrounding policy change are likely a result of 
psychological reactance, whereby the removal or expected removal of clearing opportunities 
provoked opposition and resistance from some landholders (Brehm 1966). The results of this study 
reflect the potential short-term behavioural effects of this reactance, yet long-term cognitive effects 
may also explain the series of regulatory relaxations since 2012 (Schenk et al. 2007). 
Because political factors have both positively and negatively influenced forest transition, it is 
imperative that future deforestation interventions use the proper tools to reduce forest loss and 
strategically minimise attitudinal or behavioural retaliations. Command-and-control regulation may 
be effective at a large scale, but it can produce perverse incentives to over-value the lost opportunities 
(Kinzig et al. 2013) or increase individuals’ self-interest (Cardenas et al. 2000), which may reduce 
effectiveness at regional scales. Retrospective provisions to the Vegetation Management Act 
amendments since 2004 have likely curbed many instances of pre-emptive or ‘panic’ clearing, and 
this practice has been frequently used in similar policies in other Australian states (Productivity 
Commission 2004). This may be advantageous, as people are more likely to accept impending 
regulations when the changes seem more inevitable (Proudfoot & Kay 2014). In contrast, voluntary 
extension-based approaches may be more flexible and collaborative, and promote understanding and 
collective action (Lockie 2009; Ives et al. 2010; Ens et al. 2013), but they may incur some pitfalls in 
terms of large-scale impact, funding, and practical issues with their implementation (Santos et al. 
2006; Kollmann & Schneider 2010; Jordan & Matt 2014). 
 
3.6.3 Limitations, opportunities, and future directions 
 
The similarities and dissimilarities between trends in net forest cover and remnant forest cover have 
important implications for monitoring and reporting in Queensland. It is encouraging that the NCAS 
and SLATS data used to monitor national- and state-level deforestation, respectively, largely capture 
the same drivers of forest cover change. Their differences, however, will affect how Australia 
measures its progress toward achieving international biodiversity targets, as all forests are not equal 
in ecological impact (Watson et al. 2018). The large amount of reforestation since 2007 is a positive 
outcome for Queensland, as secondary forests can provide new habitats for threatened species in 
agroecosystems (Bowen et al. 2009). These new forests, however, often require decades of growth in 
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order to achieve a number of ecosystem services comparable to remnant forests, including greater 
species richness and abundance, greater carbon sequestration, and maintenance of regional climate 
(Bowen et al. 2009; Reside et al. 2017; Watson et al. 2018). A reliance on monitoring net forest gains 
across the state may thus ignore the rates of remnant forest loss, which are likely to have a 
disproportionately negative impact on biodiversity than the positive impacts of regrowth forests. We 
recommend broader uptake and reporting of the SLATS methodology for Australia, as it provides 
critical information unidentifiable by NCAS and monitors a larger range of woody vegetation that is 
also important for biodiversity (Macintosh 2007). 
The Bayesian causal impact estimate used in this analysis does not account for spatial 
heterogeneities in the landscape. Thus, these estimates are reflective of the overarching goals of the 
broad-scale clearing ban, but will not distinguish novel deforestation behaviours from traditional 
behaviours. Nevertheless, this method of causal impact estimation could prove to be an easy tool for 
initial estimations of policy impact that can be used by policy advisors and practitioners. Future 
research is needed to assess the full impacts of vegetation management regulations on deforestation 
across Queensland. Additional research is also needed in order to fully understand the mechanisms 
through which policy uncertainty and command-and-control regulations alter landholders’ clearing 
behaviours. The indicators used in this study may be capturing specific psychological drivers of 
change or other unidentified characteristics of these time periods. A greater understanding of the 
psychological and social implications for deforestation decision-making is needed to determine how 
to create sustainable behaviour change. 
The results of this study may yield significant implications for other deforestation hotspots 
around the world, and the effects of policy uncertainty may well extend outside of conservation 
policy. Different contexts, however, will warrant investigations into other drivers of land use change 
or other perverse outcomes associated with regulatory interventions. For example, the uncertainty 
provoked by impending policy changes affecting the property rights or tenure security of landholders 
in some nations may inevitably counteract intended conservation outcomes (Alston et al. 2000; 
Aldrich et al. 2012). In other tropical, developing country contexts, the influence of different 
deforestation enterprises (e.g. logging, oil palm plantations, cropping) and socioeconomic conditions 
(e.g. population size, poverty, access to roads) may be more influential in driving land use changes 
(Busch & Ferretti-Gallon 2017). Further, the influence of political regime changes may provoke 
different responses in other countries, such as exporting deforestation activities into neighbouring 
countries (Meyfroidt et al. 2010). Even within Australia, state-level differences in landholders’ 
response to forest policies and government incentives have contributed to the high rate of forest loss 
in Queensland relative to other states (Marcos-Martinez et al. 2018). Regardless of the context, it is 
critical that the intentional and perverse effects from conservation policy are measured alongside 
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more traditional drivers frequently used in the literature, as the psychological and social ramifications 
of regulatory intervention represent a universal driver of behaviour change. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
Conservation regulations and political uncertainty can be significant drivers of deforestation 
alongside other biophysical and socioeconomic drivers. Frequent inconsistency or instability along 
the political timeline can delay or reverse forest transitions and minimise the effectiveness of policy 
interventions. It is imperative that countries monitor how conservation policy instruments are 
contributing to forest cover change at national and regional scales, and identify how the flow-on 
effects of intervention may create perverse outcomes from stakeholders. Further, countries must 
explicitly consider trends in primary forest loss alongside net forest gains in order to monitor the 
differential effects that forest cover dynamics will have on biodiversity, ecosystem function, and 
success rates of deforestation interventions. Governments seeking to use forest conservation policy 
to effectively reduce deforestation must ensure their interventions account for state- and regional-
level deforestation drivers, minimise frequent legislative changes, and be robustly evaluated to ensure 
regulation is achieving the desired responses from landholders. 
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Chapter 4: Effectiveness of regulatory policy in curbing deforestation 
in a biodiversity hotspot 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
Recent rates of deforestation on private lands in Australia rival deforestation hotspots around the 
world, despite conservation policies in place to avert deforestation. This study uses causal impact 
estimation techniques to determine if a controversial conservation policy—the Vegetation 
Management Act (VMA)—has successfully reduced deforestation of remnant trees in the Brigalow 
Belt South, a 21.6 M ha biodiversity hotspot in Queensland. We use covariate matching to determine 
the regulatory effect of the policy on deforestation rates over time, compared to two counterfactual 
scenarios representing upper and lower estimates of policy impact. The VMA significantly reduced 
the rate of remnant deforestation in the highest impact scenario, saving 17,729 ± 1,733 ha during 
2000–2016. In the lowest scenario, ‘panic clearing’ before and after enactment of the VMA 
minimized the amount of remnant forests saved and may have marginally increased deforestation 
relative to the counterfactual (−404 ± 617 ha). At peak effectiveness, the VMA successfully 
counteracted the amount of remnant deforestation during 2010–2012, but this only represents 4.78% 
of the 371,252 ha of remnant forests cleared in the bioregion since enactment in 1999. Thus, while 
deforestation rates in the region have substantially reduced since the policy was enacted, our results 
of positive yet limited direct regulatory impact suggests the policy’s effectiveness is strongly 
confounded by other deforestation drivers, like changing socioeconomic or climate conditions, as 
well as new social signals provoked by the policy. The mechanisms through which the policy 
influences deforestation behaviour must be further investigated to ensure real, desirable change is 
achieved.  
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
Policy evaluation is critical for adaptive management and political development, as it can illuminate 
the successes of policy instruments and identify areas requiring improvement (Bovens et al. 2006; 
Pawson 2006). A crucial component of measuring policy effectiveness is impact evaluation, which 
investigates the direct influence of policy, unconfounded by other rival explanations (Ferraro 2009); 
yet such analyses are rare due to policy subjectivity, time and resource limitations (McGrath 2010; 
Perche 2011), and complex biophysical, demographic, and economic implementation contexts (Pfaff 
& Robalino 2012; Börner et al. 2016). However, naïve before-after or with-without comparisons of 
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impact indicators, such as the amount of remaining habitat or qualitative impact scores, often yield 
misleading estimates of the intervention’s true effects (Ferraro 2009; Miteva et al. 2012; Baylis et al. 
2015).  
Robust causal inference approaches (Winship & Morgan 1999; Imbens & Wooldridge 2009) 
are becoming more prevalent in evaluating conservation policy instruments (Miteva et al. 2012), 
particularly for policies implemented under relatively constrained conditions, such as protected areas 
(Andam et al. 2008), payments for ecosystem services (Arriagada et al. 2012), and ‘hybrid’ 
instruments (Lambin et al. 2014). The few studies aimed at estimating impacts of deforestation 
policies over more variable landscapes, including those largely under private management, show 
more variable and contrasting results (e.g. Alix-Garcia et al. 2015; Sills et al. 2015; Bos et al. 2017). 
For instance, conservation regulations reduced deforestation by nearly 50% in the Amazon (Assunção 
et al. 2012), but increased pre-emptive habitat destruction resulting from species’ listings under the 
U.S. Endangered Species Act, contrasting with evidence based upon naïve impact indicators (Ferraro 
et al. 2007). Amidst increasing competition for land and resources around the world, it is critical that 
the causal impact of conservation policies is robustly evaluated to justify the many direct and indirect 
costs associated with these interventions and to ensure desirable change is being created for 
biodiversity conservation and sustainability. 
The Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999 is a controversial policy that regulates 
deforestation on private land to achieve its primary purpose of preserving woody remnant vegetation 
in a globally-significant deforestation hotspot in Queensland, Australia (McGrath 2010). The policy 
has been highly criticized since its enactment by landholders and lobby groups, who cite its lack of 
transparency, inflexibility, and ignorance of potential economic outcomes (Productivity Commission 
2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), and was hotly debated as recently as March 2018 when new amendments 
were put forward by the Queensland Government. Remnant vegetation is defined by the Act as an 
old-growth native tree or plant (excluding grasses and mangroves) covering “more than 50% of the 
undisturbed predominant canopy and averaging more than 70% of the vegetation’s undisturbed 
height” (Vegetation Management Act 1999, 2015, sch 5).  
The VMA regulates deforestation of remnant vegetation on private land by largely prohibiting 
broad-scale clearing for agriculture or pasture. The extent of native vegetation clearance is frequently 
used as an indicator for monitoring the success of the VMA (Evans 2016). This measure, however, is 
inadequate, as it does not separate the impacts of the policy itself from the confounding effects of 
changing socioeconomic, climatic, or political conditions. While evaluations of the VMA have 
indicated that the statute may have design limitations and present significant costs to landholders 
(Productivity Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), to date, there has been no robust evaluation 
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of the VMA that directly assesses its effectiveness in achieving its primary purpose of conserving 
remnant vegetation.  
This study provides the first robust quantitative analysis of the policy’s ability to reduce 
deforestation of remnant trees, amidst ongoing intense debate surrounding the policy’s effectiveness 
and concerns over its significant costs to local farmers and graziers (Senate Inquiry 2010; Reside et 
al. 2017; Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). We illustrate a new application of causal inference 
techniques to a broad-reaching environmental statute over a temporally dynamic period, using 
covariate matching to determine how the policy has affected rates of remnant deforestation in the 
Brigalow Belt South (BBS) bioregion of Queensland, Australia, compared to two counterfactual 
scenarios—pre-emptive clearing (PC) and social preference (SP) scenarios—representing the lower 
and upper impact estimates, respectively, over time. We illustrate how our results compare with 
associative evidence based upon naïve trend analyses and highlight the importance of future studies 
to apply counterfactual thinking to evaluating similar policies in both developed and developing 
countries. 
 
4.3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Study area 
 
The BBS (21.6 M ha) is an agricultural area consisting largely of extensive pasture grazing by beef 
cattle (22.7521ºS–28.9991ºS, 145.9432ºE–152.3913ºE) (Fig. 4.1). The study area is a flashpoint for 
nature conservation and development in Australia. It has significant ecological importance as a 
national biodiversity hotspot (Ponce-Reyes et al. 2014) and deforestation hotspot (Evans 2016). As 
of 2016, the area of woody vegetation in the BBS constitutes 11.1 M ha, with remnant areas covering 
only 38% of the bioregion. 
 
4.3.2 Data 
 
The VMA is defined and assessed in regulation through the use of the Statewide Landcover and Trees 
Study (SLATS) dataset (QSC 2016h). The SLATS data define woody vegetation clearing outcomes 
at approximately 25 m resolution according to the type of clearing event (e.g. clearing for pasture, 
crop, or infrastructure), identifying trees with a minimum foliage projective cover of 8–11% (DSITI 
2016), and is considered to be 95% accurate based on field verification (Macintosh 2007; Scarth et 
al. 2008). In this study, we define ‘tree’ to represent woody vegetation, and ‘deforestation’ to 
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Fig. 4.1. The 2016 extent of (a) remnant vegetation and primary land uses, (b) woody vegetation, and 
(c) remnant and non-remnant deforestation events during 1997–2016 within the Brigalow Belt South 
bioregion of Queensland. Protected areas consist of national and regional parks, forest reserves, 
timber reserves, and state forests. Land uses adapted from the Australian Land Use and Management 
Classification system. 
 
represent the observed clearance of woody vegetation identifiable by SLATS. We obtained 
deforestation data for all available time periods from the SLATS dataset: fiscal-year periods between 
2000 and 2016 and combined data for 1997–1999. For simplicity, we identify the annual fiscal years 
by their latest record (i.e. ‘1999–2000’ = 2000, ‘2000–2001’ = 2001, etc.). The earliest map of 
remnant tree extent was obtained for 1997 from the Queensland Government’s spatial catalogue (QSC 
2016g) and SLATS deforestation events subtracted from this to produce annual remnant cover maps. 
Clearing events due to natural tree death or natural disaster damage, which made up less than 1% of 
SLATS data, were excluded from impact analysis. We also excluded protected areas (national and 
regional parks, forest reserves, timber reserves, and state forests; QSC 2016f), which made up less 
than 8% of SLATS data. Only freehold and leasehold lands were included in the analysis, making up 
85% of the BBS and 91% of all annual clearing events. 
 
4.3.3 Defining protection status 
 
Regulating the deforestation of remnant vegetation on private land is the main mechanism though 
which the VMA (1999) attempts to achieve its primary purpose—preserving remnant vegetation. 
Therefore, we define the ‘treatment’ as aligning with the spatial extent of remnant vegetation on 
private land, as defined by the data used by Queensland to support and evaluate the policy (QSC 
2016g,h). As nearly all remnant area on private land in the state is effectively treated by the Act, we 
derive the counterfactual—the assumption of what would have occurred in the absence of policy—
from areas of non-remnant tree cover. We define non-remnant trees as all trees that do not meet the 
aforementioned remnant criteria under the Act. Because the VMA does not regulate deforestation 
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within grassland regional ecosystems, all trees in these ecosystems were assumed to be non-remnant. 
Our analysis does not distinguish legal and illegal deforestation, as some exemptions from regulation 
(e.g. clearing for fences, weed control, necessary infrastructure) will be present in the deforestation 
data. 
This represents a simplification of the temporal and thematic coverage of the policy, which 
has undergone fluctuations in the level of restrictions placed on deforestation (Simmons et al. 2018b, 
Chapter 2), including provisions for ‘high-value regrowth’, and for remnant vegetation on leasehold 
lands. High-value regrowth—regrowth that had not been cleared since December 31, 1989—also 
experienced some deforestation regulation during 2009–2013 from an amendment to the policy, but 
we excluded these trees from our definition of treatment status since they are not remnant trees. The 
VMA regulated remnant deforestation on freehold lands since enactment, but deforestation on 
leasehold lands was not covered by the Act until 2004. Therefore, treated forests for 2000–2004 only 
consisted of remnant trees on freehold land, and treated forests for 2005–2016 consisted of remnant 
trees on freehold and leasehold lands.  Thus, we emphasize that our analysis measures the 
effectiveness of the policy’s overarching goal of reducing deforestation of remnant vegetation since 
its enactment. 
 
4.3.4 Scenarios and causal impact estimation 
 
The exposure status of a given forest pixel i is determined by the VMA 1999, which provides 
regulatory protection to remnant woody vegetation. Remnant woody vegetation thus represents the 
treatment units of the policy intervention (Di = 1). We assume non-remnant trees can represent the 
untreated units that do not receive explicit protection (Di = 0). Our outcome variable (Yi) represents 
the deforested status of each pixel. For years 2000–2004, only remnant units on freehold land are 
considered treated, and remnant units on leasehold land are considered treated for 2005–2016. We 
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) over each time period to measure how 
effective the policy has been at reducing the deforestation of remnant trees on private land: !"" = $(&' − &)|+ = 1) = 	$(&'|+ = 1) − $(&)|+ = 1)            (1) 
where $(&'|+ = 1) is the observed remnant deforestation rate under the VMA, and $(&)|+ = 1) is 
the counterfactual remnant deforestation rate without the VMA (Imbens & Angrist 1994). We assume 
that in the absence of the VMA, remnant and non-remnant deforestation rates, conditional upon 
matched covariates (X), would have followed common trends over time (Lechner 2010). The use of 
observed non-remnant deforestation under the VMA, $(&)|+ = 0), thus serves as an appropriate 
counterfactual approximation, as the underlying structural similarities of treated and untreated forests 
can account for the processes influencing deforestation (Sills et al. 2015), such that  
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$(&)|+ = 1, 1) = $(&)|+ = 0, 1).       (2) 
Two ATT baselines for the period prior to implementation of the VMA (1997–1999) were 
generated for remnant forests only on freehold tenures (FO) and remnant forests on freehold and 
leasehold tenures (FL). The ATTs for this pre-intervention period revealed remnant deforestation 
rates significantly higher than the counterfactual (ATT1999,FO = 4.46%, ATT1999,FL = 3.29%). Two 
explanations for this preferential clearing of remnant trees compared to similar non-remnant trees in 
this period are: 1) that this period shows ‘pre-emptive’ clearing of remnant trees prior to the Act, 
evidence of which has been reported in previous analyses (Simmons et al. 2018b,c, Chapter 2, 3) 
and landholder testimonials (Productivity Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010), or 2) that this is 
a ‘social preference’ for clearing of remnant trees versus similar areas of non-remnant trees. We 
developed two assumption scenarios from these: 1) Pre-emptive Clearing scenario (ATTPC), 
assuming that elevated pre-emptive clearing of remnant trees is caused entirely by the Act and that 
the true difference between our treated and counterfactual samples is zero (ATT1999 = 0%), and 2) 
Social Preference scenario (ATTSP), assuming that there is a fixed ‘social preference’ for clearing 
remnant over equivalent non-remnant, which is equal to a constant deforestation rate of SPFO = 4.46% 
for 2000–2004 and SPFL = 3.29% for 2005–2016. In the latter scenario, we use a difference-in-
difference approach commonly used in the impact evaluation literature (Lechner 2010; Miteva et al. 
2012) to subtract this fixed value from the ATTPC for the calculation of the ATTSP. These two 
scenarios provide a bound estimate on the ATT of the VMA across time: !""23,4 = $(&4'|+ = 1, 1) − $(&4)|+ = 0, 1)              (3) 
 !""52,4' = !""23,4' − 6789 = !""23,4' − 0.0446       (4) 
 !""52,4= = !""23,4= − 678> = !""23,4= − 0.0329       (5) 
where t is in {2000, …, 2016}, t1 is in {2000, …, 2004}, and t2 is in {2005, …, 2016}.  
The sensitivity of the ATTPC estimates to hidden bias due to unobserved confounding factors 
was tested using Rosenbaum’s sensitivity test for binary outcomes (Keele 2010), where Γ represents 
a relative measure of bias ranging from one (no hidden bias) to infinity. The value of Γ at the moment 
when the effect of bias begins to significantly affect the ATT estimate (p = 0.05) was compared 
between years. Significance of the annual ATT estimates was tested by applying the Holm-Bonferroni 
Method to pairwise Pearson chi-square comparisons and associated odds ratios. The amount of 
avoided remnant tree loss was calculated annually for each scenario according to the representation 
of our matched sample within the population: 
 ‘Pre-emptive clearing’ scenario 
      !(&4)B+ = 1) = 	CDDEF,G	HG	(IJ,GK 	CL,GMK|NO')PG 	                        (6) 
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‘Social preference’ scenario 
      !(&4)B+ = 1) = 	CDDQE,G	HG	(IJ,GK 	CL,GMK|NO')PG 	                         (7) 
where !(&4)|+ = 1) is the additional area of remnant trees that would have been cleared in the 
counterfactual, n is the number of observations in the population within the matched strata, N is the 
number of observations in the population within all sampled strata, R&S,4' B+ = 1T is the rate of 
remnant deforestation within the matched sample, and R!H,4U'B+ = 1T is the area of remnant trees 
within the matched strata that was available to be cleared in the previous year. Under the ‘social 
preference’ scenario, ATTSP corresponds to the respective constant for the 2000–2004 and 2005–
2016 treatment distinctions (Eq. 4, 5). 
 
4.3.5 Matching 
 
We used the following temporally constant variables—which have previously been shown to explain 
54% of the variation in BBS clearing patterns (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2)—to match treated 
and control observations: remoteness (ALA 2016), slope (QSC 2016d), parcel size, tenure (QSC 
2016c), frequency of drought declarations (QSC 2016a), rainfall variability (QSC 2016b), and 
regional ecosystem (RE) code (QSC 2016e). REs are vegetation communities characterized by unique 
geology, soil, and landform combinations, defined according to their bioregion, land zone, and 
vegetation community (Sattler & Williams 1999). Because of the large diversity of vegetation 
communities in the BBS, we developed an RE code that groups vegetation communities based upon 
the bioregion code, land zone code, and density of the vegetation community—1 = very sparse, 2 = 
sparse, 3 = mid-dense, or 4 = dense—according to the Regional Ecosystem Description Database 
(Queensland Herbarium 2016). Freehold and leasehold tenure was represented as a binary variable.  
 Data were collated in ArcGIS v10.3.1 for all periods from 1997 to 2016 within the BBS at the 
25 m pixel resolution. We constrained the analysis to the estimated extent of woody vegetation 
outside protected areas as of 1997, which covers approximately 8.9 M ha, or 47% of the unprotected 
BBS landscape. Trend impact indicators—clearing extent and mean/maximum clearing patch sizes—
were calculated for each year based upon SLATS polygons to compare with causal impact estimates. 
Stratified random sampling was performed in R (R Core Team 2017) on the population dataset 
separately for treated and untreated pixels for every year using the ‘sampling’ (Tillé & Matei 2016) 
and ‘data.table’ (Dowle et al. 2016) packages. We created annual samples, rather than tracking select 
observations over time, in order to account for annual changes in deforestation patterns, thus creating 
samples that would reflect the temporally dynamic clearing behaviours of landholders throughout the 
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bioregion (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). Strata were defined according to outcome, RE code, 
and tenure variables to ensure adequate matching of categorical variables and adequate representation 
of the population’s true outcome. Strata that consisted of only remnant or non-remnant trees, as well 
as those that never experienced deforestation, were excluded from the sampling (3% of study area). 
For each year, the number of observations randomly selected from each stratum was weighted 
according to its representation in the true population. The final annual sample distributions mirrored 
those of the true population. 
Covariate matching and subsequent evaluations were performed using R packages ‘Matching’ 
(Sekhon 2015), ‘rbounds’ (Keele 2015), and ‘rgenoud’ (Mebane Jr. & Sekhon 2015) on the annual 
sample datasets. Two methods for matching were compared—nearest neighbour (NN) and nearest k 
neighbours (NKN) matching—under multiple caliper conditions. The adequacy of matching methods 
was evaluated according to multiple empirical and visual match balance estimations (additional 
details in Appendix G). We selected the NN method using a 0.25 caliper for the causal impact 
estimation, which produced the best covariate balance (Table H1) and significantly enhanced the 
comparability of remnant and non-remnant samples across all observed measures (Table H2), but 
excluded 8–10% of observations due to a lack of insufficient matches (Table I1). 
 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
4.4.1 Effectiveness of the Vegetation Management Act 
 
Under the ‘pre-emptive clearing’ scenario, remnant deforestation rates relative to matched non-
remnant deforestation rates have significantly reduced for most years following the enactment of the 
VMA, with the lowest rate occurring in 2016 at −1.21 ± 0.14% (ATTPC ± 95% CI), indicating a shift 
in preference toward non-remnant deforestation (Fig. 4.2a). Overall, the impact of the VMA relative 
to the counterfactual is negligible; despite reducing the rate of remnant tree clearance by an average 
of 0.22% during 2000–2016, panic clearing surrounding the VMA’s enactment minimized the 
cumulative amount of remnant forests saved from deforestation, even potentially increasing 
deforestation (−404 ± 617 ha) (Fig. 4.2b). 
The continued deforestation immediately following the passing of the Act in 2000 
(1.91 ± 0.23%) reflects reported instances of spikes in pre-emptive deforestation rates (‘panic 
clearing’) (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2) and likely arose, in part, due to the delayed 
proclamation of the VMA in September 2000, when most statutory provisions commenced. This 
perverse outcome has also been observed during similar deforestation policy changes in the Amazon 
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Fig. 4.2. Causal inference results. (a) Annual estimates of the change in remnant deforestation rates 
due to the Vegetation Management Act 1999, according to two scenarios: the average treatment effect 
on the treated relative to the non-remnant counterfactual deforestation rate (ATTPC), and the impact 
relative to the fixed social preference rate of deforestation (ATTSP). (b) Cumulative avoided remnant 
tree loss over time according to the ‘pre-emptive clearing’ and ‘social preference’ scenarios. (c) 
Robustness of annual ATTPC estimates to potential hidden bias at significance (p = 0.05). Shaded 
areas for (a) and (b) represent the 95% confidence interval. (*) Period represents all deforestation 
events during 1997–1999 for only freehold lands (FO) and freehold and leasehold lands (FL). 
 
(Alston et al. 2000; Aldrich et al. 2012) and in other sectors of environmental policy (Lueck & 
Michael 2003; Rivalan et al. 2007). Policy effectiveness increased until 2003, when remnant 
deforestation rates began to increase again (0.26 ± 0.14%), provoking a moratorium issued in the 
following year (Kehoe 2009). As expected, effectiveness was relatively high while the moratorium 
was in place (−0.81 ± 0.15%). After the moratorium was lifted, however, the effectiveness of the Act 
relative to this counterfactual diminished. ATTPC estimates from 2006 and 2007 did not differ 
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significantly from zero, meaning that deforestation rates between equivalent remnant and non-
remnant trees were similar, and the impact of the VMA was insignificant (Table I1). This is likely 
due the government’s implementation of a transitional cap of 500,000 ha of broad-scale clearing to 
be permitted throughout Queensland before the broad-scale clearing ban in 2007 (McGrath 2007). In 
the years immediately following the ban, the policy displayed limited effectiveness. Negligible 
changes in policy impact continued through the period of additional protection of high-value forest 
regrowth on freehold land in 2009–2012 (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). Since 2012, against the 
backdrop of rising deforestation rates in both remnant and non-remnant vegetation, the VMA has 
increased in effectiveness relative to the counterfactual, with non-remnant areas experiencing a 
greater increase in deforestation rates relative to remnants.  
Prior to the introduction of the VMA (1999) under the ‘social preference’ scenario, the rate 
of remnant deforestation in the BBS was 4.46 ± 0.25% higher than similar locations with non-remnant 
trees on freehold properties, and 3.29 ± 0.12% higher on both freehold and leasehold properties (Table 
I1). These rates of deforestation reflect historical incentives for preferentially clearing remnant trees, 
which targeted intact vegetation likely for economic reasons (e.g. to enhance productivity and expand 
pastoral lands), practical reasons (e.g. switching from degraded or over-grazed pre-cleared land), 
and/or cultural reasons (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). The temporal pattern of the annual ATTSP 
estimates reflects those of the ATTPC estimates. Given the greater social preference for clearing 
remnant vegetation specifically on freehold land, however, 2004 represented peak effectiveness, 
reducing remnant deforestation rates by −5.26 ± 0.40% (ATTSP ± 95% CI) (Fig. 4.2a). In this scenario, 
all ATT estimates following the introduction of the VMA differed significantly and more strongly 
from the baselines than those of the ‘pre-emptive clearing’ scenario (Table I2). Under the social 
preference scenario, the impact of the VMA has been much more effective, reducing the rate of 
remnant deforestation by an average of 3.86% during 2000–2016 and avoiding a cumulative loss of 
17,729 ± 1,733 ha of remnant forest (Fig. 4.2b), roughly equivalent to the combined amount of 
remnant deforestation during 2010–2012. 
 
4.4.2 Impact robustness 
 
ATT results for most years were moderately robust to potential hidden bias (Fig. 4.2c). For most of 
the high-impact years, the sensitivity analysis suggests that any potential confounding factor that was 
excluded from this study would need to exert an influence on the occurrence of remnant trees more 
than twice that of the other covariates in order to affect the impact estimates (Keele 2010). The years 
most sensitive to hidden bias coincide with the early years of the VMA timeline, where landholders 
were subjected to frequent policy uncertainty arising from multiple amendments, a moratorium on 
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clearing permits, withdrawal of Federal Government support for a $150 million structural adjustment 
package, and implementation of a broad-scale clearing ban (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). 
Frequent periods of policy uncertainty have been shown to increase deforestation in Queensland 
(Simmons et al. 2018c, Chapter 3), which could explain the sensitivity of impact estimates during 
this period. For these years, other unobserved confounders such as additional socioeconomic factors, 
aesthetic values of nature, or shifts in social or cultural norms could also have a significant effect on 
the impact of the VMA (Kull et al. 2007; Seabrook et al. 2008; Marcos-Martinez et al. 2017).   
The impact estimates of this study are limited by the lack of data on pre-intervention remnant 
deforestation trends, which would produce a more robust counterfactual. The two scenarios 
considered in this study, however, represent the potential bounds of policy effectiveness under 
opposing levels of social influence that could logically represent the true counterfactual. This study 
also does not distinguish between the most threatened types of vegetation in the landscape. Evidence 
suggests rarer, threatened forests are still being cleared faster than more common, less threatened 
forests (Rhodes et al. 2017). Under this definition of effectiveness, the impact of the VMA may differ 
significantly from the overarching definition used in this study. Assessing the effectiveness of the 
VMA is inherently complex given its multiple objectives and frequent amendments, but at its core 
purpose of preserving remnant vegetation, we find the direct regulatory impact of policy has had a 
small (if any) positive effect, yet these impacts of the policy may be increasing with increasing 
background deforestation rates recently observed in the state. 
 
4.4.3 Complementing trend impact indicators 
 
Naïve trend analyses of the rate of remnant deforestation (Fig. 4.3a) and the area of trees cleared over 
time (Fig. 4.3b) show a general decline since the enactment of the VMA until the recent policy 
relaxations, and this is often used as evidence for the effectiveness of the Act (Evans 2016). When 
looking at additional indicators of broad-scale clearing, such as mean and maximum patch size of 
clearing events (Fig. 4.3c), it is evident that landholders are clearing fewer trees and in smaller patches 
under the VMA. Like other indicators, however, this also increases following the conservative 
government’s policy relaxation during 2012–2013, potentially representing a wider social shift in 
landholder clearing preferences in the most recent years. 
Our causal impact estimates of the VMA differ from these trend impact indicators; we show 
the continued effectiveness of the VMA against the counterfactual, even amidst concerns over the 
rising rates of deforestation since 2012. The amount of remnant deforestation in the BBS has 
increased since 2012, but the amount of non-remnant deforestation has increased faster, with high- 
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Fig. 4.3. Trend impact indicators. (a) Comparison of deforestation rates between the population and 
matched samples, with remnant deforestation rates on freehold and leasehold lands distinguished. (b) 
Trends in deforestation extent relative to the passing of the VMA 1999, inclusion of leasehold lands 
under regulation, and broad-scale clearing ban in 2007. (c) Changes in the size of deforestation 
patches over time. Overall trends for 2000–2004 exclude deforestation on leasehold lands. (*) 
Deforestation extent represents an average annual estimate for freehold and leasehold lands. 
 
value regrowth constituting 15–23% of non-remnant deforestation in the last three years (Fig. 4.3b). 
Additional discrepancies between our impact estimates and those based upon trend indicators include 
contrasting trends between ATT estimates and absolute clearing areas; for example, 2004 and 2016 
exhibit high reductions in remnant deforestation rates (Fig. 4.2a) yet relatively high volumes of 
remnant deforestation (Fig. 4.3b). This can be explained by examining the differential changes in 
remnant vs. non-remnant deforestation. In 2004, the amount of non-remnant deforestation increased 
by 45% from the previous year, but remnant deforestation only increased by 11%. Similarly, non-
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remnant deforestation increased by 82% in 2016, and remnant deforestation by a mere 9%. Our results 
highlight an increasing division in the rates at which remnant trees and corresponding non-remnant 
trees are being cleared in the study region: that is, an increase in the direct effectiveness of the policy. 
The high effectiveness in 2016, however, may still be confounded by a reduction in remnant clearing 
due to retrospective (i.e. ex post facto) clearing restrictions proposed in a VMA bill introduced that 
year, which ultimately was not passed in Parliament. Overall, our results show that the perceived 
effectiveness of the VMA in reducing remnant deforestation rates in the BBS from 2000–2016 is 
largely due to confounding factors rather than the direct impact of the VMA itself. 
 
4.4.4 Potential mechanisms driving policy effectiveness 
 
It is evident from Fig. 4.3b that the naïve deforestation trends are highly confounded. Clearing of 
non-remnant trees is unregulated by the VMA; yet, during 2006–2010, remnant and non-remnant 
deforestation has changed largely in concert. Most interestingly, remnant deforestation has not 
increased proportionally to non-remnant deforestation since policy relaxations in 2012. Thus, there 
must be some confounding factor(s) acting upon landholders that has (1) substantially reduced all 
deforestation during 2006–2010, even for trees that are permitted to be cleared, and (2) largely 
dissuaded landholders from preferentially clearing remnant trees during 2012–2016, even when given 
more legal opportunities to clear. 
 The BBS experienced the greatest rainfall deficit of any bioregion in Queensland during 
Australia’s ‘Millennium Drought’ of 2001–2009 (van Dijk et al. 2013), and annual rainfall patterns 
have been identified as a significant driver of remnant and non-remnant deforestation in the region 
(Simmons et al. 2018c, Chapter 3). It is likely that this drought was largely responsible for the 
reduction of absolute deforestation rates during this period by diminishing the economic incentives 
to clear, which could explain why the VMA was only marginally effective in those years. 
Characteristics of landholders’ clearing patterns during this period have reflected a preference for 
maximizing quality over quantity (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2), and this may explain the 
subsequent increase in the quantity of non-remnant deforestation following the end of the drought. 
These climate restraints could also have flow-on effects on other socioeconomic drivers of 
deforestation, such as food prices and potential profitability, which can ultimately diminish the direct 
impact of the VMA (Marcos-Martinez et al. 2017; Rhodes et al. 2017; Simmons et al. 2018c, Chapter 
3). 
 The increased effectiveness of the VMA following the drought may also be a product of the 
direct or indirect social impacts on landholders. The social preference scenario in this study assumed 
a norm existed prior to regulation that increased landholders’ preference for clearing remnant trees. 
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It is likely that the VMA, its subsequent amendments, or the broad-scale clearing ban would have 
diminished the strength of this norm over time by altering social conventions toward appropriate 
deforestation practices and influencing how landholders expect others to change their behaviours 
(Ensminger & Knight 1997). This could have been facilitated through changes in personal or social 
norms. The costs of illegally clearing remnant trees imposed by the VMA can reach 1665 penalty 
units (AU$202,963.50) (Vegetation Management Act 1999, 2015, s 18); combined with landholders’ 
early protests regarding the accuracy of satellite images used to monitor clearing, limitations on 
permissible legal defences, and a reversed onus of proof (Productivity Commission 2004), the 
majority of landholders may not be willing to accept the risks associated with excessive remnant 
deforestation, necessitating reluctant compliance as a new personal norm. The VMA may have 
elicited indirect impacts on collective social norms, as well, leading to increased effectiveness in later 
years. Seemingly in contrast to other deforestation contexts, where deforestation and property rights 
regulations have induced pro-deforestation shifts in social norms (e.g. Rudel 1995; Schmidt & 
McDermott 2015), it appears the VMA may have provoked a redirection of landholders’ clearing 
activities toward non-remnant trees. Despite landholders’ severe lack of trust in the Queensland 
Government (Brown 2018), they may have changed their behaviour in accordance to the regulations 
if they recognize the growing social stigma around deforestation and seek to counteract the public’s 
perception of farmers.  
 
4.4.5 Implications and future directions 
 
Our analysis illustrates how robust causal inference techniques can be used to understand how policy 
effectiveness changes over time amidst a highly dynamic political, climatic, and social environment. 
The VMA represents a unique and complex conservation statute, where protections fluctuate, clearing 
restrictions evolve, and private landholders’ behaviour is involuntarily regulated, largely without 
compensation. We show impact evaluation techniques can still be robust to hidden biases under these 
complex conditions, and counterfactuals can be developed even when reliable pre-intervention trends 
are unavailable through the use of bounded counterfactual scenarios. The significant yet limited 
effectiveness of the VMA reflects previous impact estimates of the broad-scale clearing ban in the 
BBS (Simmons et al. 2018c, Chapter 3), as well as similar deforestation policies around the world, 
such as the Brazil Forest Code (Azevedo et al. 2017) and numerous international initiatives (Bos et 
al. 2017), where effectiveness may be limited to a brief period on the policy timeline, or intervention 
outcomes do not significantly differ from the expected counterfactual. 
Policies have the potential to introduce strong social signals into the community (Kinzig et al. 
2013). If the VMA has managed to directly or indirectly shift current deforestation norms away from 
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preferentially targeting remnant forest—whether it be due to risk aversion (instrument compliance), 
re-aligning their collective clearing behaviours (norm-oriented compliance), or merely an obligation 
to follow the law (legitimacy compliance) (Ramcilovic-Suominen & Epstein 2012)—it is important 
that future interventions reinforce these new norms and avoid crowding out the incentives for 
retaining remnants. Policy interventions, however, may not be enough to completely reduce 
landholders’ preferred deforestation regimes. The negative cultural associations with the ‘red tape’ 
nature of environmental policy is unlikely to change landholders’ underlying clearing preferences 
and may spur desires to rescind what current command-and-control policies do exist, as is being 
observed in Queensland (Reside et al. 2017). Sustainable change in deforestation behaviours will 
need sufficient, stable, and enforceable underlying conservation statutes supplemented with on-the-
ground instruments, incentives, and interventions that can target changes in social norms, attitudes, 
and other psychosocial characteristics (Beedell & Rehman 1999). Given that the effectiveness of 
these interventions and programs is largely inconsistent and case-dependent (Miteva et al. 2012), 
ongoing causal inference evaluations will become increasingly valuable for policy development.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
Conservation policies often lack thorough evaluation due to an over-reliance on impact indicators or 
failures to control for confounding factors. Here we show that more robust quantitative impact 
evaluation techniques could be used to assess whether policy interventions are producing real, 
effective, and desirable change. We found that the Vegetation Management Act implemented in 
Queensland, Australia was successful, on average, at reducing deforestation of remnant vegetation in 
the Brigalow Belt South bioregion. However, the magnitude of the impact is lower than estimates 
from less-robust analyses. Nevertheless, the results show that landholders are redirecting their 
deforestation efforts toward unprotected vegetation—an emergent norm that must be sustained for 
long-term deforestation behaviour change. Given the growing efforts towards sustainable 
development, it is ever important that, in addition to robust techniques for conservation policy 
assessment, the evaluation of unintended policy effects should be undertaken. 
 
4.6 List of Appendices for Chapter 4 
 
Appendix G: Details of the covariate matching methodology and evaluation. 
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Appendix I: Full results for the causal inference analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Landholder typologies illuminate pathways for social 
change in a deforestation hotspot 
 
5.1 Abstract 
 
Psychosocial factors determine individual and collective behaviours, and there is growing evidence 
of their influence on land management behaviours. In Queensland, Australia, the controversial 
Vegetation Management Act 1999 was enacted to protect remnant vegetation from globally-
significant deforestation rates. Met with considerable opposition from landholders, the success of the 
policy has been questioned and its impact on landholders debated. As native vegetation management 
encompasses biophysical, economic, political, and cultural dimensions that are immensely complex, 
a more thorough understanding of the personal and cultural dimensions of deforestation activity is 
required. We surveyed landholders across Queensland in order to identify different landholder 
typologies based upon (1) their recent tree clearing behaviours and (2) their psychosocial 
characteristics, and determined the unique demographic and psychosocial factors associated with 
typology membership. The relationship between typology distribution in the landscape and historical 
deforestation hotspots was also assessed. We identified a heterogeneous mosaic of landholders in the 
clearing landscape, composed of four clearing typologies and five psychosocial typologies. Social 
norms, identity, trust, and security played crucial roles in distinguishing different types of 
landholders. The two most contrasting clearing typologies—active and inactive clearers—were 
primarily located in hot- and cold-spots of deforestation, respectively; in contrast, most psychosocial 
typologies could be found throughout the landscape, highlighting the potential benefit of 
complementing generalised state-wide psychosocial targets with localised behavioural targets. We 
discuss how conservation policy instruments can be regionally tailored, and relevant strategies for 
effective communication and engagement can be developed to create behaviour change by 
understanding the characteristics and distribution of these types of landholders. If modified top-down 
efforts (e.g. strategic messages, community-based communication) can be supplemented with more 
bottom-up approaches (e.g. collective learning, building network support), sustainable land 
management in this global deforestation hotspot may be achievable. 
 
5.2 Highlights 
 
• Norms, identity, trust, and security are important predictors of landholder typology. 
• Clearing typologies occur in clusters, while psychosocial typologies are dispersed. 
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• Behaviour change strategies will benefit from both state-wide and localised targets. 
• Strategic messages and trust-building efforts may successfully reduce tree clearing. 
 
5.3 Introduction 
 
Agricultural expansion is the most commonly cited proximate driver of deforestation (Barbier & 
Burgess 2001a; Hosonuma et al. 2012), and the resulting land use change is responsible for an 
estimated 25% decline in global biodiversity (Murphy & Romanuk 2014) and more than 10 Gt of 
carbon dioxide emissions every year (Kindermann et al. 2008). As countries strive to meet their 
commitments to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, it is imperative that conservation 
interventions deliver effective solutions to the deforestation crisis (FAO 2018). Despite numerous 
government-led approaches to curbing deforestation, such as command-and-control regulation 
(Simmons et al. 2018c, Chapter 3), payments for ecosystem services (Miteva et al. 2012), and 
protected areas (Joppa & Pfaff 2011), the success of these policy instruments is often unknown or 
underwhelming. These interventions may result in no change in target behaviour (Azevedo et al. 
2017), displacement of deforestation activities (Meyfroidt et al. 2010), or increases in pre-emptive 
clearing (Simmons et al. 2018c, Chapter 3). The failure of many interventions is likely due to an 
over-reliance on traditional top-down approaches, such as direct regulation and market-based 
incentives (Mallampalli et al. 2016; Busch & Ferretti-Gallon 2017). The effectiveness of such 
approaches are contingent upon high compliance and conventional economic behavioural theory—
characteristics that do not adequately reflect the realities of deforestation (Lynne et al. 1988).  
Psychosocial drivers of deforestation are not commonly investigated, despite their critical 
importance in driving individual and collective behaviours (Bamberg & Möser 2007; Meyfroidt 2013; 
Mastrangelo et al. 2014). For example, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1985) indicates that 
attitudes, norms, and perceived behavioural control directly influence behavioural intentions; these 
factors are, in turn, influenced by factors like values and identity (Fielding et al. 2008; Klöckner 
2013). Such frameworks have been used to explain many conservation-oriented behaviours 
(Armitage & Conner 2001; Kaiser et al. 2005) and shed light on how to design and tailor conservation 
interventions. In Australia, emerging research identifies the importance of landholder values, 
attitudes, and social norms in driving on-farm conservation behaviours—from general habitat 
maintenance to restorative actions like tree planting—which can suppress or complement the 
influence of economic drivers (Burton 2004; Smith 2008; Farmar-Bowers & Lane 2009; Greiner & 
Gregg 2011). Different farmers may have distinct values and attitudes, and thus be inclined to adopt 
different types of land management approaches (Petrzelka et al. 1996; van den Berg et al. 1998; 
Gosling & Williams 2010). For example, in Australia, different motivation-driven typologies of 
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graziers in northern Queensland were linked to differences in their willingness to participate in 
general conservation policy interventions and adopt on-farm conservation practices (Greiner & Gregg 
2011). In New South Wales, distinguishing farmers according to economic- and conservation-
oriented values revealed different program goals and targets necessary to influence farmers’ decision-
making (Maybery et al. 2005). Different conservation policy instruments may be more appropriate 
for different sectors of the target population, but identifying relevant behaviour change strategies is 
contingent upon an understanding of each unique case study, as the psychological profiles and drivers 
of landholders’ behaviours will likely vary substantially from one region to another (Knowler & 
Bradshaw 2007). 
In this study, we investigated how multiple psychosocial drivers of behaviour influence 
different types of landholders responsible for managing native vegetation, using Queensland, 
Australia as a case study. A region fraught with intense debate surrounding dynamic and controversial 
state vegetation management policy, tree clearing in Queensland encompasses biophysical, 
economic, political, and cultural dimensions that are immensely complex; thus a more thorough 
understanding of the personal and cultural dimensions of tree clearing is required to illuminate 
pathways for sustainable vegetation management in this deforestation hotspot. In an effort to 
understand perceptions of vegetation management policy and why deforestation rates continue to soar 
despite policy intervention, we surveyed landholders throughout the intensive agricultural regions of 
Queensland and generate two complementary typologies of landholders: (1) typologies based on 
recent clearing behaviours, and (2) typologies based on perceptions about tree clearing and vegetation 
management regulations. For each typology, we identify the key psychosocial, demographic, and 
socioeconomic factors associated with group membership. Finally, we examine the spatial 
relationship between the distribution of landholder typologies and deforestation hotspots throughout 
the study area, and conclude with recommendations for strategic targeting of landholders to provoke 
sustainable land management behaviour change. 
 
5.4 Methods 
 
5.4.1 Study area 
 
5.4.1.1 Regulatory context 
 
Over the last 40 years, the State of Queensland, Australia has lost 60% of its forests due to the rapid 
replacement of remnant (i.e. primary) vegetation for pasture expansion (Evans 2016), resulting in 
severe habitat fragmentation and biodiversity decline (Cogger et al. 2003; McAlpine et al. 2011). In 
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response, the Queensland Government enacted the controversial Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 
1999, which placed clearing regulations on all remnant woody vegetation on private lands. The Act 
has since been the focus of heated political debate, with landholders and agricultural lobby groups 
arguing that the policy lacks transparency, accuracy and relevance to the landscape, and disregards 
the financial consequences on farmers (Productivity Commission 2004; Senate Inquiry 2010). As a 
result, the VMA has undergone multiple amendments in its nearly 20-year lifespan, with regulations 
tightening, loosening, and tightening again in recent years (Simmons et al. 2018b, Chapter 2). 
Despite some forest gains in the last decade, this volatility of the VMA has elicited unintended ‘panic 
clearing’ from landholders, diminishing the potential benefits of regulatory intervention (Simmons et 
al. 2018c, Chapter 3). Particularly, in the Brigalow Belt South bioregion of Queensland—an 
extensively cleared national biodiversity hotspot—the direct effectiveness of the VMA has been 
limited, but its most significant impact may lie in its ability to alter social norms of tree clearing, as 
more landholders are redirecting their clearing efforts away from protected vegetation (Simmons et 
al. 2018a, Chapter 4).  
 
5.4.1.2 Data 
 
All postcodes within Queensland that were listed as the participant’s place of residence and/or the 
location of their production property (for land managers) were mapped, and the amount of clearing 
within the last five years—relative to the postcodes’ area—was calculated for all woody vegetation 
and remnant woody vegetation only (Fig. 5.1). We used clearing data from Queensland’s Statewide 
Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS), and intersected the clearing polygons with remnant vegetation 
maps generated from the Queensland Spatial Catalogue (QSC 2016g,h). The final map of remnant 
and total tree clearing was aggregated to a 400 km2 resolution and represented as the proportion of 
the pixel cleared during 2013–2016. The amount of clearing within each postcode was calculated, 
and each postcode’s standard deviation (SD) from the mean of all postcode clearing rates was used 
to identify hotspots of clearing. The following clearing categories were generated based upon each 
postcode’s amount of clearing per km2, relative to the average amount of clearing for all postcodes: 
low (SD < −0.50), moderate (−0.50 £ SD £ 0.50), and high (SD > 0.50). The average degree of 
remoteness for residence and property postcodes was calculated using the Accessibility/Remoteness 
Index of Australia (ALA 2016). 
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Fig. 5.1. Clearing hotspots within participants’ postcodes. Land clearing rates of (a) all woody 
vegetation and (b) remnant woody vegetation during 2013–2016 as percent of 400 km2 pixel area. (c) 
Total clearing and (d) remnant clearing rates for residential and property postcodes reported in survey. 
 
5.4.2 Participants 
 
Farmers/graziers, landowners, and/or members of farming families who lived in Queensland, 
Australia were recruited by a social research company to complete an anonymous telephone interview 
(or equivalent online survey, if preferred). The study received ethical clearance prior to 
commencement (Approval #2017001054). All participants provided informed consent and were 
surveyed during May 2018. The final sample (N = 265) consisted of predominantly male participants 
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(72%), 80% of which managed one or more production properties, and the remainder largely 
represented members of farming families. Of the 211 land managers, 72% were the primary decision-
maker in the family; most others made joint decisions with other family members. The average 
participant was 62 years old. Land managers had been managing their current production property 
for an average of 34 years. Most participants lived in moderately remote regions of Queensland, 
typically within proximity to rural towns. The sample comprised a variety of education and income 
levels (Appendix M). 
 
5.4.3 Survey 
 
5.4.3.1 Variables for land clearing typologies 
 
Five variables were used to generate clearing typologies for land managers (Table 5.1). Four items 
measured the frequency with which land managers had cleared trees in the last five years for relevant 
(i.e. permitted) purposes, and two items for non-relevant (i.e. prohibited) purposes, as defined by the 
most recent 2018 amendment of the VMA (0 = ‘never’ to 4 = ‘very often’). The same scale measured 
their frequency of clearing the following amounts of trees (including tree regrowth): single trees, <1 
ha, 1–5 ha, 5–10 ha, >10 ha. A weighted value of 0.10, 0.50, 2.50, 7.50, and 15.0 was attributed to 
each clearing amount, respectively, and multiplied by their respective score (0 to 4). The final 
continuous scale for clearing amount represented the sum of each land manager’s weighted clearing 
scores (0 to 102.4). Land managers’ perception of their clearing amount relative to other farmers was 
measured on a five point scale (1 = ‘much less than others’ to 5 = ‘much more than others’). Their 
intentions to clear trees during the next six months was measured on a six point scale (1 = ‘strongly 
disagree’ to 6 = ‘strongly agree’) adapted from Fielding et al. (2008). 
 
5.4.3.2 Variables for psychosocial typologies 
 
The following variables were used to generate psychosocial clusters: attitudes toward tree clearing 
and VMA regulations, relative threat of the VMA, negative emotions to the VMA, and social norms 
for tree clearing and VMA disobedience (Table 5.1). Most items were scored on a six point scale (1 
= ‘strongly disagree’ to 6 = ‘strongly agree’). The relative threat of the VMA was calculated based 
on participants’ response to the prompt, “To what degree do the following pose a threat to the land in 
your area/the property you manage?” (1 = ‘no threat’ to 6 = ‘severe threat’) for a list of relevant 
potential threats, such as drought, pest species, and vegetation management regulations. The final 
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continuous score was calculated by taking the average difference in threat level of ‘vegetation 
management regulations’ from all other threats (−5 = ‘lowest threat’ to 5 = ‘highest threat’). 
 
Table 5.1. Description of the survey items including the scale and Cronbach’s alpha (a) of single 
scores generated for multi-item scales. Complete table with all survey items in Table K1. 
Variables Items Scale a 
Clearing Purposes * In the last 5 years, how often have you cleared trees from your 
property for the following purposes?   
     Relevant      Restorative purposes (e.g. thinning) [0, 4] 0.758  
     Necessary maintenance (e.g. regrowth or weed removal)    
     Infrastructure (e.g. fences, barns or sheds)    
     Fodder development or expansion   
     Not Relevant      High-value agriculture development or expansion [0, 4] 0.709  
     Pasture development or expansion   
Clearing Amount * In the last 5 years, how often have you cleared the following 
amount of trees from your property? [0, 102.4]
 ‡  
 
     Single trees [0, 4]   
     Less than 1 hectare (ha) [0, 4]   
     1 - 5 ha [0, 4]   
     5 - 10 ha [0, 4]   
     More than 10 ha [0, 4]  
Clearing Amount Relative to Others * Compared to other farmers/graziers in your community, do you 
think you clear trees more or less than they do? 
[1, 5]  
Clearing Intentions (next 6 months) * "I intend to engage in tree clearing on my property during the 
next 6 months." 
[1, 6]  
Attitudes **    
     Pro-Clearing I am concerned about the rate of tree clearing in Queensland † [1, 6] 0.819  
Tree clearing should be stopped †    
People are clearing too many trees †    
People who clear trees from their property do not care about the 
environment †   
     Anti-VMA In my opinion, vegetation management regulations… [1, 6] 0.648  
     Are a burden to me    
     Are fair to farmers †    
     Are necessary †    
     Should be more strict †   
Relative threat of the VMA ** To what degree do the following pose a threat to the property 
you manage? 
[−5, 5] ‡  
      Drought and extreme weather [1, 6]  
      Pest species (e.g. feral cats, pigs, foxes, rabbits) [1, 6]  
      Mining activities [1, 6]  
      Your personal health and well-being [1, 6]  
      Escalating costs of running the business [1, 6]  
      Changing prices for agricultural products [1, 6]  
      Vegetation management regulations [1, 6]  
      Chemical and pesticide use regulations [1, 6]  
Emotions to Regulations ** When you think about vegetation management regulations in 
Queensland, do you feel…   
     Negative      Angry [1, 6] 0.859  
     Depressed    
     Anxious    
     Exhausted   
Social Norms **    
     Tree clearing Most of the farmers in my community clear trees [1, 6]  
     Disobeying regulations Most of the farmers in my community follow the vegetation 
management regulations † 
[1, 6]  
* Variables used for clearing clusters 
** Variables used for psychosocial clusters 
† Scores reversed for analysis 
‡ Scale of computed score differs from items’ scale; see main text for calculation 
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5.4.3.3 Variables describing both typologies 
 
Additional psychosocial variables described the resulting clusters for both typologies (see Table K1 
for survey items). Perceived behavioural control was measured using items of controllability and 
self-efficacy (Cronbach’s a = 0.669) adapted from Rhodes and Courneya (2003). Two items 
measured participants’ trust in the Queensland Government (a = 0.712), and two distinct measures 
of security represented the perceived threat of the VMA to their lifestyle (“I am confident that I can 
enjoy a comfortable lifestyle while following vegetation management regulations”) and livelihood 
(“Vegetation management regulations are a threat to my business or livelihood”). Participants’ 
definition of a ‘good farmer’ was measured according to five qualities: profit-maximizing, altruistic, 
law-abiding, productivity-maximizing, and lifestyle-focused. Awareness of norms was measured for 
land managers based on two items, “I know how most farmers in my area manage their land” and 
“Most farmers in my area know how I manage my land” (a = 0.797), while those who did not manage 
a property received only the former item. Financial strain was measured by three items (a = 0.712) 
from Ullah (1990). Life satisfaction was measured using an 11 point scale developed by IWG (2013). 
A single score for participation in voluntary programs was calculated based on their average rate of 
participation in programs, such as land management agreements and conservation covenants. 
Respondents who had participated in at least one of these programs were asked which incentives for 
participation were their main reasons for participating (select top three choices), with five suggested 
items based on results from Kabii and Horwitz (2006). Similarly, those who had not participated in 
at least one program were asked about their main barriers to participation from a list of five items. 
Some psychosocial variables were most relevant to land managers and thus were only 
presented to this group (N = 211). Three items from Maybery et al. (2005) measured relevant 
economic values (a = 0.747), lifestyle values (a = 0.748), and conservation values (a = 0.743), and 
two items from Gosling and Williams (2010) measured place attachment (a = 0.644). Land 
managers’ self-identity as a ‘good farmer’ was measured based on their score for “I think of myself 
as a ‘good farmer.’” Four items adapted from De Baets and Buelens (2012) measured different types 
of loss aversion relevant to land managers: possessions, profits, autonomy, and land. Two measures 
of social capital relevant for Queensland farmers—agricultural and community group membership—
were adapted from ESS (2016). Demographic characteristics recorded in the survey included age, 
gender, education, income, postcode of main place of residence, and the number of years they have 
lived at their current residence. For those identifying as a land manager, we also recorded the 
postcode(s) their property is located in, the number of years they have managed their current property, 
if they currently (or within the last four years) have trees on their property, and if they are primarily 
responsible for making land management decisions on this property. 
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5.4.4 Analysis 
 
A total of 180 participants (68%) met the following criteria to be included in the clearing typology 
analysis: (1) manages a production property, (2) currently has trees on their property or had trees on 
their property in the last four years, and (3) answered all questions that were used to generate clusters. 
This excluded 14% of land managers from the analysis. Ward’s method for hierarchical 
agglomerative clustering (Ward 1963) using squared Euclidean distance produced the strongest 
clustering of the data compared to other methods (agglomerative coefficient, ac = 0.973). The ‘elbow’ 
(Ketchen Jr. & Shook 1996) and gap statistic (Tibshirani et al. 2001) methods for determining cluster 
cut-offs identified a three- and five-cluster solution to be optimal, respectively. The three-cluster 
solution over-represented participants in the second cluster (45%), while the five-cluster solution 
produced a cluster containing only 13% of land managers. The four-cluster solution was chosen as a 
compromise between cut-off methods, cluster representation, and conceptual relevance. 
Psychosocial typologies were created for all participants (N = 265). Following the same 
cluster methodology above (Ward’s ac = 0.963), the ‘elbow’ method and gap statistic identified a 
four-cluster solution to be optimal. This solution, however, grouped 47% of participants into the first 
cluster. The five-cluster solution split this cluster into 26% and 21% of participants and produced a 
conceptually important distinction between the two new clusters; thus the five-cluster solution was 
selected for further analysis. Differences between clusters were first identified using the Kruskal-
Wallis H test (Kruskal & Wallis 1952). A series of logistic regression models were developed using 
the significant variables identified in the K-W tests in order to identify significant drivers of individual 
cluster membership (Dean et al. 2016). To identify the most parsimonious model explaining cluster 
membership, the model with the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC) resulting from sequential 
parameter reduction was selected for each cluster (Fig. L1). For the psychosocial typologies (land 
managers and non-managers), the following variables differed significantly between typologies but 
were excluded from further analysis due to their relevance for land managers only: values, self-
identity, loss aversion, barriers to program participation, and most measures of clearing behaviour. 
Model fit was assessed using McFadden’s pseudo R-squared (McFadden 1974). 
 
5.5 Results 
 
5.5.1 Participant characteristics 
 
Overall, participants scored highly on pro-clearing and anti-VMA attitudes (Fig. 5.2). Most 
participants did not view tree clearing or disobedience of VMA regulations to be the norm in their 
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community, and they generally agreed that they were aware of how others manage their land. 
Participants largely felt a diminished sense of security from the VMA, but the severity of the VMA 
threat was relatively equal to other threats facing farming communities. A diminished sense of 
behavioural control and strong lack of trust in the Queensland Government was also common 
amongst participants. While most did not express positive emotions toward the VMA, the majority 
did not express very strong negative emotions. Land managers scored highly on economic values and 
very high on lifestyle and conservation values, as well as place attachment. Most managers stated that 
they occasionally clear for VMA-relevant purposes and rarely for non-relevant purposes. The 
reported amount of clearing varied between participants, with an average clearing rate of similar 
magnitude to frequently clearing 1–5 ha or occasionally clearing 5–10 ha of trees. The majority 
believed that they clear trees almost as much as others in their community and do not anticipate 
clearing any trees within the next six months. Additional characteristics of participants can be found 
in Tables L1 and L2. 
 
    
Fig. 5.2. Mean and standard deviation of landholders’ scores across select variables. All variables 
were scored on a 1 to 6 scale. See main text for scale descriptions for each variable. Complete 
summary statistics for all variables included in the analysis are available in Tables L1 and L2. 
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5.5.2 Clearing typologies 
 
Throughout this section, we refer to ‘land managers’ as those participants meeting the aforementioned 
criteria for inclusion in the clearing typology analysis. The following clearing typologies were 
identified (Fig. 5.3):  
• Inactive Clearers: land managers clear less frequently than all other typologies for relevant 
and non-relevant purposes, clear a minimal amount of trees, believe they clear less than others 
in their community, and do not intend to clear in the next six months; 
• Irregular Clearers: land managers clear for relevant and non-relevant purposes more 
frequently than the average participant, yet they clear fewer trees than the average participant, 
and they recognise that they clear less than others in their community; 
• Perceived Active Clearers: land managers tend to rank their relative clearing behaviour higher 
than other clusters and are more likely to clear in the next six months; 
• Active Clearers: land managers clear more often for relevant and non-relevant purposes, clear 
a much larger amount of trees, tend to rank their relative clearing behaviour higher than other 
clusters, and have very strong intentions to clear in the next six months. 
 
 
Fig. 5.3. Composition of the four clearing typologies identified for land managers. Mean standardized 
z-scores for variables outside the confidence interval of the mean (CI = 0.146) were considered 
high/low, and those exceeding one SD were considered very high/very low. Number of land managers 
within each typology: inactive clearers (n = 62), irregular clearers (n = 35), perceived active clearers 
(n = 46), active clearers (n = 37). 
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Significant differences between clearing typologies were identified for the following 
variables: values, attitudes, relative VMA threat, emotions, social norms, awareness of norms, life 
satisfaction, clearing influences, voluntary program participation, age, and remoteness (Table M1). 
Membership within the active clearers typology had the greatest explanatory power (AIC = 126.35, 
McFadden R2 = 0.390) (Table 5.2). Active clearers were uniquely characterised as younger 
landholders, with strong anti-regulation attitudes and strongly influenced by droughts and the 
aesthetic value of trees. Inactive clearers had stronger pro-regulation attitudes and were less 
influenced by the costs attributed to clearing. The contrast between irregular and perceived active 
clearers is most pronounced in the strength of their economic values and local clearing norms, with 
irregular clearers having weaker economic values despite living in a normative clearing 
environment. Interestingly, where clearing is perceived to be the norm, active and irregular clearers 
are found, and where clearing is not the norm, inactive and perceived active clearers are found. For 
more detailed descriptions of the typology characteristics, see Appendix N. 
 
Table 5.2. Coefficients* of the variables included in the models of clearing typology membership. 
Variable† Inactive Clearers 
Irregular 
Clearers 
Perceived 
Active Clearers 
Active 
Clearers 
Age 0.03 (0.02)   −0.06 (0.02)‡ 
Voluntary Program Participation −0.84 (0.28)‡ 0.41 (0.29)  0.46 (0.35) 
Life satisfaction  −0.30 (0.11)‡ 0.15 (0.11)  
Awareness of Norms −0.27 (0.17)    
Values     
     Economic −0.26 (0.19) −0.43 (0.20)‡ 0.49 (0.19)‡ 0.52 (0.28) 
Social Norms     
     Tree clearing −0.30 (0.12)‡ 0.30 (0.13)‡ −0.33 (0.13)‡ 0.55 (0.18)‡ 
Remoteness     
     Residence postcode 0.06 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07) −0.15 (0.07)‡  
Emotions to Regulations     
     Negative  0.32 (0.17)  −0.25 (0.22) 
Attitudes     
     Pro-clearing   −0.32 (0.20)   
     Anti-regulations −0.40 (0.20)‡   0.62 (0.31)‡ 
Clearing Influences     
     Aesthetics  −0.30 (0.14)‡  0.48 (0.15)‡ 
     Droughts   −0.37 (0.15)‡ 0.42 (0.15)‡ 
     Costs −0.32 (0.11)‡  0.17 (0.12)  
     Profitability   0.19 (0.14)  
     Regulations   0.21 (0.12)  
     Policy uncertainty    0.15 (0.14) 
Sample size 170 172 172 173 
AIC 187.50 157.28 182.85 126.35 
McFadden pseudo R2 0.218 0.172 0.166 0.390 
* Coefficients, mean (SD), represent the percent change in membership probability per 1% change in the explanatory 
variable. 
† Variables not retained in the final models: relative VMA threat, influence of agricultural prices on clearing. 
‡ p < 0.05 
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5.5.3 Psychosocial typologies 
 
The following psychosocial typologies were identified (Fig. 5.4): 
• Refusers: participants have very strong pro-clearing and anti-regulation attitudes, stronger 
negative emotions toward the VMA, view VMA regulations as a more severe threat to their 
area, and tend to believe more people in their community may not be following these 
regulations; 
• Reluctant Acceptors: participants have very strong pro-clearing and anti-regulation attitudes, 
stronger negative emotions toward the VMA, view VMA regulations as a more severe threat 
to their area, yet they believe most people in their community follow these regulations; 
• Neutrals: participants view VMA regulations as a less severe threat to their area and believe 
most people in their community abstain from tree clearing and follow the regulations; 
• Acceptors: participants have weaker pro-clearing and anti-regulation attitudes, weaker 
negative emotions toward the VMA, yet they believe most people in their community are 
clearing trees and more people may be disobeying regulations; 
• Supporters: participants have very strong anti-clearing and pro-regulation attitudes, minimal 
negative emotions toward the VMA, view VMA regulations as a much lower threat to their 
area than others, and despite believing most people are abstaining from tree clearing, they 
tend to believe people in their community are disobeying regulations more than the average 
participant. 
Significant differences between psychosocial typologies were identified for the following variables: 
‘good farmer’ definition, trust, security, emotions, perceived behavioural control, norm awareness, 
and remoteness (Table M2). According to the most parsimonious model, membership within the 
supporters typology had the greatest explanatory power (AIC = 125.71, McFadden R2 = 0.444) (Table 
5.3). Perceptions about the impact of vegetation management regulations on lifestyle or livelihoods 
were strongly associated with most psychosocial typologies. Expectedly, landholders with a greater 
sense of security (neutrals and supporters) viewed clearing to be atypical in their community, and 
they were the only ones who did not view the VMA as a substantial threat. Those with the strongest 
anti-regulation attitudes (refusers and reluctant acceptors) were more likely to perceive that the VMA 
threatened their livelihood and lifestyle. Landholders who reported being aware of others’ land 
management behaviours (reluctant acceptors and neutrals) tend to agree that farmers are obeying 
regulations, and abstaining from tree clearing is the norm. In contrast, those who reported being least 
aware of others’ behaviours (refusers and acceptors) have a greater tendency to believe that people 
are more disobedient and more likely to be clearing trees. For more detailed descriptions of the 
typology characteristics, see Appendix N. 
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Fig. 5.4. Composition of the five psychosocial typologies identified for participants. Mean 
standardized z-scores for variables outside the confidence interval of the mean (CI = 0.120) were 
considered high/low, and those exceeding one SD were considered very high/very low. Number of 
participants within each typology: refusers (n = 55), reluctant acceptors (n = 69), neutrals (n = 49), 
acceptors (n = 57), supporters (n = 35). 
 
 
Table 5.3. Coefficients* of the variables included in the models of psychosocial typology 
membership. 
Variable† Refusers Reluctant Acceptors Neutrals Acceptors Supporters 
Awareness of Norms −0.35 (0.15)‡ 0.48 (0.18)‡ 0.42 (0.16)‡ −0.45 (0.13)‡ −0.33 (0.20) 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.32 (0.17) −0.31 (0.18) −0.24 (0.16) 0.09 (0.16) 0.51 (0.21)‡ 
Trust in the Government −1.61 (0.64)‡   0.20 (0.20)  
Sense of Security      
     Lifestyle −0.30 (0.15)‡ −0.31 (0.14)‡ 0.12 (0.12) 0.05 (0.12) 0.57 (0.18)‡ 
     Livelihood  −0.42 (0.11)‡ 0.27 (0.10)‡  0.58 (0.18)‡ 
Emotions to Regulations      
     Positive −0.34 (0.19) −0.39 (0.18)‡  0.22 (0.13) 0.37 (0.19)‡ 
Remoteness      
     Residence postcode  0.09 (0.05) −0.05 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) −0.21 (0.09)‡ 
Good Farmer Identity      
     Law-abiding −0.37 (0.12)‡ 0.40 (0.14)‡    
Sample size 264 257 257 257 257 
AIC 234.92 216.56 236.47 257.50 125.71 
McFadden pseudo R2 0.174 0.325 0.071 0.096 0.444 
* Coefficients, mean (SD), represent the percent change in membership probability per 1% change in the explanatory 
variable. 
‡ p < 0.05 
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5.5.4 Typologies in the landscape 
 
Supporters were the only psychosocial typology to differ significantly from statistical expectation 
within the clearing landscape, with a disproportionately low number residing in high clearing 
postcodes for all woody vegetation (Pearson’s c2 = 16.37, df = 8, p = 0.037) (Fig. O1). No significant 
relationship between psychosocial typology and remnant clearing hotspots was observed (Fisher’s 
exact test, p = 0.451). Membership of clearing typologies was associated with residential postcode 
clearing hotspots (Fig. O2): a disproportionately high number of inactive clearers resided in low 
clearing postcodes, and the majority of participants residing in high-clearing postcodes were active 
clearers (c2 = 23.20, df = 6, p < 0.001) (Fig. 5.5). In contrast, no significant relationship between 
clearing typology and remnant clearing hotspots was observed (p = 0.229). Similar relationships were 
observed when considering the postcodes of managers’ production properties: most managers within 
high total clearing postcodes were active clearers (c2 = 18.78, df = 6, p = 0.005), and no relationship 
was found according to remnant clearing postcodes (p = 0.307). The majority of land managers 
classified as supporters were also classified as inactive clearers (c2 = 21.58, df = 12, p = 0.043). 
Surprisingly, no other relationships were identified between typologies. Inactive and irregular 
clearers could be found in most psychosocial clusters in relatively equal densities, and active clearers 
were often reluctant acceptors or acceptors (Fig. P1). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.5. Concentration of clearing typologies within the landscape. Characteristics of the two most 
contrasting clearing typologies are displayed, including unique drivers of typology membership and 
their prevalence throughout post codes included in the study area. 
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5.6 Discussion 
 
The results of this study highlight the heterogeneity of landholders throughout Queensland, as well 
as the inherent complexity in determining distinct farmer typologies in such dynamic agricultural 
landscapes, as has been identified in previous studies (e.g. Emtage et al. 2007). The psychosocial 
typologies are reflective of the spectrum of farmer typologies previously identified in the Wet Tropics 
of Queensland (Emtage & Herbohn 2012), which was based on potential adoption of ‘best 
management practices.’ Interestingly, Queensland landholders differ from those in the neighbouring 
state of New South Wales, where landholders were distinctly separated into economic, lifestyle, and 
conservation value-oriented typologies (Maybery et al. 2005), unlike most landholders in this study. 
This emphasises the uniqueness of farmer typologies and the need to investigate the personal and 
cultural dimensions of land management behaviour on a case-by-case basis. The range of 
psychosocial drivers of typology membership investigated in this study extends our understanding of 
what influences tree clearing, with social norms, identity, trust, and security playing crucial roles. In 
the remainder of this discussion, we expand upon the role of these social drivers, highlight the major 
issues that must be addressed, and describe mixed-method approaches to promote sustainable 
vegetation management behaviours across Queensland. 
 
5.6.1 Challenges and opportunities: the role of social drivers 
 
5.6.1.1 Clearing typologies 
 
The intricacies of defining clearing typologies are most apparent in the intermediate typologies: 
irregular clearers and perceived active clearers. Values have been known to act as broad, underlying 
determinants of behaviour (Stern et al. 1999; Roccas et al. 2002), and their influence on self-
perceptions of clearing is apparent in irregular and perceived active clearers. Situated in a normative 
clearing environment, the significantly weaker economic values of irregular clearers may contribute 
to their disproportionately low perception of their own clearing behaviours, particularly if they clear 
primarily for maintenance or necessity, which would explain their frequent small-scale clearing 
efforts. In contrast, perceived active clearers have stronger economic values and perceive themselves 
to be clearing much more than others, despite clearing as much as the average participant in this 
study; because these landholders are situated within more urban areas, this inflated self-perception 
may be indicative of a different reference point from landholders in more remote areas where clearing 
is more common. If they are aware of clearing norms, the relatively strong clearing intentions of 
perceived active clearers indicates two potential roles for them within their community: (1) they are 
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‘lone-wolf’ active clearers situated in areas under-represented in this survey, where their minimal 
amount of clearing is, in fact, very high in their community; (2) they represent up-and-coming active 
clearers that may have recently began clearing greater areas of trees, whose clearing history has yet 
to reflect future clearing behaviours. 
The lack of influence of economic values, potential profitability of clearing, and financial 
strain on the two most contrasting clearing typologies (active and inactive clearers) is an important 
result. Despite some studies, and farmer testimonials, highlighting the importance of financial 
motivations and incentives for driving environmental behaviour (Productivity Commission 2004; 
Maybery et al. 2005; Sorice et al. 2013), the characteristics of these contrasting clearers are driven 
primarily by other psychosocial factors. It is possible that for landholders in Queensland, financial 
incentives are necessary but not sufficient for change, and they may need to be accompanied by 
psychological approaches for meaningful change in clearing behaviours (Burton et al. 2008).  
Characteristics of our clearing typologies appear to lend support to the influence of attitudes and 
norms as indicated by psychological theories (Ajzen 1985; Klöckner 2013), but the lack of influence 
of control or security—in contrast to the psychosocial typologies—is surprising. This missing 
component, encompassing measures of security, self-efficacy, and controllability (Bandura 2001), 
may be an underlying issue that affects all types of clearers. If these core issues can be addressed, it 
may have beneficial flow-on effects into the more direct drivers of clearing typology membership. 
While active and inactive clearers do not tend to overlap as often in the landscape (consistent 
with their reported clearing norms), irregular and perceived active clearers are present throughout 
low- and high-clearing regions. The interaction between land managers’ perceptions of tree clearing 
norms and their own clearing behaviours relative to this norm is important for defining clearing 
typology characteristics. For example, inactive clearers are situated in communities where clearing 
is atypical, which may provoke or enhance their anti-clearing and pro-regulation attitudes, but the 
prevalence of tree clearing in active clearers’ communities with stronger clearing norms may 
strengthen anti-regulation attitudes and spur more vested interests in protesting ongoing changes to 
the VMA—especially given the influence of recent droughts for making clearing decisions, which 
was a significant point of argument from rural farmers during recent Parliamentary debate (Bond & 
Bhole 2018). Active clearers were also the only typology to be strongly influenced by the aesthetic 
value of trees in making clearing decisions. While this has been previously identified as a key driver 
of tree retention in the Brigalow Belt bioregion of Queensland (Seabrook et al. 2008), it is surprising 
that this characteristic is unique to the most prevalent clearers. If these landholders are located in 
communities with high rates of tree loss, this may result in positive environmental feedbacks, 
whereby the aesthetic value of trees becomes increasingly important as native vegetation becomes 
scarce. 
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5.6.1.2 Psychosocial typologies 
 
The most prominent characteristics distinguishing psychosocial typologies from one another —their 
sense of security—reflect previous reports from farmers most opposed to ongoing VMA regulations 
regarding the perceived threats to local livelihoods and autonomy (Productivity Commission 2004; 
Senate Inquiry 2010). Previous research has shown that people with greater degrees of security and 
self-determination are more likely to engage in environmentally-friendly behaviours because they 
believe they have a greater degree of choice (Villacorta et al. 2003; de Groot & Steg 2010). Given 
the significance of security to psychosocial typology classification, tackling the broader issues of 
security, autonomy, and flexibility may promote the transition of more refusers or reluctant acceptors 
into neutrals or supporters, though trust will be a significant barrier, particularly for refusers. 
It is interesting that landholders who state they are more aware of others’ land management 
behaviours believe there are few behavioural issues (i.e. farmers are obeying the laws and tree 
clearing is relatively uncommon), while those who state they are less aware tend to believe the 
opposite is occurring. Landholders’ perceptions can play a critical role in modifying environmental 
behaviour (Fielding et al. 2005), as they provide a benchmark for comparison of their own behaviours 
relative to those of the community (Schultz et al. 2007; Kinzig et al. 2013). There appears to be an 
important interaction between landholders’ perceptions and awareness of these norms that is 
influencing their membership into the psychosocial typologies. For example, acceptors were the only 
typology to consider tree clearing to be normative behaviour, yet their diminished awareness of 
norms—the lowest of all typologies—may skew their perception of reality, potentially leading to a 
rationale that government intervention is a justifiable solution to a normalised problem. 
It is possible that perceived norms may influence landholders’ sense of security. For example, 
neutrals see the burden of regulations on landholders, yet they may have a greater sense of security 
because they do not perceive clearing or disobedience to be a significant issue. Additionally, in more 
urban areas where clearing is less the norm, perceptions of rural farmers’ outrage over the VMA may 
influence supporters’ greater sense of sense of security and behavioural control from government 
intervention. Numerous studies have highlighted this interplay between norms, attitudes, and 
perceived control or security on environmental behaviours, though the directionality of influence is 
often case-specific (Fielding et al. 2005; Price & Leviston 2014; Zeweld et al. 2017). Moreover, it is 
likely that social norms and ‘good farmer’ identity work synergistically, playing a crucial role in 
distinguishing the two typologies of landholders that should be prioritised for conservation efforts: 
refusers and reluctant acceptors. Despite large similarities between the two, reluctant acceptors 
primarily distinguish themselves from refusers due to their unique emphasis on defining ‘good 
farmers’ as law-abiding citizens. Because identity theory posits that individuals will act in accordance 
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with their self-identity (Tajfel 1981; Fielding et al. 2008), landholders’ identity is thus an important 
component to target for conservation interventions (Seabrook & Higgins 1988; Sulemana & James 
Jr. 2014). 
 
5.6.2 Pathways to change 
 
This study has identified two complementary sets of landholder typologies across Queensland based 
upon numerous psychosocial and demographic factors. Identifying the types of landholders present, 
and the factors that influence their clearing behaviours, can highlight different strategies for 
promoting change in clearing behaviours. Characteristics and aggregation of the typologies in the 
landscape can allow regional natural resource management (NRM) organizations to tailor local 
extension programs for specific landholder groups (Emtage et al. 2007; Greiner 2015).  It has been 
argued that collective change in vegetation management requires effective communication and 
engagement at both localized, community-based scales, and larger population scales (Siepen & 
Westrup 2002). Communicating for behaviour change—sometimes referred to as ‘nudging’ 
(Michalek et al. 2015; Reddy et al. 2016)—involves targeting psychological drivers of behaviour.  
For example, experimental studies show that communicating positive social norms can strengthen 
landholder intentions to continue in environmental schemes (Kuhfuss et al. 2016). Below, we outline 
a number of top-down and bottom-up strategies that could be used within both localized engagement 
and large-scale communication activities to tackle the key factors driving membership into refusers, 
reluctant acceptors, and active clearers (Fig. 5.6).  
While refusers were most untrusting of the Queensland Government, trust was exceptionally 
low for most landholders; this raises the challenge of how to best improve trust in the government in 
the context of these contested spaces. When coupled with a reduced sense of security, control, and 
autonomy provoked by policy intervention, it is likely that most attempts at intervention will fail if 
these barriers are not targeted for immediate change (Moon & Cocklin 2011; Sorice et al. 2013; Price 
& Leviston 2014). Combatting this lack of trust will require long-term relationship building between 
the farming community and government. Some surveyed landholders expressed disappointment that 
their relationship with the former Department of Primary Industries has been dissolved, stating that 
the help they received from this resource was “quite amazing,” and its amalgamation into other 
departments has had negative effects on the community. Such relationships need to be cultivated 
across Queensland once again, as personal communication is most successful at building trust 
between actors (Siepen & Westrup 2002). Several landholders also suggested more on-the-ground 
projects, including educational programs, community-led projects, and land clearing forums with 
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Fig. 5.6. Proposed path of influence for targeted behaviour change strategies. This mix of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches for behaviour change represent overarching strategies for Queensland 
landholders (communication, dissemination), strategies targeting psychosocial typologies (choosing 
message content), and strategies targeting tree clearing typologies (social learning, networks). 
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diverse stakeholder representation, and many indicated that they occasionally used the advice of 
industry experts, agronomists, or ‘best practice’ articles to inform their land management decisions. 
It is important to highlight that learning about how to respond to a problem (procedural knowledge) 
is more likely to support new behaviours than factual-based learning about a problem (Kaiser & 
Fuhrer 2003; Dean et al. 2018). Particularly, if farmers do not have extensive experience working 
under such heavy regulatory conditions, facilitating the development of their adaptive skills in this 
context may make it easier to adjust to top-down interventions. As one landholder stated, “The 
farmers want to be left alone unless they can be convinced they are genuinely being helped” (emphasis 
added). Thus, the most successful bottom-up approaches to trust building (and progressive behaviour 
change) will likely need to promote local knowledge exchange, strengthen adaptive capacity, identify 
and prioritise solutions to local issues, and increase community involvement in managing these issues. 
Regarding the VMA regulations, landholders have criticized its transparency, scientific 
legitimacy, spatial accuracy of vegetation maps, and underlying agenda (Productivity Commission 
2004; Senate Inquiry 2010). Most recently, farmers in the Mulga Lands have issued a call to 
Parliament to clarify whether they are allowed to harvest fodder to feed cattle during drought under 
the 2018 VMA amendments (Queensland Times 2018). Effective communication is critical here. As 
one landholder stated in the survey, “communication with all the community and cooperation are the 
two most important things.” The use of personal communication, community involvement, and 
promotion of trusted mentors or local champions to disseminate political and scientific information 
can be effective tools to engage landholders at multiple levels (Siepen & Westrup 2002; Haq et al. 
2013), as was observed after the enactment of the VMA, when the government implemented the 
short-lived Vegetation Management Extension Framework to promote knowledge exchange between 
landholders and policy-makers (Westrup 2001). Changing clearing norms, and simultaneously 
enhancing landholders’ awareness of these norms, will require emphasising normative pro-
environmental behaviours, while promoting communication via social groups, advice and support 
networks, and collective learning (Bandura 2001; Price & Leviston 2014; Mills et al. 2017).  
 The majority of landholders held high lifestyle and conservation values. Despite the 
agreement of these results with those observed in graziers of northern Queensland (Greiner & Gregg 
2011), many landholders report frustration at what they believe are misconceptions about farmers and 
rural life, where they are portrayed as villains in the vegetation management story. Many survey 
participants emphasized this issue: e.g. “recognition for conservation works on the farm goes 
unnoticed,” “people have to remember the good work that has been done […] they are good people 
and attached to the land and want to do the right thing on conservation issues.” Importantly, active 
clearers are also highly influenced by the aesthetic values of trees. The key to effective 
communication here lies in promoting these stewardship values and identities of landholders. 
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Conservation policy instruments promoting positive norms, positive perceptions, and greater 
awareness of issues and impacts are more likely to promote behaviour change and increase program 
participation (Moon et al. 2012; Bennett 2016; Kuhfuss et al. 2016). Previous studies have argued 
that framing messages of agricultural conservation around land stewardship behaviours (rather than 
anti-environmental behaviours) and the role of farmers as stewards of the land will be most successful 
in creating change (Greiner & Gregg 2011; Price & Leviston 2014; Greiner 2015). Behaviour change 
strategies should thus be targeted toward the most prolific clearers, emphasise landholders’ intrinsic 
values and support for nature, and highlight the successes and rewards of farmers making significant 
strides to improve the natural environment. As one landholder put it, “What would make a massive 
difference is if rural producers were rewarded and applauded for their current commitments and the 
true story of the good [that] ordinary people are doing every day to make a difference to themselves, 
the health of their land, their produce and the greater community and environment.” 
Importantly, there are a number of factors excluded from this study that should be considered 
when developing these conservation targets. First, the questions in our survey did not distinguish 
remnant (protected) and non-remnant (typically unprotected) trees, but rather addressed tree clearing 
as a whole. This was done to avoid soliciting information of potentially illegal clearing behaviours 
from landholders, which could diminish participant trust in our survey, leading to false or incomplete 
results. Given landholders’ responses and their situation in the landscape, there is a high likelihood 
that participants answered honestly to clearing questions, but these typologies may change if only 
illegal clearing behaviours were studied. Second, some factors driving environmental behaviour that 
have been identified elsewhere were not measured in this study, such as subjective norms (van Dijk 
et al. 2016), farm size (Seabrook et al. 2008), political identity (Unsworth & Fielding 2014), and tree 
planting behaviours (Gosling & Williams 2010). The typologies created in this study, however, are 
based upon relevant characteristics that can be useful to researchers, practitioners, NRM 
organizations, and government representatives for identifying targets for behaviour change (Emtage 
& Herbohn 2012). Finally, additional data should be collected from Queensland farmers in other 
clearing hot- and cold-spots to create a larger representative map of typologies across the state. Given 
the reliability of identifying our active and inactive clearers in the clearing landscape, it is important 
that behaviour change interventions target proximate drivers of tree clearing (drivers of clearing 
typology membership), knowing that successful strategies will have positive flow-on effects to 
changing the underlying social drivers of clearing (drivers of psychosocial typology membership). 
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5.7 Conclusions 
 
Native vegetation management has become deeply embedded into the moral framework of farming 
culture in Queensland, transforming tree clearing codes into profound issues surrounding property 
rights, trust, and economic and environmental sustainability. Diverse approaches are needed to 
capture a thorough understanding of the myriad of internal and external drivers of landholders’ tree 
clearing decision-making. We have identified a number of opportunities for engagement and 
communication strategies to target key underlying psychosocial issues provoked by command-and-
control policy in order to create sustainable behaviour change. If new top-down and bottom-up 
approaches can be developed that (1) emphasise the roles, knowledge, and concerns of landholders, 
(2) are open and adaptable to new information and two-way learning, and (3) can adequately capture 
the complex human dimensions of tree clearing, then it is likely that landholders will become more 
responsive to vegetation management policy instruments. 
 
5.8 List of Appendices for Chapter 5 
 
Appendix J: Ethics approval letter. 
Appendix K: Full list of survey items included in the analysis. 
Appendix L: Results of model selection for all typologies. 
Appendix M: Summary of participants’ responses to all variables. 
Appendix N: Detailed typology descriptions. 
Appendix O: Results of the relationship between typologies and clearing hotspots. 
Appendix P: Results of the relationship between clearing and psychosocial typologies. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
6.1 The dimensionality of tree clearing: a synthesis 
 
The chapters of this thesis have illuminated critical drivers of tree clearing across multiple dimensions 
of land management decision-making that are often singularly considered, if they are considered at 
all. The findings are both timely and crucial for the development of future vegetation management 
policy interventions. By examining historical clearing behaviour trends, providing evidence and 
rationales of intervention successes and failures, and generating more comprehensive frameworks of 
behavioural influence through a multi-dimensional lens, this thesis fills an important gap in our 
understanding of how environmental regulations like the Vegetation Management Act can directly 
and indirectly influence the compliant and non-compliant responses of landholders targeted for 
behaviour change. Although it may be impossible to completely disentangle the linkages between 
these dimensions of decision-making, it is important to understand the key driving factors within each 
dimension so that potential feedback effects can be accounted for when adapting vegetation 
management policy instruments.   
 
6.1.1 Biophysical factors 
 
Chapter 2 verified the standard assumptions regarding aggregate tree clearing patterns of landholders 
across Queensland: areas that are most suitable for pasture development and expansion are the 
primary targets for landholders’ clearing regimes. These various spatial characteristics defining the 
agricultural suitability of the landscape accounted for more than 50% of the variance observed in 
clearing patterns in most regions of the state. Chapter 3 confirmed the influence of climate 
characteristics on both metrics of forest cover dynamics across spatial scales, highlighting both the 
importance of ecological characteristics and stochastic events, such as long periods of drought, in 
driving clearing regimes. However, at more localised scales, important nuances in the selection of 
these clearing locations were detected, indicating different underlying drivers of selective clearing 
(Chapter 2). This includes differences between pasture expansion (i.e. extending current pastoral 
regimes into less favourable areas, as observed in the Brigalow Belt South) and pasture growth (i.e. 
developing new pastures, as observed in South Eastern Queensland). Ultimately, these differences in 
biophysical characteristics of clearing events shed an important light on how landholders’ have 
responded to changes in vegetation management policy. Landholders in the Brigalow Belt South 
appear to be consistently driven by the availability of potentially profitable uncleared areas, regardless 
of policy changes. In contrast, landholders in the Great Barrier Reef catchment and South Eastern 
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Queensland responded more opportunistically to policy changes, directing their clearing efforts to 
more favourable locations during panic clearing and policy relaxation periods.  
 
6.1.2 Political factors 
 
The characteristics and absolute amounts of tree clearing were influenced by significant policy regime 
changes. For the first time, detailed characteristics of perverse responses to policy change (i.e. panic 
clearing) were identified and described across spatial scales (Chapter 2), and the effects resulting 
from these peak periods of policy uncertainty were quantified (Chapter 3). While responses to 
frequent policy uncertainty negated the potential benefits of the broad-scale clearing ban—by up to 
4 M ha of remnant forests during 2007–2014—the clearing ban still exhibited positive spill-over 
effects onto secondary forest cover gains. These results reveal important distinctions between metrics 
of reforestation and deforestation that can assist policy-makers in determining what environmental 
indicators should be used to assess policy effectiveness and how policy instruments can differentially 
impact these indicators. Instruments like the broad-scale clearing ban, for example, may be best suited 
to deter deforestation of atypical or relatively intact landscapes, as they introduce new disincentives 
(both politically and socially) to undertaking new clearing regimes. In the Brigalow Belt South, 
however, the broad-scale clearing ban was found to be consistently ineffective at preventing 
deforestation. Chapter 4 investigated this curious case further by presenting the first robust impact 
evaluation of the VMA in this historical clearing hotspot. Under the best-case counterfactual scenario, 
the Act managed to prevent nearly 20,000 ha of remnant clearing—a figure that represents less than 
5% of all remnant clearing since the policy’s enactment. Under the worst-case scenario, the Act may 
have even made the situation slightly worse due to the perverse effects of panic clearing following 
enactment. Today, the absolute trends in tree clearing are still the basis for politicians’ and 
environmental advocates’ claims that the Act was supremely effective during the height of policy 
restriction (2006–2011). This thesis, however, shows that these simple impact proxies are highly 
confounded by other drivers of clearing, including many of the biophysical characteristics identified 
in this thesis.   
 
6.1.3 Cultural factors 
 
Fortunately, the impacts of vegetation management policy are not all doom and gloom. Despite 
increasing clearing rates following regulatory relaxations (2012–2016), Chapter 4 identified 
increasing effectiveness of the VMA in the Brigalow Belt South. That is, even when given more 
opportunities to legally clear remnant vegetation, landholders are no longer targeting these protected 
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trees at the same rate before the Act was introduced. Thus the Act may have elicited new social signals 
in the agricultural community, whereby landholders are more inclined to direct their management 
efforts to clearing unprotected regrowth vegetation on their properties. Evidence of this potential 
cultural effect is presented in Chapter 5, which identifies different types of landholders across 
Queensland according to cognitive and behavioural profiles. Active clearers, more so than any other 
typology identified, stated that they were more strongly influenced by the aesthetic value of trees 
when making tree clearing decisions on their property. This surprising result could explain recent 
departures from targeting remnant vegetation: the VMA may have introduced this intrinsic valuation 
of nature into the clearing community, or the VMA may have activated this existing intrinsic value 
in landholders. Nevertheless, potentially long-lasting damage from landholders’ experiences of 
vegetation management regulation presents a significant hurdle to provoking sustainable behaviour 
change. Issues of trust in the government were consistent across all landholders, and landholders’ 
sense of security, self-identity, and perceptions of normative clearing behaviours in their community 
are critical to shaping their classification into these different cognitive and behavioural typologies. 
Such psychosocial characteristics, however, can be malleable and potentially re-aligned to reflect 
vegetation management goals. Combined with an increased understanding of the biophysical and 
political dimensions of tree clearing, this chapter offers the most comprehensive recommendations to 
date for promoting change in tree clearing behaviour, outlining targeted communication strategies 
emphasising trusted and transparent information exchange, collaborative networks, social learning, 
and message framing. 
 
6.2 Creating change: contributions to conservation research and policy 
 
6.2.1 An interdisciplinary focus on conservation behaviour 
 
This thesis has illustrated how interdisciplinary thinking can be applied to conservation science and 
that complex, multi-dimensional factors contribute to environmental decision-making, which is the 
first step researchers must recognise in seeking to solve the global environmental crisis. Using 
theories, techniques, and variables characteristic of fields like political science, economics, and social 
psychology, the chapters of this thesis have addressed the what, where, when, who, and why’s of the 
tree clearing story in the most comprehensive analysis of deforestation behaviour in Queensland to 
date. Better integration of these disciplines in conservation research, as well as better collaboration 
between researchers in these disciplines, is crucial for understanding environmental behaviours and 
targeting pathways for sustainable change (Bennett et al. 2016; Reddy et al. 2016). In this section, I 
outline how this thesis has enhanced our understanding of conservation behaviour, referencing the 
Chapter 6 104 
important connections these contributions have in the interdisciplinary decision-making space. In the 
following section (6.2.2), I translate the conclusions of the thesis into important implications for 
environmental policies attempting to regulate private land management behaviours and provide 
recommendations to improve policy intervention in the Queensland tree clearing context. 
Investigating the impacts of command-and-control policy instruments is critical to ensuring 
desirable change is created by conservation efforts. Chapter 2 provides the first characterisation of 
panic clearing events, Chapter 3 is the first to quantify the perverse effects of policy uncertainty on 
remnant forest loss, and Chapters 3 and 4 are the first to apply robust counterfactual thinking to 
assessing the impacts of the broad-scale clearing ban and the Vegetation Management Act, 
respectively. These results reflect important theories from political science and economics. Due to 
complex positive feedback effects (Jordan & Matt 2014), more regulations do not necessarily provoke 
more intentional outcomes (Knill et al. 2014); in fact, the norm signals introduced by regulations are 
highly susceptible to perverse outcomes or ‘boomerang effects’ (Byrne & Hart 2009) if the signals 
provoke reactance (i.e. resistance) responses from landholders due to emphases on lost freedoms 
(Cornforth 2009) or crowding out common-interest behaviours in favour of self-interest behaviours 
(Kinzig et al. 2013). Strict regulation is not always going to work, and indeed, it has been marginally 
effective for tree clearing in Queensland. Counterfactual thinking is critical for conservation research, 
as ecological indicators cannot separate intervention impacts from simple correlations, as is the case 
in Queensland. 
 The chapters of this thesis also reveal the heterogeneity of these impacts, providing the first 
investigations into the spatial and temporal heterogeneity of clearing behaviours (Chapter 2) and the 
first investigation into the behavioural, cognitive, and spatial heterogeneity of landholders across 
Queensland in the tree clearing context (Chapter 5). Together, these results highlight the importance 
of considering multiple scales and units of environmental decision-making, as landholders respond 
differently to policy intervention changes given the conditions of the natural, political, and social 
environments in which they make land management decisions. Social science, and particularly social 
psychology, has a lot to offer to conservation. In a similar way that corporations implement strategic 
marketing tactics to influence consumers’ purchases, conservation scientists must also realise that 
many pro-environmental behaviours will need to be ‘sold,’ for example, through social marketing 
(Haq et al. 2013) and normative messages (Schultz et al. 2007). The identification of different types 
of landholders in the tree clearing context reveals important qualities that have yet to be considered 
(or utilised) by researchers, advocacy groups, and politicians in Queensland. Such market-
segmentation approaches must be used to target policy interventions to landholders where impacts 
can be greatest (Mills et al. 2017), utilising methods outside of the natural sciences, like message 
framing and priming (Cornforth 2009; Crompton 2010; Unsworth & Fielding 2014).  
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6.2.2 Pitfalls and recommendations along the policy intervention cycle 
 
With a greater understanding of the interdisciplinary nature of conservation behaviours, we can build 
a more comprehensive understanding of the intricate pathways of influence that environmental policy 
instruments exert on behaviour. Politicians, scientists, lobbyists, campaigners, journalists, and 
neighbours can all play a role in influencing the success of policy interventions. While these pathways 
of influence typically exist in disciplinary silos, the lessons learned from this thesis highlight the 
important roles of these actors within the policy intervention cycle, allowing for a more complete and 
inclusive picture of behavioural influence to be drawn. Throughout this section, I describe the roles 
of various stakeholders along a dynamic policy intervention cycle, punctuated by four key 
components influencing intervention success: (1) design and implementation, (2) monitoring and 
enforcement, (3) impact evaluation, and (4) communication. Figure 6.1 outlines the roles of these 
different components along both the direct intervention path of influence and the feedback paths of 
influence that shape adaptive management and behaviour. Using evidence from this thesis, and 
supported by the interdisciplinary literature, I identify the pitfalls and failures of each component 
within the Queensland vegetation management context (Fig. 6.2) and provide recommendations for 
each component that can reduce perverse policy outcomes and facilitate positive tree clearing 
behaviour change (Fig. 6.3). Recognisably, a number of additional factors and stakeholders play an 
important role in influencing intervention success, and these are discussed further in Section 6.3. 
 
6.2.2.1 Design and implementation 
 
From the outset, the potential for intervention success rests in the hands of policy-makers through the 
design and implementation of their policy instruments. Targets and minimum standards are 
established, appropriate policy instrument(s) are selected, and the spatial (i.e. local, state, national) 
and temporal (i.e. timing, sequencing) scales of implementation are determined. A significant degree 
of Queensland landholders’ distrust stems from this component. Direct regulation is inherently 
unfavourable for most landholders (Cocklin et al. 2007), so issues surrounding the consistency and 
validity of these instruments and their underlying rationales will only strengthen mistrust and provoke 
perverse outcomes (Schmidt & McDermott 2015). As observed in Queensland, a lack of transparency 
regarding regulations, disagreements around a ‘one size fits all’ approach to vegetation management, 
frequent changes in the restrictions and objectives of the VMA, and the unpalatable nature of 
command-and-control regulation propelled panic clearing behaviours. 
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Fig. 6.1. Key components punctuating the various stages of the policy intervention cycle. Influences 
of additional factors, such as climate, personal circumstances, market forces, and non-governmental 
organisations and their instruments, are excluded. 
 
As vegetation management policy adapts in the future, it is imperative that its objectives 
remain consistent and abrupt changes to restrictions are minimised. Many landholders expressed 
frustration and confusion over the lack of consideration of the heterogeneity of land management 
requirements across the variable landscape. While it is important for baseline standards and targets to 
be established at state or national levels, environmental decision-making is a multi-scale process, and 
greater consideration should be given to regional and local conditions and proposing relevant 
standards that can account for considerable heterogeneity of landscapes (Anderson et al. 2009). 
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Despite a role for Local Government Areas to apply VMA regulations within their jurisdictions, 
greater flexibility and subjectivity of state-level rules to be interpreted and implemented by local 
governments could be beneficial; this is only the case, however, if they have the resources and 
capacity to enforce adequate applications of the law to fit the economic and ecological needs of their 
communities, and if this does not generate more uncertainty or ambiguity around legal and illegal 
activities for landholders. Examples of similar decentralised regulations, like those within the Brazil 
Forest Code, have indicated that these tactics can be quite favourable to stakeholders (Bauch et al. 
2009).  
This could also be facilitated by implementing a greater mix of extension-based approaches 
to curb tree clearing rates, which can greatly complement regulatory intervention (Santos et al. 2006; 
Lambin et al. 2014). It is currently unclear, however, what instruments may prove successful in 
curbing tree clearing in Queensland. Some market-based incentives have been suggested as 
alternative instruments, such as carbon farming (e.g. Evans 2018), but these tactics may have perverse 
psychological outcomes (Agrawal et al. 2015) or marginal large-scale impacts (Cooke & Moon 2015). 
And although some previous voluntary instruments have been well-received by landholders in the 
past (e.g. Landcare, Caring for Our Country), evidence suggests they have minimal conservation 
effects beyond the property level and may reinforce resistant attitudes toward top-down controls 
(Lockie & Higgins 2007). In response, some scholars have argued that environmental cooperatives 
may be able to effectively generate widespread support and participation of landholders while 
delivering environmental benefits at the necessary landscape level (Cooke & Moon 2015). In the end, 
increased government recognition of the potential value of more incentive-based instruments 
(whether financial or non-financial), could at the very least improve landholder attitudes toward 
intervention efforts at all levels, and more research will need to examine the potential effectiveness 
of different incentive-based instruments (cf. Section 6.3.4).  
 
6.2.2.2 Monitoring and enforcement 
 
Informed by the design and implementation of the intervention, policy-makers must determine what 
tools will be used to monitor compliance, the standards of compliance, the level of enforcement of 
these standards, and the consequences for non-compliance. While Queensland employs the most 
detailed and accurate monitoring system of tree clearing in the country (SLATS) (Macintosh 2007), 
a number of surveyed landholders argued that the vegetation maps employed by the state are 
inaccurate, and the use of satellite surveillance techniques is largely unfavourable to landholders, 
citing concerns about privacy (Bartel 2005). Additional issues have risen stemming from high-profile 
cases where oversight at the state level resulted in permitting up to 32,000 hectares of remnant 
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clearing (Willacy & Solomons 2015; Slezak 2017). Strict enforcement of regulations is important for 
ensuring effectiveness (Ferraro et al. 2013; Arima et al. 2014), but inconsistencies or inadequacies in 
persuading compliance and punishing non-compliance are a hindrance to tree clearing regulation 
(Bartel 2008).  
Importantly, despite annual SLATS reports of tree clearing across the state, the consideration 
of multi-scale spatial and temporal patterns of clearing is lacking. The results of this thesis highlight 
the importance of identifying regional-scale patterns across multiple facets of tree clearing, as we 
observed heterogenous patterns in terms of the extent, frequency, timing, and characteristics of 
clearing events. Given ecological and social conditions are spatially and temporally heterogenous, 
using coarse or incomplete measures to monitor behavioural responses can overlook micro- and 
meso-level drivers of clearing and, subsequently, micro- and meso-level intervention impacts (Pfaff 
& Robalino 2012; Bos et al. 2017; Carlson et al. 2018). Decentralising enforcement may also be 
beneficial for Queensland. Local governments and communities can play a greater role in monitoring 
and enforcing compliance, which can improve adaptive management (Bauch et al. 2009) and may be 
more effective at reducing forest loss than state-level governance (Cardenas et al. 2000; Corrigan et 
al. 2018). 
Future policy development would benefit from an improved understanding of state- and 
regional-level responses surrounding clearing regulation and its evolution, as goals and targets (cf. 
Section 6.2.2.1) can be adapted to reflect the relevant clearing dynamics across the state. This should 
also include a broader suite of impact indicators and outcomes to monitor (cf. Section 6.2.2.3), beyond 
the mere amount of clearing, which only describes a piece of the tree clearing situation. For example, 
Rhodes et al. (2017) tracked bioregional trends in tree clearing between threatened and unthreatened 
vegetation, arguing that improved monitoring and spatially-targeted enforcement regimes could 
address the disproportionate clearing pressures facing vegetation in different parts of the state. 
Queensland’s Department of Environment and Science is currently in the process of improving the 
technology used to generate maps of vegetation in the state (D. Vandenberg, personal 
communication), which will hopefully minimise future conflicts with landholders and facilitate 
greater trust—though this will be heavily dependent on the communication of these surveillance 
techniques to landholders. Recognising the financial limitations for complete monitoring and 
enforcement on behalf of the state (Albers 2010), the role of neighbours in monitoring and reporting 
tree clearing activities may also be important for promoting voluntary compliance norms, which are 
an important complement to coercive compliance methods (Arias 2015, cf. Section 6.2.2.4). 
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6.2.2.3 Impact evaluation 
 
Policy instruments must have some reflective capacity to ensure the interventions are eliciting the 
desired behaviours; after selecting the necessary tools to monitor behavioural responses, policy-
makers must outline their methodology surrounding impact evaluation—how success will be 
measured, the outcome indicators and causal estimators of relevance, and how to implement the 
instrument to facilitate causal inference. The continued reliance of impact indicators, such as the 
amount of clearing, by politicians, scientists, and lobbyists as justification for the effectiveness of 
previous VMA regulations is both inadequate and a hindrance to policy reflection and adaptation. 
Like Queensland, this reliance on impact indicators has overestimated avoided deforestation resulting 
from command-and-control instruments across the globe (e.g. Andam et al. 2008; Joppa & Pfaff 
2011). Additionally, this perceived effectiveness by politicians, scientists, and environmental 
advocates does not align with landholders’ perceptions based on their lived experience, further 
jeopardising trust and validity in the intervention, and therefore policy support and compliance. 
The government must change its current associative measures of impact evaluation to more 
causal measures to ensure real behaviour change is occurring, controlling for the influence of 
confounding factors. This is crucial for guiding changes in the design and implementation of policy 
instruments (Arriagada et al. 2012; Azevedo et al. 2017), as simply increasing the number or intensity 
of regulations may not create the desired impacts (Knill et al. 2012). Furthermore, it would be 
beneficial to design robust methods that can evaluate the VMA’s effectiveness across all of its stated 
objectives (e.g. avoiding land degradation, preventing biodiversity loss, reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions) to understand where improvements can be made and how tree clearing affects the 
environment at grander scales (Reside et al. 2017). However, I must assert that impact indicators do 
serve an important purpose for monitoring the current state of the environment. The government 
should not abandon monitoring the extent of tree clearing, species abundances, carbon emissions, etc. 
These indicators are important for guiding environmental protection policies, monitoring global 
environmental commitments, and identifying early warnings of perverse outcomes (Ferraro 2009; 
Larrosa et al. 2016). In isolation, however, they cannot inform us of the success of current or historical 
interventions. 
Impact evaluations from outside Parliamentary walls are also important for adaptive 
management. While it is generally good practice to have independent organisations evaluate the 
effectiveness of policy instruments, the potential additionality or indirect effects of these interventions 
can reveal important outcomes that are relevant to other organisations or stakeholders, such as poverty 
(Ferraro et al. 2011), well-being (Arriagada et al. 2015), and social capital (Zammit 2013). The results 
of these external evaluations can be directly communicated to policy-makers, allowing for necessary 
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changes to the design or evaluation protocols, as well as to the stakeholders, potentially modifying 
their current behaviours more directly. Such evaluations need not only come from scientists, and the 
implementation of external evaluations from non-governmental organisations should be encouraged. 
Given complaints from landholders and agricultural lobby groups, evaluations of the impacts of 
vegetation management regulations on landholders’ economic situations could be particularly 
beneficial for informing future policy debate, guiding adaptation, and introducing new market-based 
policy instruments. 
 
6.2.2.4 Communication 
 
Governments need not (and should not) make all of the aforementioned decisions in isolation. 
Communication between policy-makers, scientists, industry experts, and other key stakeholders 
during the design and implementation stage of the policy intervention cycle can be highly influential 
on the relevancy and potential success of policy instruments, as it can facilitate two-way learning and 
knowledge exchange, strengthen networks and social capital, and identify specific issues and needs 
at various spatial scales, which often increase landholders’ acceptance and engagement in policy 
interventions (Schenk et al. 2007; Blackmore & Doole 2013; Zammit 2013; Halbrendt et al. 2014). 
Admittedly, the Queensland Government has attempted to accomplish this task in the past, yet the 
failures of their approaches far outweigh any potential benefits. For instance, shortly after the 
enactment of the VMA in 2000, the Vegetation Management Extension Framework was implemented 
to allow landholders to provide feedback to policy-makers regarding the minimum standards needed 
in their community to sustain ecological function (Westrup 2001). Despite their claims, however, the 
government decided it would be too difficult to establish and monitor such diverse standards across 
the landscape, and landholders’ recommendations were dismissed in favour of one standard 
benchmark for maintaining all remnant vegetation to at least 30% of its pre-clearing extent (Lockie 
& Higgins 2007). For many landholders, this signalled the government’s lack of consideration of their 
knowledge, as well as scientific inaccuracies forming the basis of the Act’s regulations. During debate 
of proposed bills in more recent years, the government has held community forums and allowed for 
stakeholders to submit comments on the proposed legislative changes, but the dates and deadlines of 
these events were given with very short notice and held in a few select towns, which limits the amount 
of knowledge exchange that can occur with many stakeholders (Siepen & Westrup 2002). 
During this thesis, many landholders expressed an openness to sharing their issues and 
experiences with vegetation management, with a number of those surveyed even inviting me to stay 
at their home for a few days so they could give me a tour of their community. It has become apparent 
that landholders are open to a dialogue, provided they believe others are listening rather than lecturing 
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and that their voices are valued. Comerford (2014) also found that communicating with natural 
resource management groups or environmental non-governmental organisations was not a deterrent 
for landholders’ participation in covenant programs. These exchanges are important, especially for 
natural resource management (Lynam et al. 2007), as opinions between landholders and experts can 
vary substantially (Tudor et al. 2015), and in some cases landholders’ predictions may outperform 
those of experts (Halbrendt et al. 2014). Future policy changes should be designed with a greater 
emphasis on community participation, which will be important for re-building landholders’ sense of 
trust in the government and can re-establish valued relationships between landholders and extension 
officers (Santos et al. 2006; Blackmore & Doole 2013).  
Communication of the resulting policy instrument(s) through various information channels by 
actors like journalists, industry experts, extension officers, and the general public is a critical 
component for provoking behaviour change; face-to-face communication, in particular, may be most 
successful for engaging landholders (Mills et al. 2017). Depending upon the content and framing of 
these messages, as well as the source disseminating the information, norm activation can provoke 
rationalisation or reactance behaviours (Proudfoot & Kay 2014). Despite great dismissal from 
conservation scientists in the tree clearing space, the results of this thesis provide evidence that 
landholders’ cognitive and behavioural characteristics are deeply affected by a number of 
communication failures surrounding tree clearing (e.g. the villainous portrayal of landholders, 
perceptions of clearing norms, lack of recognition of conservation efforts on farms, poor translation 
of ongoing policy restrictions). The resulting disengagement from these failures can have significant 
consequences for intervention effectiveness, particularly if highly disengaged landholders inhabit 
areas of high conservation value (Raymond & Brown 2011).   
Owing to landholders’ high conservation values, appreciation of aesthetic values of nature, 
and disengagement with top-down controls, future policy changes should be communicated more 
clearly to landholders by extension officers and trusted leaders in the community (local champions). 
Since many landholders have a tendency to view supporters of the VMA outside of their in-group, 
utilising trusted peers to communicate these messages can promote stronger support and 
rationalisation of regulations through enhanced trust, credibility, and perceived similarity (Burchell 
et al. 2013; Torabi et al. 2016). These messages should also shift from a focus on emphasising large-
scale remnant clearing (which is not reflective of the majority of landholders’ clearing behaviour) to 
emphasising stewardship values and highlighting positive environmental behaviours of landholders 
to activate conservation-oriented norms. Utilising more common-interest frames over self-interest 
frames can enhance landholders’ intrinsic—and potentially subconscious (Sherren et al. 2011)—
valuation of remnant trees, while simultaneously enhancing other environmentally-friendly 
behaviours (Crompton 2010). If these approaches are successful, they may also effectively improve 
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landholders’ sense of control and security, trust in the government, and reinforce the benevolent 
stewardship identities of farmers, which would likely reduce the number of active clearers in the 
landscape and minimise potential boomerang effects (Kinzig et al. 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.2. Pitfalls identified along the stages of the policy cycle of the Vegetation Management Act 
1999. Influences of additional factors, such as climate, personal circumstances, market forces, and 
non-governmental organisations and their instruments, are excluded. 
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Fig. 6.3. Recommendations along the stages of the policy cycle of the Vegetation Management Act 
1999 to promote sustainable tree clearing behaviour change. Influences of additional factors, such as 
climate, personal circumstances, market forces, and non-governmental organisations and their 
instruments, are excluded. 
 
6.3 Completing the tree clearing puzzle 
 
6.3.1 Data limitations 
 
Despite the relative accuracy and precision of the SLATS datasets, clearing data prior to 2000 were 
aggregated into multi-year epochs (i.e. 1988–1991, 1991–1995, 1995–1997, 1997–1999), which 
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impeded our ability to track finer-scale temporal changes in clearing characteristics (Chapter 2), as 
well as our ability to construct a more reliable counterfactual of clearing in the Brigalow Belt South 
(Chapter 4). Additionally, the extent of remnant clearing was only (reliably) monitored since 1997–
1999, which further limited the development of a proper counterfactual in the causal inference 
analysis. While the two counterfactual scenarios we created to account for the range of potential 
trends, the final results undoubtedly have a greater degree of uncertainty without more pre-
intervention data. Similarly, the extent of high-value regrowth was monitored beginning in 2007, thus 
eliminating any potential for reliably estimating impacts on this important vegetation. With more 
time, however, and perhaps with the aid of the Queensland Herbarium, more accurate historical maps 
could be estimated and utilised for future research. Admittedly, the NCAS dataset used in Chapter 3 
has been criticised for its imperfections at monitoring tree cover (Macintosh 2007). This is the best 
dataset that provides a consistent and long-term measure of forest cover across Australia, and thus is 
most relevant when considering how Australia reports on the state of its forests. While it is possible 
that such remote-sensed datasets suffer from uncertainty due to issues of image misclassification 
(Martínez et al. 2011), our approach attempted to minimise these uncertainties by controlling for 
unreasonable changes between years. Inherent differences between NCAS and SLATS, therefore, 
imply that the deforestation rates obtained by each cannot be directly compared. It is encouraging that 
the results of Chapter 3 showed similar relationships between the drivers of deforestation and the 
different metrics of forest cover, but trends in remnant tree clearing are best estimated from the 
SLATS dataset. Luckily, the limitations of the NCAS data are well-known to stakeholders and its 
classification algorithms are constantly being improved, so a more reliable dataset may be available 
in the near future, such as those implemented in Brazil (Diniz et al. 2015). 
As with most freely available data from the government, I encountered some issues with other 
variables, such as the property and tenure spatial data (Chapters 2, 3, 4). I uncovered a number of 
instances where some parcels of land did not have a property assigned to them, or multiple tenure 
classifications were overlayed on a single parcel (e.g. freehold and leasehold). After making side-by-
side comparisons of the potential outcomes from selecting either tenure classification, I found the 
differences to be noticeable yet relatively minimal. I therefore made my best judgements for each 
property as to which tenure classification would be most logical. Thus it is possible that some tenure 
properties were incorrectly labelled. This could have potentially been remedied by purchasing a more 
accurate, cleaned dataset from the government, but this was not feasible given the budget during the 
early stages of this thesis. The lack of some property information also made it unreliable to state 
which parcels of land jointly made up one property; therefore, I decided to represent properties as 
individual parcels of land, which could mask the influence stemming from properties with multiple 
parcels of land that should be treated as one unit for decision-making processes. It would have also 
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been valuable to obtain a spatial dataset outlining the market values of these properties, which could 
be an important driver of clearing (e.g. Rhodes et al. 2017). However, this dataset also must be 
purchased from the government, and even still, it represents a fixed value as of 2012, which may 
provide limited usefulness in understanding dynamic clearing patterns. I have now been gifted this 
dataset from colleagues, and it would be useful to incorporate this variable into future investigations. 
Finally, the dataset obtained from surveyed landholders (Chapter 5) has a recognisably 
limited sample size (N = 265). I had initially aimed to obtain this same sample size solely for the 
Brigalow Belt South, but it became clear during the recruitment process that it was not feasible to 
reach that many landholders in such a remote region. After exhausting recruitment efforts in this 
bioregion (obtaining approximately 130 responses), it was decided that other bioregions would also 
be targeted. To maximise relevancy, these efforts were targeted toward regions with relevant clearing 
histories, but the final sample size is small relative to the distribution of landholders surveyed across 
the state. This sample also has a relatively high median age (62 years) compared to the 2017 census 
data of the greater Darling Downs area (41 years, ABS 2018). This may have been influenced by the 
higher likelihood that older landholders would be home to answer the phone and have the time to 
answer the questions. The results of our analysis indicate that active clearers were significantly 
younger (median 54 years); had a greater number of younger landholders been obtained, this may 
have illuminated even more meaningful differences between landholders within this typology. Given 
more time and funding, a greater sample size could have been obtained through other solicitation 
methods, such as radio advertisements, posting ads in community centres or town halls, or mail-out 
surveys. It is also important to recognise the responses of this dataset represent a single snap-shot of 
the current social dimensions surrounding the tree clearing space. Under more ideal circumstances, 
these surveys would be carried out more frequently over time to produce longitudinal datasets that 
reflect the dynamic nature of these social systems (Stidham et al. 2014). While some comparisons 
could be made between the results of this chapter and that of the small-scale investigation into 
farmers’ motivations to retain trees by Seabrook et al. (2008), statements regarding how these 
psychosocial drivers have evolved over time (and thus influenced clearing dynamics) cannot be made 
just yet. 
 
6.3.2 Important assumptions and caveats 
 
Although the analyses performed throughout this thesis are designed to be robust to potential biases, 
they rely on a number of assumptions. The conclusions drawn from Chapters 2, 3, and 4, assume 
that changes along the policy timeline are due to the most pronounced and observable changes in the 
Vegetation Management Act. However, it is important to recognise that these changes are not the 
Chapter 6 116 
only changes occurring in this sphere. Changes were also likely occurring beyond the VMA, 
including changes in legislative processes, relationships between stakeholders, and other state and 
national environmental policies, which could have significant effects on tree clearing and subsequent 
impact estimations of the VMA (Capano 2009). Given more time, all of these underlying changes 
could be mapped and assessed against changing clearing patterns, though I hypothesise most will 
only have marginal or indirect effects compared to the VMA, which is the primary instrument used 
to regulate clearing. Further, the purposes of the VMA have also changed over time. Throughout this 
thesis, we made all assumptions of VMA effectiveness with reference to the original primary purpose 
of the Act, which was to “preserve” remnant vegetation. Today, however, the primary purpose is to 
“conserve” remnant vegetation; thus there has been a shift in phrasing from implying remnant trees 
be untouched to sustainably managed, which is an important distinction, however subtle the change 
may be. We also do not consider the effectiveness of the Act against its other stated objectives. Given 
more time and better data, however, it would be prudent to investigate all of these measures of 
effectiveness. 
 The analyses also do not explicitly consider the potential interactions between policy 
instruments (e.g. protected area designations, market-based or voluntary incentive schemes) on the 
impact of the broad-scale clearing ban (Chapter 3) or the VMA (Chapter 4). Despite the robustness 
of these models, these unobservable interactions could have complementary, substitutive, or 
antagonistic effects on command-and-control impacts (Lambin et al. 2014), as well as on one another 
(Bryan 2013), which would be difficult to disentangle without more complex modelling techniques 
and detailed spatiotemporal datasets of household-level participation in these instruments. Although 
the tenure dataset included in this study does identify some conservation covenant lands, which have 
seen a rapid increase in uptake in Queensland (Fitzsimons 2015), it does not indicate when these lands 
were enrolled, and there are many other voluntary, non-binding schemes that may not be sufficiently 
captured in these databases (Curtis & Lockwood 2000). Further, the impact analysis in Chapter 4 
attempts to control for potential moderators of impact, but does not investigate the effects of 
mechanisms of impact—variables that are affected by the intervention and subsequently affect its 
impact on the treated units (Ferraro & Hanauer 2014). Given the newfound understanding of the 
different dimensions of clearing, however, it could be possible to estimate the effects of potential 
mechanisms in future impact analyses, but this will require more intensive and comprehensive mind 
mapping of the different interactions between landholders and all of the available policy instruments.  
The potential for spill-over effects is also an assumption that could be violated. As Chapter 
3 identified, a potential positive spill-over may have occurred from the broad-scale clearing ban, 
which had a significantly positive influence on secondary forest cover gains. As this ban does not 
have any direct bearing on secondary forests, this could mean that this temporal indicator is reflecting 
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some other hidden change in reforestation efforts, or that new social signals were elicited to reforest 
areas. For Chapter 4, the analysis assumes no spill-over effects are present. A number of studies 
have identified significant spill-over effects, such as higher deforestation in properties adjacent to 
neighbouring properties where deforestation is occurring (e.g. Andam et al. 2008; Robalino & Pfaff 
2012). In most cases, however, these effects are prominent in the context of protected area 
establishment, which will be influenced by different mechanisms than broad command-and-control 
regulations on private properties. Nevertheless, it would be beneficial for future impact evaluations 
of the VMA to consider the possibility of these spatial interactions, perhaps by using more explicit 
spatial matching techniques (e.g. Honey-Rosés et al. 2011). 
I must also recognise potential caveats or biases surrounding the design, implementation, and 
responses of the survey in Chapter 5. Given the timing of the survey solicitation—immediately 
following the passing of the new VMA amendments—it is possible that some degree of participation 
bias may exist, where landholders who were strongly pro- or anti-regulation would be most inclined 
to express their opinions. In a similar vein, responses to some survey questions may also be biased 
due to the political environment or the questions presented to them. For example, Proudfoot and Kay 
(2014) found that when participants’ attitudes were directly assessed, they were more likely to provide 
reactance-based responses (i.e. strongly opposed to regulation). Thus it is possible that some of the 
questions presented may have unintentionally influenced landholders’ responses. The analysis for 
this chapter also assumes the participants were honest and accurate in their responses, that they 
understood and interpreted all questions as intended, and that the sample adequately reflected the true 
population of graziers in the region. While it appears that the self-reported clearing behaviours of 
active and inactive clearers align with recognised hot- and cold-spots of total clearing, there was no 
correlation between typologies and remnant-specific clearing hotspots. Thus it may be that 
landholders were honest about their clearing behaviours and there was simply not enough prolific 
remnant clearers in the sample, or they may have intentionally underestimated their amount of 
remnant clearing in their total clearing accounts. All survey questions had undergone initial pilot 
testing, and the final questionnaire reflects adaptations based on prior feedback from the test audience 
to ensure no problematic items were present. Future studies would benefit from explicitly asking 
landholders about their remnant clearing behaviours, but as this may largely constitute illegal 
behaviours, we avoided asking this question to promote more trusting attitudes toward the survey. 
Finally, landholders’ responses to the various psychosocial and behavioural measures are assumed to 
accurately reflect their recent history. Some evidence has shown, however, that landholders’ stated 
farming objectives and behaviours does not reflect their past behaviours (e.g. Guillem et al. 2012). 
Additionally, some typologies identified may be experiencing false consensus effects (Mannarini et 
al. 2015), whereby they inaccurately assume most people in their community behave and share the 
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same perceptions as they do. Given more time and resources, these responses could be tested against 
past clearing observations, but this would only be possible for those landholders that provided more 
detailed spatial information regarding their place of residence, which was an even smaller sample 
size. 
 
6.3.3 Strengthening causal linkages between variables and behaviour 
 
This thesis has identified a number of tree clearing drivers across multiple analyses, but confirming 
causal pathways of influence is exceptionally difficult. Ultimately, understanding the relationships 
and interactions of moderators and mechanisms of policy impact requires identifying the relevant 
scales at which tree clearing patterns are defined, using robust experimental designs for impact 
evaluations, and investigating all potential variables that could affect decision-making. Despite the 
relevance for recognising household- or intrahousehold-level decision-making (McGregor et al. 
2001), this was not the unit of analysis for most chapters of this thesis. This was primarily due to the 
lack of reliable household identification information in the property dataset, but it also would have 
been difficult to estimate how many different properties were under the control of a single landholder. 
Chapters 2 and 3 thus considered clearing patterns at 100 m and 1 km resolutions, respectively, to 
reflect relevant biophysical scales, and Chapter 4 considered a 25 m pixel resolution to identify 
discrete treated and untreated plots of vegetation, relevant to the scale of SLATS measurement. Given 
better property-level data, different impact estimations and important management implications could 
appear if individual properties were used as the unit of analysis, which would be beneficial for future 
investigations. Ideally, utilising a range of scales will be most informative for understanding decision-
making processes. 
 Though grounded in the literature, the design and analysis of some chapters also presents 
some limitations to identifying causal pathways of influence. In an ideal, proactive setting, causal 
impact evaluations should be constructed following robust experimental designs; that is, treated and 
untreated units are selected randomly in the landscape and are identical across observable 
characteristics except the treatment status (Ferraro 2012). For Chapter 4, however, we had to 
implement a quasi-experimental design, as is common for most environmental policy impact 
analyses. Although controlling for a number of confounding factors created sufficient match balance 
between remnant and non-remnant trees, there are inherent differences between the two types of 
vegetation. For example, remnant trees are under greater clearing pressures than non-remnant trees, 
and this is why the VMA was enacted to begin with. In fact, this issue is often present in conservation 
impact estimations (e.g. Alix-Garcia et al. 2015), but as long as the control units have “some 
underlying structural similarity to the treated unit in terms of the processes that generate the outcome” 
Chapter 6 119 
(Sills et al. 2015), robust matching methods can minimise this potential bias. It is also worth noting 
that high-value regrowth could also have been considered ‘treated’ by the VMA during 2009–2013. 
Ultimately, however, high-value regrowth was excluded from treatment status as it was not part of 
the original primary purpose of the Act, and there was minimal pre-intervention data on the extent of 
this vegetation category. It would be interesting to evaluate how effective the 2009 amendment to the 
VMA was at protecting high-value regrowth given more time and consideration of the different 
policies relevant to this vegetation. The identification of the psychosocial and behavioural typologies 
in Chapter 5 can also be criticised, as defining landholder typologies is both difficult and subjective 
due to the changing status and identity of farmers over time (Burton & Wilson 2006). While these 
typologies were chosen based upon hypotheses derived from the literature and previous chapters, it 
is possible that other typologies could be distinguished that better reflect the interplay of psychosocial 
and behavioural characteristics on landholders. Due to time constraints, however, more explorations 
into different typology orientations were not feasible, but it will be an important investigation for 
future analyses. 
 Understanding why landholders decide to clear trees is a challenging task, as the literature is 
overflowing with potential political, socioeconomic, and psychosocial drivers of decision-making 
that vary on a case-by-case basis. Due to limitations in model parameterisation, data availability, and 
survey length, the following variables were not investigated in this thesis but could be relevant in the 
Queensland tree clearing context: (1) political factors, such as the influence of campaigns and activist 
groups (Whelan & Lyons 2005), and the number, intensity, and direction of policy changes (Knill et 
al. 2012); (2) socioeconomic factors, such as land prices (Armsworth et al. 2006), assets and farming 
resources (Arriagada et al. 2015, Dayer et al. 2018), training experience (Seabrook et al. 2008), debt 
(Hamblin 2009), and economic reliance on farming (Raymond & Brown 2011; Comerford 2013); (3) 
psychosocial factors, like habits (Klöckner 2013), farming motivations or goals (Farmar-Bowers & 
Lane 2009), knowledge and awareness of environmental issues (Schirmer et al. 2012), connectedness 
to nature (Gosling & Williams 2010), injunctive or subjective norms (Smith et al. 2012; Niles et al. 
2016), political or occupational identity (Groth et al. 2014; Unsworth & Fielding 2014), and media 
influences (Ryffel et al. 2014). Finally—and perhaps most importantly—it may be that the most 
relevant question is not, ‘Why do landholders clear trees?’ but rather, ‘Why do landholders not clear 
trees?’ (Seabrook et al. 2008; Schirmer et al. 2012). This important distinction may be necessary for 
understanding a different perspective on the tree clearing story, or at least to complement our 
understanding of clearing behaviours. Although it is unrealistic to expect all of these factors could be 
measured and analysed to investigate drivers of tree clearing, the current understanding of how these 
different dimensions influence tree clearing can inform the development of future studies seeking to 
complement the current findings of this thesis with other select variables. Perhaps the most logical 
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approach for future research would be to present as many of these variables as possible to landholders 
in a mind-mapping exercise to eliminate the most unlikely drivers in this context. There are certainly 
no shortages to the possibilities for further research on landholders’ decision-making, and the results 
of this thesis provide a crucial foundation for solving the tree clearing puzzle. 
 
6.3.4 Future directions 
 
While a number of potential drivers of behaviour exist, it is important to recognise that each case 
study system will require its own investigation to eliminate rival explanations that may be relevant 
elsewhere (Knowler & Bradshaw 2007). An important next step to understanding tree clearing 
behaviours is constructing and testing models of behaviours that can make more direct, quantifiable 
linkages between social-ecological feedback mechanisms affecting decision-making (Meyfroidt 
2013). Future studies could benefit from investigating well-established frameworks of environmental 
decision-making, such as the value-belief-norm framework (Kaiser et al. 2005), theory of planned 
behaviour (Klöckner 2013), and theory of interpersonal behaviour (Feola & Binder 2010), as well as 
unique modifications or combinations of decision-making models that may be more relevant for the 
tree clearing context (Mastrangelo et al. 2014; Price & Leviston 2014). In some cases, these models 
have been used to explain 64–95% of people’s conservation behaviours (Kaiser et al. 2005) and can 
provide important insights into the relationships and potential feedbacks occurring as landholders 
interpret and evaluate their clearing behaviours.  
The large variety of psychosocial variables measured in Chapter 5 would allow for many of 
these established theories to be tested and many potential pathways of influence to be investigated. 
For example, structural equation models could be designed to analyse the (in)direct relationships of 
landholders’ clearing and regulation attitudes, perceived behavioural control, self-identity, and 
perceived norms on their clearing intentions (i.e. a test of the theory of planned behaviour), which 
could then be assessed against their actual clearing behaviours in the last five years. Alternatively, 
the results of Chapter 5 indicate that the following variables may have greater significance on 
clearing behaviours in the Queensland context: sense of security, clearing influences, ‘good farmer’ 
definition, and awareness of norms. Ultimately, a number of models will need to be designed and 
compared. In addition, time limitations prevented me from analysing the importance of different types 
of media on informing landholders’ decisions, and this should be incorporated in future analyses to 
identify the relevant information channels influencing behaviour. 
 This thesis has focused on a singular command-and-control policy instrument, but a number 
of other instruments may be influencing tree clearing behaviours, such as direct payment schemes for 
conservation (Hajkowicz 2009), conservation covenants (Fitzsimons 2015), and heritage agreements 
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(Leaman & Nicolson 2014). It will be important to consider the potential participation rates and 
effectiveness of these various approaches, which require a greater understanding of the motivations 
driving landholders’ willingness to engage with these instruments (Greiner & Gregg 2011). For 
example, some instruments rely on financial incentives to encourage greater participation and uptake 
of conservation practices, yet the literature is inconsistent in its support for this approach; despite the 
importance for using monetary incentives to increase uptake for some of the most resistant types of 
farmers (Kabii & Horwitz 2006; Kusmanoff et al. 2016), the interactions of multiple financial 
incentives can affect environmental outcomes (Bryan & Crossman 2013) and may crowd out the 
intrinsic, environmental motivations for conservation (Agrawal et al. 2015). Alternatively, an 
increasing number of studies are arguing that the use of non-financial incentives are most likely to 
promote participation from landholders, such as increased social recognition (Greiner & Gregg 2011), 
social learning (Selinske et al. 2015), and stronger relationships with extension officers (Selinske et 
al. 2017). In some cases, however, capacity-building incentives like increased education, support, and 
training can result in a boomerang effect, whereby participation rates decline as landholders feel they 
no longer need assistance (Blackmore & Doole 2013). 
 The survey designed in Chapter 5 also included a subset of questions asking participants, 
“Which option is most important to you when considering bush management schemes?” They were 
presented with ten unique pairs of hypothetical contract attributes for preservation schemes from 
which they could choose only one attribute per pair. This included one direct financial attribute 
(financial compensation per hectare), two indirect financial attributes (option to certify produce as 
‘bush friendly’, extra public funding for community-based projects), and seven non-financial 
attributes (most farmers in the region being involved, regular updates on the scheme’s outcomes, 
training in best management practices, flexibility to choose the length of the program, flexibility to 
choose the areas of land to be included, low compliance monitoring, low paperwork). The results of 
this small choice experiment are currently in preparation for submission to an environmental 
economics journal, but they reveal that landholders’ sense of security is strongly related to whether 
they prefer financial or non-financial incentives, which is an important extension to the results in this 
thesis. 
 Extending this research into incentive preferences further, it would be interesting to measure 
the potential usefulness of the different policy instruments available (e.g. protected areas, carbon 
farming, covenants). This could come from the design of a similar series of choice experiments, but 
the preference for these hypothetical instrument options would be measured under various social, 
political, and economic contexts. Similar strategies have been employed to understand the effects of 
regulatory crowding out on optimal economic decision-making (Cardenas et al. 2000), what types of 
motivations drive willingness to participate in conservation programs (Greiner 2015), and how 
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attitudes affect landholders’ willingness to pay for conservation benefits (Hoyos et al. 2015). This 
would also present more opportunities to investigate how landholders perceive and cope with varying 
levels of risk (Levin et al. 1998; Mase et al. 2015), which could provide a more direct measure of the 
effects of (e.g.) policy uncertainty, droughts, and message framing on regulatory compliance, their 
interaction with different policy instruments, and overall tree clearing decision-making. 
 Finally, it would be wise to use this new knowledge to identify areas where different 
interventions would be most successful. Future research endeavours could utilise this greater 
understanding of relevant drivers of tree clearing to estimate optimal configurations of the landscape 
for biodiversity, identify areas prone to heterogeneous intervention impacts, and determine the most 
cost-effective locations or land management practices for future conservation investments. For 
example: (1) would interventions be more successful under a land-sharing or land-sparing mosaic 
(e.g. Balmford et al. 2012), or targeted preferentially toward marginal lands rather than productive 
lands (e.g. Batáry et al. 2015)? (2) which areas are more likely to experience smaller or larger impacts 
based upon the local deforestation pressure (e.g. Rhodes et al. 2017) or habitat characteristics (e.g. 
Carlson et al. 2018)? (3) which areas would be most cost-effective for intervention efforts (e.g. Kalcic 
et al. 2015) or for certain market-based incentives (e.g. Evans et al. 2015)? These various applications 
of spatial planning and prioritisation are crucial to understanding the trade-offs between engaging 
landholders and maximising environmental returns (Raymond & Brown 2011; Sorice et al. 2013).  
It will be important for researchers to consider how social factors vary across the landscape, 
as they will inevitably impede or facilitate intervention success (Bryan et al. 2010; Knight et al. 2010). 
An interesting avenue for future research could utilise the spatial psychosocial data from Chapter 5 
to map areas of Queensland where landholders are most likely to engage in conservation efforts, 
which could then be compared with a map of the most important areas for biodiversity conservation. 
Promising results in the literature indicate that conservation planning software, such as Marxan and 
Zonation, can combine important social and ecological data to produce optimal planning solutions 
that deliver high conservation benefits (Troupin & Carmel 2014; Whitehead et al. 2014). The results 
would then inform which locations are more likely to succeed with minimal or maximal persuasion, 
perhaps in the form of financial versus non-financial incentives. Ultimately, if the different 
biophysical, political, and cultural drivers of tree clearing can be identified, quantified, mapped, and 
manipulated, sustainable land management change may finally be achieved in Queensland. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Details of the principal component analyses 
 
Prior to analysis, two tests were applied to each case study to assess the usefulness of principal 
component analysis for the datasets. Bartlett’s test of sphericity assesses the degree of collinearity in 
the dataset (Bartlett 1950). We reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between variables at a 
significance level a = 0.05 and determine that there is sufficient collinearity between variables for 
analysis. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test of sampling adequacy is applied to all 
datasets, which measures the adequacy of the correlation matrices by estimating the degree of 
common variance among variables (Kaiser 1970). The number of principal components selected was 
based upon the commonly used Kaiser Criterion (Kaiser 1958) and verified by a scree test (Cattell 
1966). The Kaiser Criterion retains principal components with eigenvalues—the variance captured 
within a component, E—that extract at least as much variance as one original variable (E ≥ 1). To 
compliment this selection method, we use a scree test to visually identify large breaks in principal 
component eigenvalues; when the difference in eigenvalues between components begins to level off, 
we select the leftmost component before this break. For all case study regions, the scree test identified 
few potential breaks in component eigenvalues, with the largest break appearing to occur around the 
Kaiser Criterion eigenvalue of 1.0 (Fig. C1). Some components were observed with an eigenvalue 
0.98 < E < 1.0 for QLD, SEQ, and GBRC, and were still selected. Thus all principal components with 
E > 0.98 were selected for rotation. All final datasets used in the PCAs were found to be adequate 
according to Bartlett’s test of sphericity (p < 0.001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling 
adequacy (KMO > 0.50). 
When variables produced significant contributions to more than one principle component, we 
applied varimax rotation to the selected principal components using the R package ‘psych’ (Revelle 
2017). Rotation of the principal components enhances the interpretability of the components by 
producing a “simple structure,” where variables have high loadings—correlations with the 
component—on one component and near-zero loadings on the remaining components. We chose the 
orthogonal varimax method for rotation to produce simplified, uncorrelated rotated components 
(RCs) that maximize column variance in the RC pattern matrix (Kaiser 1958; O’Rourke & Hatcher 
2013). Here, we use the term ‘rotated components’ in lieu of the more traditional term ‘factors’ in 
order to eliminate confusion between principal components and factors. In cases when variables 
exhibit cross-loading—significant loadings on two or more rotated components—the variable(s) were 
removed from the dataset and the analysis was performed again until rotation produced the desired 
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simple structure. A loading value of ±0.32 is typically regarded as a standard threshold, beyond which 
variables are significantly represented in a given component (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). The final 
selection of RCs was made based upon interpretability and variable representation. While an RC with 
at least three high-loading variables is generally satisfactory (Costello & Osborne 2005), we selected 
RCs with two high-loading variables when the variables represented a similar conceptual construct, 
thus enhancing the interpretability of the components. The variables chosen for interpretation of each 
selected RC were based upon the strength of their loading according to the scale provided by Liu et 
al. (2003): strong ( > 0.75), moderate (0.50−0.75), weak (0.30−0.49). We thus interpreted each RC 
according to all variables with moderate or strong loadings. 
The initial varimax rotations of each case study yielded one or more variables cross-loading 
into more than one rotated component (i.e. exhibited loadings > |0.32| on multiple rotated 
components). Thus those variables with loadings greater than 0.32 on more than one rotated 
component were removed from the dataset and the analysis performed again. For most cases, this 
resulted in no further cross-loadings in the final rotated components, though CYP and SEQ regions 
had one variable loading at −0.34 and 0.33, respectively. After multiple attempts to remove different 
combinations of variables and multiple alterations in the number of selected components, however, 
these results for CYP and SEQ proved to capture the most variance in the data with the minimal 
amount of cross-loadings. Therefore, we set the threshold for cross-loading at 0.34 for this analysis, 
recognising that this is still considered a “weak” loading (Liu et al. 2003).  
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Appendix B. Additional spatial and temporal characteristics of clearing across 
Queensland 
 
 
 
 
Fig. B1. Proportion of annual land clearing area devoted to seven anthropogenic purposes. Clearing 
within protected areas, natural tree losses, and unidentified clearing purposes are excluded. 
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Fig. B2. Frequency of clearing events per parcel of land across the twenty time periods monitored by 
the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS) for (a) Brigalow Belt South (BBS), (b) Great 
Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC), (c) South Eastern Queensland (SEQ), and (d) Cape York Peninsula 
(CYP). Parcels within protected areas and natural tree loss events are excluded. 
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Appendix C. Full results for the principal component and cluster analyses 
 
 
Fig. C1. Scree plot from the final principal component analyses for each case study: Queensland 
(QLD), Brigalow Belt South (BBS), Cape York Peninsula (CYP), South Eastern Queensland (SEQ), 
and Great Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC). Most regions exhibited an observable break around the 
Kaiser Criterion (red dotted line) used for component selection. Only the first six principal 
components shown. 
 
 
Fig. C2. Ward’s hierarchical clustering of aggregated policy periods based on the mean component 
scores across the Property, Climate, and Terrain Components for the State of Queensland. 
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Fig. C3. Mean component scores by year, coloured according to policy period, across the final rotated 
components for (a) Brigalow Belt South (BBS), (b) Great Barrier Reef catchment (GBRC), (c) South 
Eastern Queensland (SEQ), and (d) Cape York Peninsula (CYP). 
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Fig. C4. Hierarchical clustering of policy periods based on the mean component scores across the 
selected rotated components for (a) Brigalow Belt South (BBS), (b) Great Barrier Reef catchment 
(GBRC), (c) South Eastern Queensland (SEQ), and (d) Cape York Peninsula (CYP). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C1. Selected components’ eigenvalues (E), individual variance captured (v), and the 
cumulative variance for all components (Vc) for unrotated and varimax-rotated principal component 
analyses for each region. 
Region Rotation Component 1  Component 2  Component 3  Component 4 Vc 
E v  E v  E v  E V 
QLD Unrotated 2.06 26%  1.62 20%  1.14 14%  1.00 12% 73% 
Rotated 1.90 24%  1.60 20%  1.28 16%  1.04 13% 73% 
BBS Unrotated 3.01 38%  1.32 17%  - -  - - 54% 
Rotated 2.97 37%  1.36 17%  - -  - - 54% 
CYP Unrotated 2.00 29%  1.79 26%  - -  - - 54% 
Rotated 1.97 28%  1.82 26%  - -  - - 54% 
SEQ Unrotated 2.48 35%  1.10 16%  0.99 14%  - - 65% 
Rotated 2.41 34%  1.13 16%  1.01 14%  - - 65% 
GBRC Unrotated 2.07 30%  1.22 17%  1.02 15%  1.00 14% 76% 
Rotated 2.00 29%  1.25 18%  1.04 15%  1.02 15% 76% 
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Table C2. Rotated component (RC) loadings for variables within each case study region. Loading 
parameters include communality, measured by the squared cosine (h2), uniqueness (u2), and loading 
complexity (com). Variables without a loading in a given region were excluded due to significant 
cross-loadings on previous rotation attempts. 
Region Variable Rotated variable loadings h2 u2 com 
RC 1 RC 2 RC 3 RC 4 
Queensland  
(QLD) 
Clearing type - - - - - - - 
Drought declarations −0.12 0.76 −0.17 0.31 0.71 0.29 1.50 
Elevation 0.32 0.15 0.82 −0.12 0.82 0.18 1.40 
Parcel size 0.73 −0.05 −0.09 0.10 0.55 0.45 1.10 
Rainfall variability −0.09 −0.89 −0.08 0.17 0.83 0.17 1.10 
RE status 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.91 0.87 0.13 1.10 
Remoteness 0.78 0.32 0.02 0.07 0.72 0.28 1.30 
Slope −0.29 −0.28 0.73 0.22 0.74 0.26 1.90 
Tenure −0.71 0.17 −0.18 −0.06 0.57 0.43 1.30 
Brigalow Belt South 
(BBS) 
Clearing type 0.19 0.51 - - 0.30 0.70 1.30 
Drought declarations −0.71 0.05 - - 0.51 0.49 1.00 
Elevation 0.79 0.28 - - 0.70 0.30 1.30 
Parcel size 0.71 0.03 - - 0.50 0.50 1.00 
Rainfall variability - - - - - - - 
RE status −0.20 0.70 - - 0.53 0.47 1.20 
Remoteness 0.88 −0.09 - - 0.78 0.22 1.00 
Slope 0.09 0.71 - - 0.51 0.49 1.00 
Tenure −0.69 −0.13 - - 0.50 0.50 1.10 
Cape York Peninsula 
(CYP) 
Clearing type 0.61 0.27 - - 0.45 0.55 1.40 
Drought declarations - - - - - - - 
Elevation 0.68 0.28 - - 0.54 0.46 1.30 
Parcel size 0.68 −0.34 - - 0.57 0.43 1.50 
Rainfall variability - - - - - - - 
RE status 0.08 −0.74 - - 0.56 0.44 1.00 
Remoteness 0.78 −0.31 - - 0.70 0.30 1.30 
Slope 0.23 0.67 - - 0.50 0.50 1.20 
Tenure −0.09 0.67 - - 0.46 0.54 1.00 
South Eastern 
Queensland  
(SEQ) 
Clearing type 0.33 0.60 −0.13 - 0.49 0.51 1.60 
Drought declarations 0.90 0.04 0.09 - 0.82 0.18 1.00 
Elevation 0.79 0.22 0.15 - 0.69 0.31 1.20 
Parcel size 0.08 −0.02 0.98 - 0.96 0.04 1.00 
Rainfall variability −0.83 −0.06 0.02 - 0.69 0.31 1.00 
RE status −0.40 0.17 0.04 - 0.19 0.81 1.40 
Remoteness - - - - - - - 
Slope - - - - - - - 
Tenure −0.19 0.83 0.08 - 0.73 0.27 1.10 
Great Barrier Reef 
catchment  
(GBRC) 
Clearing type 0.19 −0.77 0.20 0.16 0.69 0.31 1.30 
Drought declarations −0.09 0.00 0.96 −0.02 0.93 0.07 1.10 
Elevation - - - - - - - 
Parcel size 0.78 −0.04 0.11 −0.07 0.62 0.38 1.20 
Rainfall variability 0.08 0.81 0.18 0.19 0.73 0.27 1.10 
RE status - - - - - - - 
Remoteness 0.85 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03 0.73 0.27 1.10 
Slope −0.08 0.02 −0.02 0.97 0.95 0.05 1.00 
Tenure −0.78 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.65 0.35 1.40 
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Appendix D. Details of the design and selection of the econometric models 
 
An iterative spatial Hausman test was applied to all four models to determine if random or fixed 
effects were most appropriate for the analysis (Hausman 1978). Results of the Hausman test from 400 
samples containing 4,000 observations per model, tracked over the corresponding periods of analysis, 
indicated that random effects were acceptable on average for all models except the FCI-BBS model 
(Table D3). However, the p-value histograms of the samples indicated that a fixed effects approach 
would be more suitable for 59% of samples at a significance of a = 0.05 (Fig. D2). We confirmed 
that results for all four models using random effects and fixed effects were largely consistent, with 
the statistically significant variables having the same sign and roughly equivalent magnitudes. Thus 
we focus the results and discussion of our analysis to the fixed effects model but note the significance 
of several time-invariant variables in the random effects models (Tables E1, E2). 
 To compute predictions for each model for all study periods, we followed the fixed effects 
spatial maximum likelihood estimation (FE-MLE) described by Baltagi et al. (2012), where the best 
linear unbiased predictor (BLUP) of FCI or RCI for observation i at time T + t is represented as: XYZ,D[\ = 1Z,D[\]^_>`,8` + b̂Z                      (D1) 
with b̂Z = XdZ − 1dZ]^_>`,8`                 (D2) 
and XdZ = ∑ XZ,4 "⁄D4O'               (D3) 
where XY is the estimated FCI or RCI value (BLUP), 1]^ is the change explained with the observed 
data, Xd is the overall mean FCI or RCI, 1d is the mean value of the time series variables, and b̂ is the 
estimate of the fixed effect. As a goodness-of-fit measure, we generated pseudo R-squared averages 
for each year, as well as global R-squared averages per model, by using the square of the correlation 
coefficient between predicted and observed FCI or RCI values described by Elhorst (2014): ghii=R&, &jT = k(IUId)l(IjUId)mn[(IUId)l(IUId)][(IjUId)l(IjUId)]           (D4) 
 
 Table D1. Variables included in the econometric model. (Continued on next page.) 
Variable Description Unit Type Resolution Source 
Forest Cover Index 
(FCI) 
Proportion of 1-km cells with designated forest status Score  
(0–1) 
Spatial time series 1 km 
 
Remnant Forest 
Cover Index (RCI) 
Proportion of 1-km cells with designated remnant forest 
status 
Score  
(0–1) 
Spatial time series 1 km 
 
Biophysical characteristics 
Elevation Meters above sea level m Spatial 90 m QSC 2016d 
Slope Slope gradient Degrees Spatial 90 m QSC 2016d 
Soil pH pH in the upper 30 cm soil layer - Spatial 250 m ACLEP 2014 
Soil clay content Percent of clay content in the upper 30 cm soil layer % Spatial 250 m ACLEP 2014 
Soil bulk density Bulk density in the upper 30 cm soil layer Mg m−3 Spatial 250 m ACLEP 2014 
Rainfall Five-year moving averages of annual rainfall mm Spatial time series 0.05 deg. BOM 2015 
Rainfall variability Standard deviation of average rainfall during 1890–2013 mm Spatial 5 km QSC 2016b 
Maximum 
temperature 
Five-year moving averages of annual maximum 
temperature 
°C Spatial time series 0.05 deg. BOM 2015 
Drought frequency Percentage of time during 1983–2011 where the Local 
Government Area was declared in drought by the State 
% Spatial 1 km QSC 2016a 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
Food price index Average of 5 commodity group price indices, weighted with 
the average export shares of each group for 2002–2004 
Point  
Index 
Annual time series 
 
FAO 2018 
Potential agricultural 
profit 
Highest profit per hectare for agricultural land uses in 
2005–2006 
AU$ ha−1 
(2013) 
Spatial 1 km Marinoni et al 2012 
Distance to protected 
areas 
Euclidean distance from each pixel to the nearest pixel 
under protection status 
km Annual spatial time 
series 
1 km Department of the 
Environment 2014 
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 Accessibility and 
Remoteness Index of 
Australia (ARIA) 
Measure of a location's proximity to the nearest urban 
centre 
Score  
(0–19) 
Spatial 1 km ALA 2016 
Property characteristics 
Parcel size Area within a property's cadastral boundaries as of 2016 km2 Spatial 100 m QSC 2016c 
Tenure 
     
     Freehold Dummy variable for land under freehold tenure as of 2016 
 
Spatial 100 m QSC 2016c 
     Leasehold Dummy variable for land under leasehold tenure as of 2016 
 
Spatial 100 m QSC 2016c 
     Other Dummy variable for land that is not freehold or leasehold 
land as of 2016 
 
Spatial 100 m QSC 2016c 
Political characteristics 
Broad-scale clearing 
ban 
Dummy variable for the years during enforcement of the 
clearing ban 
 
Annual time series 
  
Policy uncertainty Dummy variable denoting policy uncertainty 
 
Annual time series 
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Fig. D1. Collinearity of variables included in econometric model. (Lower panel) Correlogram of all 
continuous variables included in the complete random effects model. (Upper panel) Correlation 
matrix displaying Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r). Colour intensity corresponds to strength of 
correlation. 
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Table D2. Individual variable multicollinearity diagnostics. Collinearity is undetectable when the 
variable inflation factor (VIF) < 1.50, present but acceptable when VIF < 5, and high when VIF > 10. 
Variable VIF(b) 
Potential agricultural profit 1.011 
Distance to protected areas 1.138 
Remoteness (ARIA) 2.671 
Slope 1.319 
Elevation 1.708 
Soil pH 1.462 
Soil clay content 1.599 
Soil bulk density 1.344 
Rainfall 3.288 
Rainfall variability 2.936 
Maximum temperature 3.580 
Drought frequency 2.744 
Parcel size 1.289 
Tenure 1.421 
 
 
Table D3. Mean p-value of the iterative spatial Hausman test for each model. 
Model Mean p-value Recommended approach 
FCI-QLD 0.2084 Random effects 
FCI-BBS 0.0409 Fixed effects 
RCI-QLD 0.1194 Random effects 
RCI-BBS 0.3947 Random effects 
 
 
       
Fig. D2. Histogram of individual sample p-values under the iterative spatial Hausman test for FCI-
QLD. Histogram represents 400 samples each composed of 4,000 observations tracked over time. 
While the mean p-value (0.2094) suggests a random effects approach, 59% of samples preferred a 
fixed effects approach (p < 0.05).
  
Appendix E. Results for the random effects models 
 
Table E1. Coefficients (b) of the variables included in the random effects econometric model of net forest cover change. Coefficients represent the 
percent change in forest cover index (FCI) per 1% change in the explanatory variable. 
Variable 
Queensland  Brigalow Belt South 
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval  
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval 
Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound 
(Intercept) 46.76 0.120 46.75 46.76 *  54.10 0.629 54.06 54.14 * 
Biophysical characteristics            
     Elevation −0.135 0.089 −0.140 −0.129 *  −0.538 0.083 −0.544 −0.533 * 
     Slope 0.900 0.008 0.900 0.901 *  1.056 0.008 1.055 1.056 * 
     Soil pH −5.835 3.774 −6.069 −5.602 *  −7.875 3.661 −8.102 −7.648 * 
     Soil clay content −0.606 0.001 −0.606 −0.606 *  −0.894 0.001 −0.894 −0.894 * 
     Soil bulk density 0.058 0.264 0.042 0.074 *  0.962 0.445 0.935 0.990 * 
     Rainfall (5-year moving mean) † −0.039 0.057 −0.042 −0.035 *  −0.984 0.099 −0.990 −0.978 * 
     Rainfall variability (average std. dev.) 6.376 0.252 6.361 6.392 *  7.961 0.465 7.932 7.990 * 
     Maximum temperature (5-year moving mean) † −20.98 0.819 −21.03 −20.93 *  −23.89 1.108 −23.96 −23.83 * 
     Drought frequency 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.060 *  1.321 0.629 1.282 1.360 * 
Socioeconomic characteristics            
     Food price index† −0.814 0.354 −0.836 −0.792 *  −0.759 0.033 −0.761 −0.757 * 
     Potential agricultural profit −0.247 0.159 −0.256 −0.237 *  −0.015 0.122 −0.023 −0.008 * 
     Distance to protected areas† −0.001 0.021 −0.002 0.000   0.009 0.024 0.008 0.011 * 
     Remoteness index 0.194 0.009 0.193 0.194 *  0.633 0.010 0.632 0.633 * 
Property characteristics            
     Parcel size 0.106 0.029 0.104 0.108 *  0.163 0.033 0.161 0.165 * 
     Tenure – Leasehold 0.560 0.120 0.552 0.567 *  1.518 0.122 1.511 1.526 * 
     Tenure – Other 1.920 0.354 1.898 1.941 *       
Political characteristics            
     Broad-scale clearing ban† 0.131 0.021 0.129 0.132 *  0.136 0.024 0.135 0.138 * 
     Policy uncertainty† −0.155 0.009 −0.155 −0.154 *  −0.177 0.010 −0.178 −0.176 * 
Bioregion indicator            
     Brigalow Belt South 0.162 0.159 0.153 0.172 *       
Spatial autocorrelation (r) 0.249  0.248 0.249 *  0.218  0.218 0.219 * 
Random error variance (su) 4.505  4.500 4.511 *  4.460  4.454 4.465 * 
* Confidence interval excludes zero 
† Included in fixed effects model 
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Table E2. Coefficients (b) of the variables included in the random effects econometric model of remnant forest loss. Coefficients represent the percent 
change in remnant forest cover index (RCI) per 1% change in the explanatory variable. 
Variable 
Queensland  Brigalow Belt South 
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval  
Coefficient Std. dev. 
95% Conf. Interval 
Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound 
(Intercept) −0.1074 0.1640 −0.4788 0.1955   −0.4985 0.3950 −1.4129 0.0511  
Biophysical characteristics            
     Elevation −0.0076 0.0037 −0.0151 0.0002   0.0218 0.0255 −0.0066 0.0910  
     Slope 0.0438 0.0027 0.0386 0.0487 *  0.0493 0.0026 0.0443 0.0539 * 
     Soil pH −0.2080 0.0245 −0.2577 −0.1633 *  −0.3996 0.0234 −0.4428 −0.3542 * 
     Soil clay content −0.0374 0.0061 −0.0489 −0.0257 *  −0.0457 0.0065 −0.0575 −0.0326 * 
     Soil bulk density 0.0003 0.0176 −0.0335 0.0356   0.0347 0.0279 −0.0222 0.0877  
     Rainfall (5-year moving mean) † −0.0073 0.0011 −0.0093 −0.0051 *  −0.0055 0.0019 −0.0092 −0.0019 * 
     Rainfall variability (average std. dev.) 0.3296 0.0213 0.2899 0.3729 *  0.3416 0.0362 0.2776 0.4089 * 
     Maximum temperature (5-year moving mean) † −0.2630 0.0230 −0.3072 −0.2212 *  −0.1554 0.0198 −0.1957 −0.1184 * 
     Drought frequency −0.0015 0.0047 −0.0110 0.0079   0.0082 0.0267 −0.0548 0.0570  
Socioeconomic characteristics            
     Food price index† −0.0217 0.0019 −0.0260 −0.0181 *  −0.0235 0.0016 −0.0268 −0.0203 * 
     Potential agricultural profit 0.0118 0.0048 0.0029 0.0220 *  0.0318 0.0062 0.0194 0.0433 * 
     Distance to protected areas† −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0003 0.0001   −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0004 0.0002  
     Remoteness index 0.0101 0.0060 0.0000 0.0225   0.0545 0.0132 0.0203 0.0739 * 
Property characteristics            
     Parcel size 0.0138 0.0020 0.0100 0.0179 *  0.0114 0.0018 0.0077 0.0148 * 
     Tenure – Leasehold 0.0440 0.0087 0.0279 0.0606 *  0.0973 0.0079 0.0822 0.1114 * 
     Tenure – Other 0.1486 0.0293 0.0936 0.2068 *       
Political characteristics            
     Broad-scale clearing ban† 0.0038 0.0005 0.0029 0.0047 *  0.0031 0.0004 0.0024 0.0039 * 
     Policy uncertainty† −0.0024 0.0002 −0.0028 −0.0019 *  −0.0025 0.0002 −0.0029 −0.0021 * 
Bioregion indicator            
     Brigalow Belt South 0.0442 0.0140 0.0149 0.0689 *       
Spatial autocorrelation (r) 0.6435  0.6062 0.6801 *  0.5121  0.4723 0.5562 * 
Random error variance (su) 0.0010  0.0008 0.0011 *  0.0010  0.0008 0.0011 * 
* Confidence interval excludes zero 
† Included in fixed effects model 
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Appendix F. Full results for the Bayesian impact analyses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F1. Results of the Bayesian causal impact analysis of the broad-scale clearing ban for each model. Impacts on the area of avoided deforestation 
are estimated by intervention year (2004 or 2007) for all fixed effects variables, all fixed effects variables excluding policy uncertainty, and all fixed 
effects variables excluding the years 2012–2014. 
Model Study area 
Impact (km2) 
2004  2007 
All variables Excl. policy uncertainty Excl. 2012–2014  All variables 
Excl. policy 
uncertainty Excl. 2012–2014 
Net forest change Queensland 39208 ± 11525 ** 41707 ± 12773 ** 13003 ± 6887 **  69918 ± 19246 ** 72139 ± 20600 ** 38451 ± 10091 ** 
Brigalow Belt South 3344 ± 3360 2772 ± 3489 1355 ± 2017  8262 ± 2992 * 8637 ± 2042 ** 5968 ± 1562 * 
Remnant forest loss Queensland 18784 ± 7454 ** 19646 ± 7902 ** 14174 ± 5082 **  18969 ± 10340 * 6483 ± 4504 13252 ± 7066 ** 
Brigalow Belt South 1380 ± 1450 1528 ± 1459 973 ± 1079  94 ± 1502 −323 ± 1376 102 ± 889 
*  p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
A
ppendix F 
166 
Appendix G 167 
Appendix G. Details of the covariate matching methodology and evaluation 
 
Matching of treated and untreated samples compared two primary methods under multiple parameter 
conditions: nearest neighbour (NN) and nearest k neighbours (NKN) matching. NN matching 
identifies the one control observation that best matches each treatment observation, while NKN 
matching identifies multiple control observations to match with each treatment observation. In this 
study we selected the nearest four neighbours for NKN matching. A third type of matching using 
covariate weights—genetic matching (Diamond & Sekhon 2013)—was also applied but consistently 
produced similar results to NN matching; due to these similarities and the significant computation 
time required, it was excluded from further analyses. Calipers were applied to define the limits for 
the maximum search distance for matches, above which treatment observations would be excluded 
from analysis due to inadequate control matches (Wang et al. 2013). For each matching method, 
calipers were set to search within 0.25, 0.30, 0.50, and 0.75 standard deviations, as well as without 
caliper limits. All matching was performed with replacement, and ties between control observations 
were broken randomly. 
No single test can provide the best measure of match balance (the degree of similarity of 
matched treatment and control observations) due to the high dimensionality of the data (Sekhon 
2011). Thus the adequacy of matching methods was compared according to multiple empirical and 
visual match balance estimations. In addition to absolute and standardized (scale-less) differences in 
matched and unmatched means, we tested if treatment and control means were equal before (two 
sample t-test) and after matching (paired t-test), as well as if there was equal distributional balance 
between treatment and control observations before and afterward (bootstrapped Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). Two distributional measures were also compared, the empirical quantile-quantile 
(eQQ) and cumulative distribution function (eCDF). Finally, a visual estimation of match balance 
was compared between methods according to a QQ plot of matched treatment and control values 
across all covariates, with greatest match balance achieved at a slope of one. No matching method 
provided the best balance across all covariates, but NN matching with a 0.25 caliper consistently 
produced the best balance across the most covariates, while retaining a relatively large number of 
observations (Tables H1, H2, I1), consistent with previous studies investigating optimal caliper 
options (Wang et al. 2013). 
 
 
  
Appendix H. Outcomes of covariate matching 
 
Table H1. Results from all nearest neighbour (NN) and nearest k neighbours (NKN) matching methods for each covariate, based upon the standardized 
difference between remnant (treated) and non-remnant (untreated) tree means. (Continued on next page.)  
Variable Match method Caliper 
 Standardised Difference in Treatment and Control Means After Matching 
1999FO 1999FL 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Regional Ecosystem 
(RE) code 
NN 0.00 -0.16**^^ -0.10**^^ -0.15**^^ -0.12**^^ 0.019^  ^ -0.21**^^ -0.074*  ^ -0.11**^^ -0.12**^^ -0.15**^^ -0.209**  ^ -0.69**^^ -0.13**^^ 0.006^  ^ -0.255**  ^ -0.18**^^ -0.086*^  ^ -0.236**  ^ -0.212**  ^
0.25 -0.15**^^ -0.033*^  ^ -0.14**^^ 0.010 0.003  ^ -0.003 -0.042* 0.124**^  ^ 0.148**^  ^ 0.087**  ^ 0.055*  ^ -0.005^  ^ 0.081**^  ^ 0.042*  ^ -0.032  ^ -0.009^  ^ 0.046*^  ^ -0.029 -0.052*  ^
0.50 -0.16**^^ -0.12**^^ -0.16**^^ -0.12**^^ -0.059*^  ^ -0.2**^  ^ -0.128**  ^ 0.023^  ^ -0.029^  ^ 0.023^  ^ -0.104**  ^ -0.25**^^ 0.009^  ^ 0.012  ^ -0.108** -0.08**^^ -0.112**  ^ -0.076**  ^ -0.219**  ^
0.75 -0.17**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.15**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.039^  ^ -0.21**^^ -0.111**  ^ -0.058*^  ^ -0.083*^  ^ -0.12**^^ -0.2**^ -0.46**^^ -0.032^  ^ -0.027^  ^ -0.224**  ^ -0.14**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.19**^^ -0.218**  ^
NKN 0.00 -0.27**^^ -0.29**^^ -0.26**^^ -0.23**^^ -0.2**^  ^ -0.25**^^ -0.26**^^ -0.24**^^ -0.27**^^ -0.22**^^ -0.28**^^ -0.79**^^ -0.28**^^ -0.20**^^ -0.35**^^ -0.31**^^ -0.27**^^ -0.36**^^ -0.36**^^ 
0.25 -0.32**^^ -0.17**^^ -0.28**^^ -0.09**^^ -0.14**^^ -0.079*^  ^ -0.15**^^ 0.033^  ^ 0.031^  ^ 0.062*^  ^ -0.049^  ^ -0.104*^  ^ -0.12**^^ -0.042^  ^ -0.10**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.052^  ^ -0.12**^^ -0.21**^^ 
0.50 -0.3**^  ^ -0.32**^^ -0.31**^^ -0.3**^  ^ -0.32**^^ -0.36**^^ -0.41**^^ -0.04^  ^ -0.22**^^ 0.001^  ^ -0.17**^^ -0.23**^^ -0.061^  ^ -0.064^  ^ -0.17**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.22**^^ -0.15**^^ -0.36**^^ 
0.75 -0.3**^  ^ -0.31**^^ -0.3**^  ^ -0.29**^^ -0.29**^^ -0.31**^^ -0.35**^^ -0.21**^^ -0.30**^^ -0.17**^^ -0.23**^^ -0.53**^^ -0.10**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.32**^^ -0.27**^^ -0.29**^^ -0.35**^^ -0.37**^^ 
Remoteness NN 0.00 0.174**  ^ 0.5**^  ^ 0.312**  ^ 0.45**^ 0.56**^ 0.487**  ^ 0.487**  ^ 0.586**^  ^ 0.43**^^ 0.512**^  ^ 0.509**^  ^ 0.329**^  ^ 0.551**  ^ 0.653**  ^ 0.488**  ^ 0.528**^  ^ 0.551**^  ^ 0.594**^  ^ 0.516**^  ^
0.25 0.12** 0.233**  ^ 0.128** 0.261** 0.251** 0.216** 0.159** 0.259**  ^ 0.258**  ^ 0.21**^ 0.19**^ 0.178**^  ^ 0.228**  ^ 0.229**  ^ 0.272**  ^ 0.235**^  ^ 0.258**  ^ 0.22**^ 0.172** 
0.50 0.211**  ^ 0.307**^  ^ 0.235**  ^ 0.379**  ^ 0.388**  ^ 0.355**  ^ 0.301**  ^ 0.372**^  ^ 0.3**^  ^ 0.273**^  ^ 0.27**^^ 0.038^  ^ 0.306**  ^ 0.322**  ^ 0.34**^ 0.332**  ^ 0.302**^  ^ 0.313**^  ^ 0.297**  ^
0.75 0.247**^  ^ 0.336**^  ^ 0.239**  ^ 0.396**  ^ 0.39**^ 0.354**  ^ 0.307** 0.366**^  ^ 0.36**^^ 0.349**^  ^ 0.306**^  ^ 0.121**^  ^ 0.376**  ^ 0.366**  ^ 0.362**  ^ 0.339**^  ^ 0.367**  ^ 0.339**  ^ 0.356**^  ^
NKN 0.00 0.275**^  ^ 0.602**^  ^ 0.382**^  ^ 0.633**^  ^ 0.621**^  ^ 0.528**^  ^ 0.552**^  ^ 0.749**^  ^ 0.662**^  ^ 0.703**^  ^ 0.595**^  ^ 0.629**^  ^ 0.77**^^ 0.89**^^ 0.603**^  ^ 0.709**^  ^ 0.699**^  ^ 0.722**^  ^ 0.622**^  ^
0.25 0.122**^  ^ 0.207**^  ^ 0.119**  ^ 0.271**^  ^ 0.242**  ^ 0.234**  ^ 0.2**^ 0.233**^  ^ 0.268**^  ^ 0.228**^  ^ 0.157**^  ^ 0.273**^  ^ 0.222**^  ^ 0.258**^  ^ 0.283**^  ^ 0.23**^^ 0.251**^  ^ 0.23**^^ 0.168**  ^
0.50 0.236**^  ^ 0.393**^  ^ 0.258**^  ^ 0.406**^  ^ 0.403**^  ^ 0.361**^  ^ 0.357**^  ^ 0.372**^  ^ 0.331**^  ^ 0.31**^^ 0.251**^  ^ 0.15**^^ 0.315**^  ^ 0.373**^  ^ 0.387**^  ^ 0.309**^  ^ 0.338**^  ^ 0.344**^  ^ 0.332**^  ^
0.75 0.303**^  ^ 0.436**^  ^ 0.289**^  ^ 0.431**^  ^ 0.4**^  ^ 0.349**^  ^ 0.37**^^ 0.406**^  ^ 0.417**^  ^ 0.437**^  ^ 0.342**^  ^ 0.335**^  ^ 0.419**^  ^ 0.437**^  ^ 0.426**^  ^ 0.393**^  ^ 0.406**^  ^ 0.426**^  ^ 0.415**^  ^
Slope NN 0.00 0.528** 0.564** 0.555** 0.582** 0.682** 0.767** 0.532** 0.787** 0.645** 0.85** 0.896** 0.775**  ^ 0.787** 0.922** 0.716** 0.736** 0.702** 0.783** 0.459** 
0.25 0.172** 0.255** 0.221** 0.253** 0.288** 0.302** 0.252** 0.33** 0.334** 0.332** 0.369** 0.3** 0.381** 0.35** 0.315** 0.308** 0.3** 0.348** 0.215** 
0.50 0.277** 0.365** 0.314** 0.362** 0.398** 0.443** 0.356** 0.519** 0.464** 0.54** 0.465** 0.464**  ^ 0.539** 0.548** 0.422** 0.503** 0.477** 0.533** 0.306** 
0.75 0.311** 0.406** 0.346** 0.445** 0.473** 0.535** 0.415** 0.64** 0.513** 0.647** 0.575** 0.616**  ^ 0.651** 0.71** 0.535** 0.615** 0.579** 0.645** 0.38** 
NKN 0.00 0.772**  ^ 0.871**  ^ 0.811**  ^ 0.922**^  ^ 0.997**  ^ 1.034**^  ^ 1.043**^  ^ 1.13**^^ 1.041**  ^ 1.173**^  ^ 1.222**^  ^ 1.139**^  ^ 1.174**  ^ 1.328**^  ^ 1.091**  ^ 1.182**^  ^ 1.004**  ^ 1.095**^  ^ 0.741** 
0.25 0.346**  ^ 0.391** 0.336** 0.42**^ 0.456**  ^ 0.476**  ^ 0.472**  ^ 0.553**  ^ 0.525**  ^ 0.513**  ^ 0.516**  ^ 0.521**  ^ 0.521**  ^ 0.533**  ^ 0.572**  ^ 0.552**  ^ 0.492**  ^ 0.556**  ^ 0.365** 
0.50 0.431**  ^ 0.569**  ^ 0.472**  ^ 0.575**  ^ 0.611**  ^ 0.612**  ^ 0.638**  ^ 0.805**^  ^ 0.759**^  ^ 0.754**  ^ 0.731**  ^ 0.765**^  ^ 0.778**  ^ 0.782**  ^ 0.731**^  ^ 0.764**  ^ 0.712**^  ^ 0.757**  ^ 0.513** 
0.75 0.444**  ^ 0.62**^ 0.534**  ^ 0.66**^ 0.685**^  ^ 0.688**  ^ 0.722**  ^ 0.935**^  ^ 0.837**^  ^ 0.862**^  ^ 0.823**^  ^ 0.922**^  ^ 0.903**^  ^ 0.973**^  ^ 0.843**  ^ 0.918**^  ^ 0.793**^  ^ 0.867**^  ^ 0.583** 
Parcel size NN 0.00 0.443** 0.701**  ^ 0.548** 0.406**  ^ 0.39**^ 0.614** 0.357** 0.81**^ 0.669**  ^ 0.593**  ^ 0.743**  ^ 0.967**^  ^ 0.773**  ^ 0.928**  ^ 0.672**  ^ 0.619**  ^ 0.637**  ^ 0.638**  ^ 0.685**  ^
0.25 0.045** 0.034*  ^ 0.052** 0.073** 0.088**  ^ 0.066** 0.051** 0.165**  ^ 0.225**  ^ 0.139**  ^ 0.159**  ^ 0.118**^  ^ 0.182**  ^ 0.119**  ^ 0.214** 0.14** 0.101** 0.128** 0.118**  ^
0.50 0.098** 0.177**  ^ 0.119** 0.176**  ^ 0.194**  ^ 0.166** 0.152** 0.221**  ^ 0.328**  ^ 0.175**  ^ 0.192**  ^ 0.419**^  ^ 0.279**  ^ 0.237**  ^ 0.303**  ^ 0.261**  ^ 0.212**  ^ 0.223**  ^ 0.247**  ^
0.75 0.136** 0.284**  ^ 0.182** 0.219**  ^ 0.235**  ^ 0.203** 0.173** 0.3**^ 0.342**  ^ 0.236**  ^ 0.315**  ^ 0.581**^  ^ 0.478**  ^ 0.353**  ^ 0.412**  ^ 0.312**  ^ 0.301**  ^ 0.261**  ^ 0.361**  ^
NKN 0.00 0.545**^  ^ 0.988**^  ^ 0.67**^^ 0.419**^  ^ 0.564**^  ^ 0.685**^  ^ 0.672**^  ^ 1.104**^  ^ 0.913**^  ^ 0.867**^  ^ 0.998**^  ^ 1.089**^  ^ 1.099**^  ^ 1.316**^  ^ 0.961**^  ^ 0.923**^  ^ 0.853**^  ^ 0.821**^  ^ 0.906**^  ^
0.25 0.029*^  ^ 0.05*^  ^ 0.06**^^ 0.055**^  ^ 0.056**^  ^ 0.065**^  ^ 0.041*^  ^ 0.19**^^ 0.188**^  ^ 0.156**^  ^ 0.16**^^ -0.003^  ^ 0.16**^^ 0.11**^^ 0.25**^^ 0.162**^  ^ 0.137**^  ^ 0.127**^  ^ 0.107**^  ^
0.50 0.115**^  ^ 0.26**^^ 0.143**^  ^ 0.168**^  ^ 0.206**^  ^ 0.19**^^ 0.19**^^ 0.268**^  ^ 0.338**^  ^ 0.245**^  ^ 0.224**^  ^ 0.345**^  ^ 0.324**^  ^ 0.304**^  ^ 0.365**^  ^ 0.29**^^ 0.296**^  ^ 0.231**^  ^ 0.288**^  ^
0.75 0.149**^  ^ 0.38**^^ 0.203**^  ^ 0.188**^  ^ 0.229**^  ^ 0.216**^  ^ 0.2**^  ^ 0.401**^  ^ 0.427**^  ^ 0.348**^  ^ 0.399**^  ^ 0.538**^  ^ 0.513**^  ^ 0.445**^  ^ 0.471**^  ^ 0.384**^  ^ 0.349**^  ^ 0.321**^  ^ 0.476**^  ^
Tenure NN 0.00 -- 0.016 -- -- -- -- -- -0.004 0.000 0.012 0.065** -0.004 -0.004 0.013 0.004 0.024 0.000 0.008 0.016* 
0.25 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.50 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.75 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NKN 0.00 -- 0.002 -- -- -- -- -- -0.006 0.001 0.027 0.116** -0.001 -0.008 0.038* 0.003 0.045* -0.003 0.001 0.014 
0.25 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.50 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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0.75 -- 0.000 -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Drought frequency NN 0.00 -0.255** 0.075* 0.011  ^ 0.032  ^ 0.276**  ^ 0.11**^ 0.425**  ^ 0.336** 0.256** 0.093* 0.202** 0.268** 0.243** 0.413** 0.319** 0.23** 0.243** 0.303** 0.178** 
0.25 0.005 -0.08** -0.004 -0.018* -0.006 0.001 -0.01 -0.084** -0.079** -0.118** -0.101** -0.104** -0.089** -0.061** -0.054** -0.112** -0.116** -0.119** -0.054** 
0.50 -0.086** -0.117** -0.149**  ^ -0.03  ^ 0.041  ^ -0.02  ^ 0.005  ^ -0.061* -0.014 -0.051* -0.059* -0.01 -0.034 -0.012 0.000 -0.078** -0.056* -0.045* -0.006 
0.75 -0.074** -0.083* -0.147**  ^ -0.013  ^ 0.065*  ^ 0.016  ^ 0.02  ^ 0.005 -0.014 -0.048* -0.019 0.077* 0.073* 0.084** 0.096** -0.007 0.008 -0.008 0.058* 
NKN 0.00 -0.27**^^ 0.073^  ^ 0^  ^ 0.112*^  ^ 0.225**^  ^ 0.099*^  ^ 0.414**^  ^ 0.425**^  ^ 0.302**^  ^ 0.113*^  ^ 0.273**^  ^ 0.347**^  ^ 0.338**^  ^ 0.366**^  ^ 0.234**^  ^ 0.224**^  ^ 0.286**^  ^ 0.327**^  ^ 0.097*^  ^
0.25 0.009 -0.08**^^ 0.004 -0.03** -0.016* -0.003 -0.015 -0.13**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.16**^^ -0.15**^^ -0.16**^^ -0.13**^^ -0.108**  ^ -0.10**^^ -0.126**  ^ -0.13**^^ -0.15**^^ -0.11**^^ 
0.50 -0.16**^^ -0.11**^^ -0.16**^^ -0.009^  ^ 0.085**^  ^ 0.008^  ^ 0.059*^  ^ -0.09**^^ -0.006^  ^ -0.11**^^ -0.062*^  ^ -0.005^  ^ -0.049*^  ^ -0.031^  ^ -0.045^  ^ -0.10**^^ -0.061*^  ^ -0.08**^^ -0.065*^  ^
0.75 -0.08**^^ -0.085*^  ^ -0.12**^^ 0.022^  ^ 0.09**^^ 0.029^  ^ 0.068*^  ^ 0.02^  ^ 0.026^  ^ -0.039^  ^ 0.035^  ^ 0.093*^  ^ 0.139**^  ^ 0.122**^  ^ 0.065*^  ^ -0.004^  ^ 0.055^  ^ 0.003^  ^ -0.044^  ^
Rainfall variability NN 
0.00 1.108**  ^ 0.985**  ^ 1.141**  ^ 1.147**  ^ 1.241**^  ^ 1.348**^  ^ 1.303**^  ^ 1.171**^  ^ 1.336**^  ^ 1.078**  ^ 1.061**  ^ 1.213**^  ^ 1.156**  ^ 1.509**^  ^ 1.163**  ^ 1.309**^  ^ 1.167**^  ^ 1.314**^  ^ 0.735**  ^
 0.25 0.148** 0.232** 0.212** 0.289** 0.294** 0.271** 0.295** 0.382** 0.428** 0.278** 0.324** 0.383**^  ^ 0.341** 0.301** 0.368** 0.347** 0.408** 0.402**  ^ 0.197** 
 0.50 0.472** 0.592**  ^ 0.526**  ^ 0.712**  ^ 0.696**^  ^ 0.739**  ^ 0.65**^ 0.683** 0.847**  ^ 0.576**  ^ 0.644** 0.72**^^ 0.722**  ^ 0.734** 0.744** 0.767**  ^ 0.704** 0.768**  ^ 0.33** 
0.75 0.569** 0.7**^ 0.654**  ^ 0.901**^  ^ 0.839**  ^ 0.839**  ^ 0.839**  ^ 0.855**  ^ 0.979**  ^ 0.678**  ^ 0.749** 0.825**^  ^ 0.88**^ 0.971**  ^ 0.93**^ 1.05**^ 0.849**  ^ 0.981**  ^ 0.445** 
NKN 0.00 1.34**^^ 1.27**^^ 1.483**^  ^ 1.511**^  ^ 1.703**^  ^ 1.552**^  ^ 1.668**^  ^ 1.668**^  ^ 1.708**^  ^ 1.501**^  ^ 1.42**^^ 1.59**^^ 1.696**^  ^ 1.924**^  ^ 1.565**^  ^ 1.745**^  ^ 1.526**^  ^ 1.705**^  ^ 1.001**^  ^
0.25 0.162** 0.27**^^ 0.19**^ 0.311**^  ^ 0.338**^  ^ 0.296**  ^ 0.323**  ^ 0.44**^^ 0.48**^ 0.473**^  ^ 0.357**  ^ 0.464**^  ^ 0.43**^^ 0.361**^  ^ 0.421**^  ^ 0.415**^  ^ 0.455**^  ^ 0.463**^  ^ 0.222**  ^
0.50 0.47**^^ 0.687**^  ^ 0.562**^  ^ 0.867**^  ^ 0.91**^^ 0.841**^  ^ 0.823**^  ^ 0.902**^  ^ 1.037**^  ^ 0.895**^  ^ 0.833**^  ^ 0.971**^  ^ 0.946**^  ^ 0.938**^  ^ 0.891**^  ^ 0.924**^  ^ 0.899**^  ^ 0.956**^  ^ 0.455**^  ^
0.75 0.575**  ^ 0.775**^  ^ 0.712**^  ^ 1.052**^  ^ 1.075**^  ^ 0.922**^  ^ 0.963**^  ^ 1.15**^^ 1.215**^  ^ 0.978**^  ^ 0.925**^  ^ 1.108**^  ^ 1.147**^  ^ 1.192**^  ^ 1.096**^  ^ 1.165**^  ^ 1.124**^  ^ 1.16**^^ 0.62**^^ 
*   paired t-test, p<0.05 
** paired t-test, p<0.001 
^   Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (bootstrapped), p<0.05 
^^ Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (bootstrapped), p<0.001 
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Table H2. Comparison of final nearest neighbour (0.25 caliper) matched and unmatched covariate 
means for remnant (treated) and non-remnant (untreated) observations, according to four measures 
of matching adequacy. Adequate matching reduces differences to near-zero. (Continued on next pages.) 
Year Covariate Mean treatment 
Mean 
control 
Mean 
difference 
Standardized 
difference 
Mean 
raw eQQ 
Mean 
eCDF 
1999FL RE code       
     Unmatched 11065 11067 −2 −0.6716 1.4813 0.0039 
     Matched 11064 11064 0 −0.0333 0.4898 0.004 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.02 9.7989 1.2211 31.574 1.2212 0.0837 
     Matched 10.826 10.817 0.009 0.2329 0.0167 0.0015 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.4048 1.5106 0.8942 30.118 0.894 0.0881 
     Matched 1.8816 1.8768 0.0048 0.2546 0.0077 0.0013 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 85.378 51.738 33.64 30.396 33.636 0.0405 
     Matched 80.164 80.127 0.037 0.0338 0.3344 0.0021 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.6232 0.6132 0.0099 2.0518 0.0099 0.005 
     Matched 0.6394 0.6394 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 27.016 27.658 −0.642 −9.6526 0.6602 0.0239 
     Matched 27.264 27.269 −0.005 −0.0799 0.0102 0.0004 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 201.08 195.66 5.42 22.673 5.4782 0.033 
     Matched 199 198.94 0.06 0.2322 0.105 0.0006 
1999FO RE code       
      Unmatched 11055 11057 −2 −0.7018 1.9154 0.0036 
      Matched 11054 11055 −1 −0.1544 0.5468 0.0038 
 Remoteness             
      Unmatched 9.6045 8.2703 1.3342 35.809 1.3342 0.091 
      Matched 9.3822 9.3778 0.0044 0.1195 0.0121 0.0009 
 Slope             
      Unmatched 2.2445 1.3775 0.867 28.613 0.8669 0.0836 
      Matched 1.8046 1.8011 0.0035 0.1718 0.0066 0.0011 
 Parcel size             
      Unmatched 53.004 25.866 27.138 38.518 27.136 0.0495 
      Matched 49.138 49.108 0.03 0.0445 0.127 0.0016 
 Drought 
frequency             
      Unmatched 28.539 29.142 −0.603 −8.9684 0.6156 0.0207 
      Matched 28.882 28.882 0 0.0047 0.0047 0.0002 
 Rainfall 
variability             
      Unmatched 195.07 188.74 6.33 25.489 6.4799 0.0387 
      Matched 193.03 192.99 0.04 0.1478 0.0843 0.0005 
2000 RE code       
     Unmatched 11058 11058 0 −0.0695 0.2196 0.0012 
     Matched 11058 11058 0 −0.141 0.4663 0.0034 
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Remoteness             
     Unmatched 9.5561 8.3712 1.1849 31.676 1.1849 0.0784 
     Matched 9.3514 9.3467 0.0047 0.1282 0.0115 0.0008 
Slope             
     Unmatched 2.2756 1.3852 0.8904 30.097 0.8903 0.0899 
     Matched 1.8349 1.8304 0.0045 0.2213 0.0072 0.0012 
Parcel size             
     Unmatched 52.578 27.082 25.496 36.442 25.493 0.0441 
     Matched 49.372 49.335 0.037 0.0524 0.1281 0.0023 
Drought 
frequency             
     Unmatched 28.588 29.06 −0.472 −6.9275 0.5072 0.0166 
     Matched 28.915 28.915 0 −0.0042 0.0045 0.0002 
Rainfall 
variability             
     Unmatched 195.63 188.89 6.74 27.511 6.8704 0.0447 
     Matched 193.62 193.57 0.05 0.2117 0.0917 0.0006 
2001 RE code             
     Unmatched 11067 11067 0 −0.0797 0.1219 0.0002 
     Matched 11067 11067 0 0.0102 0.2078 0.0023 
Remoteness             
     Unmatched 9.7123 8.4784 1.2339 31.953 1.2343 0.0789 
     Matched 9.4248 9.415 0.0098 0.2611 0.0147 0.0011 
Slope             
     Unmatched 2.3761 1.6111 0.765 25.852 0.7647 0.0749 
     Matched 1.9476 1.9423 0.0053 0.2528 0.0093 0.0014 
Parcel size             
     Unmatched 55.67 30.142 25.528 32.573 25.529 0.0277 
     Matched 51.305 51.249 0.056 0.0731 0.1822 0.0031 
Drought 
frequency             
     Unmatched 28.3 29.15 −0.85 −12.334 0.8497 0.0288 
     Matched 28.701 28.702 −0.001 −0.0178 0.0032 0.0001 
Rainfall 
variability             
     Unmatched 198.35 189.98 8.37 34.982 8.4963 0.0586 
     Matched 196.3 196.23 0.07 0.2888 0.1208 0.0008 
2002 RE code             
     Unmatched 11067 11068 −1 −0.552 0.9171 0.0009 
     Matched 11066 11066 0 0.0034 0.262 0.0029 
Remoteness             
     Unmatched 9.7149 8.4751 1.2398 31.958 1.2401 0.0791 
     Matched 9.4059 9.3964 0.0095 0.2509 0.0142 0.0011 
Slope             
     Unmatched 2.454 1.6358 0.8182 26.241 0.818 0.0765 
     Matched 1.983 1.9767 0.0063 0.2884 0.0097 0.0016 
Parcel size             
     Unmatched 55.812 30.653 25.159 32.568 25.157 0.0282 
     Matched 51.056 50.989 0.067 0.0878 0.1666 0.0024 
Drought 
frequency             
     Unmatched 28.198 29.035 −0.837 −12.186 0.8396 0.0292 
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     Matched 28.624 28.624 0 −0.0055 0.0039 0.0002 
Rainfall 
variability             
     Unmatched 198.39 189.7 8.69 35.956 8.8196 0.0574 
     Matched 196.18 196.11 0.07 0.2942 0.1069 0.0007 
2003 RE code             
     Unmatched 11067 11067 0 −0.0516 0.2672 0.0012 
     Matched 11067 11067 0 −0.0028 0.1844 0.0019 
Remoteness             
     Unmatched 9.4032 8.3308 1.0724 27.972 1.0726 0.0672 
     Matched 9.1044 9.0964 0.008 0.2156 0.0141 0.0011 
Slope             
     Unmatched 2.4244 1.6041 0.8203 25.955 0.8201 0.0759 
     Matched 1.9538 1.9472 0.0066 0.3022 0.0101 0.0017 
Parcel size             
     Unmatched 49.122 29.58 19.542 28.313 19.541 0.023 
     Matched 44.445 44.401 0.044 0.0659 0.1581 0.0022 
Drought 
frequency             
     Unmatched 28.577 29.272 −0.695 −10.111 0.7043 0.0225 
     Matched 28.999 28.999 0 0.001 0.0035 0.0001 
Rainfall 
variability             
     Unmatched 197.02 188.87 8.15 33.784 8.2938 0.0553 
     Matched 194.81 194.75 0.06 0.2713 0.108 0.0007 
2004 RE code             
     Unmatched 11069 11069 0 0.0472 0.3474 0.0011 
     Matched 11068 11068 0 −0.0419 0.125 0.0012 
Remoteness             
     Unmatched 9.5932 8.4525 1.1407 29.542 1.1413 0.0708 
     Matched 9.2769 9.271 0.0059 0.159 0.0121 0.0009 
Slope             
     Unmatched 2.4054 1.6381 0.7673 26.117 0.7671 0.0751 
     Matched 1.954 1.9488 0.0052 0.2522 0.009 0.0015 
Parcel size             
     Unmatched 53.318 30.29 23.028 30.963 23.03 0.0246 
     Matched 48.685 48.648 0.037 0.0515 0.1703 0.0026 
Drought 
frequency             
     Unmatched 28.486 29.164 −0.678 −9.7533 0.6924 0.0218 
     Matched 28.919 28.92 −0.001 −0.0097 0.0029 0.0001 
Rainfall 
variability             
     Unmatched 198.42 189.75 8.67 35.024 8.7514 0.0556 
     Matched 196.11 196.04 0.07 0.2955 0.1045 0.0007 
2005 RE code       
     Unmatched 11075 11074 1 0.2857 0.4727 0.0005 
     Matched 11074 11074 0 0.1245 0.1693 0.0022 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.358 10.228 1.13 28.535 1.134 0.0756 
     Matched 11.187 11.176 0.011 0.2593 0.0182 0.002 
Slope       
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     Unmatched 2.6573 1.8084 0.8489 26.606 0.8486 0.0766 
     Matched 2.0794 2.0726 0.0068 0.3305 0.0109 0.0017 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 96.985 70.709 26.276 20.77 26.269 0.0218 
     Matched 91.381 91.175 0.206 0.1647 0.4219 0.0028 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.5551 0.5555 −0.0004 −0.0801 0.0004 0.0002 
     Matched 0.5632 0.5632 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.477 27.345 −0.868 −13.275 0.8713 0.0303 
     Matched 26.668 26.674 −0.006 −0.0843 0.0094 0.0004 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 204.48 197.05 7.43 32.244 7.4711 0.0475 
     Matched 202.24 202.16 0.08 0.3823 0.1213 0.0008 
2006 RE code       
     Unmatched 11073 11073 0 0.0477 0.1549 0.0003 
     Matched 11074 11074 0 0.1478 0.2253 0.0028 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.129 10.028 1.101 27.558 1.1033 0.0735 
     Matched 10.962 10.951 0.011 0.258 0.0179 0.002 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.5195 1.7896 0.7299 26.004 0.7298 0.0723 
     Matched 2.0544 2.0479 0.0065 0.3337 0.0099 0.0015 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 86.176 64.526 21.65 18.553 21.647 0.0203 
     Matched 81.996 81.735 0.261 0.2248 0.4248 0.0032 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.587 0.5877 −0.0007 −0.14 0.0007 0.0003 
     Matched 0.5915 0.5915 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.81 27.591 −0.781 −11.663 0.7824 0.027 
     Matched 26.996 27.001 −0.005 −0.0786 0.009 0.0003 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.69 196.57 7.12 30.662 7.2044 0.0445 
     Matched 201.77 201.68 0.09 0.4278 0.1214 0.0008 
2007 RE code       
     Unmatched 11071 11071 0 −0.0801 0.105 0.0002 
     Matched 11071 11071 0 0.0872 0.1049 0.0017 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.078 9.9445 1.1335 28.379 1.1345 0.0758 
     Matched 10.905 10.897 0.008 0.2096 0.0161 0.0018 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.4018 1.7043 0.6975 25.51 0.6974 0.0712 
     Matched 1.9511 1.9449 0.0062 0.3315 0.0091 0.0015 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 91.435 61.027 30.408 23.699 30.403 0.0221 
     Matched 85.622 85.448 0.174 0.1393 0.4253 0.0029 
Tenure       
Appendix H 174 
     Unmatched 0.5985 0.5992 −0.0007 −0.14 0.0007 0.0003 
     Matched 0.6055 0.6055 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.904 27.745 −0.841 −12.686 0.8415 0.0279 
     Matched 27.092 27.1 −0.008 −0.1181 0.01 0.0004 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 202.96 196.07 6.89 29.525 7.0213 0.0452 
     Matched 200.97 200.91 0.06 0.2779 0.1186 0.0008 
2008 RE code       
     Unmatched 11072 11072 0 −0.034 0.1721 0.0004 
     Matched 11072 11072 0 0.0549 0.137 0.0016 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.008 9.9983 1.0097 25.253 1.0127 0.0667 
     Matched 10.821 10.814 0.007 0.1899 0.0167 0.0019 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.4691 1.7306 0.7385 25.955 0.7383 0.0729 
     Matched 1.998 1.991 0.007 0.3695 0.0096 0.0015 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 92.11 64.046 28.064 21.846 28.06 0.0195 
     Matched 85.17 84.973 0.197 0.1598 0.4219 0.0028 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.597 0.5962 0.0008 0.1663 0.0008 0.0004 
     Matched 0.6053 0.6053 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 27.057 27.829 −0.772 −11.601 0.7743 0.0277 
     Matched 27.257 27.264 −0.007 −0.1011 0.011 0.0005 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.15 195.59 7.56 32.178 7.6085 0.0493 
     Matched 201.16 201.08 0.08 0.3252 0.1116 0.0007 
2009 RE code       
     Unmatched 11069 11073 −4 −4.1342 3.7079 0.027 
     Matched 11069 11069 0 −0.0052 0.2758 0.0035 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 10.871 9.898 0.973 25.078 0.9786 0.0675 
     Matched 10.721 10.714 0.007 0.1778 0.0197 0.002 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.3745 1.7064 0.6681 24.348 0.668 0.0679 
     Matched 1.9183 1.9125 0.0058 0.3002 0.0135 0.0024 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 77.015 58.524 18.491 18.762 18.491 0.0168 
     Matched 72.692 72.578 0.114 0.1182 0.4593 0.0081 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.57 0.6151 −0.0451 −9.1076 0.0451 0.0225 
     Matched 0.5835 0.5835 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 27.238 27.758 −0.52 −7.4353 0.6297 0.019 
     Matched 27.4 27.407 −0.007 −0.1039 0.0099 0.0004 
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Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 202.88 194.45 8.43 35.398 8.4473 0.059 
     Matched 200.8 200.71 0.09 0.383 0.1566 0.0011 
2010 RE code       
     Unmatched 11075 11075 0 0.1085 0.1075 0.0001 
     Matched 11074 11074 0 0.0813 0.0656 0.0015 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.124 10.153 0.971 24.807 0.9757 0.0649 
     Matched 10.941 10.932 0.009 0.2279 0.0169 0.0018 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.4628 1.7485 0.7143 26.052 0.7142 0.0723 
     Matched 1.9858 1.9787 0.0071 0.3822 0.0104 0.0017 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 81.148 64.063 17.085 17.541 17.084 0.0183 
     Matched 76.062 75.891 0.171 0.1817 0.3944 0.0029 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.6009 0.6006 0.0003 0.0597 0.0003 0.0001 
     Matched 0.6103 0.6103 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.786 27.472 −0.686 −10.202 0.6859 0.0239 
     Matched 26.943 26.949 −0.006 −0.0889 0.0098 0.0004 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.83 196.42 7.41 32.674 7.4704 0.0524 
     Matched 201.8 201.73 0.07 0.341 0.1232 0.0009 
2011 RE code       
     Unmatched 11073 11073 0 −0.0743 0.0316 0.0001 
     Matched 11072 11072 0 0.0416 0.0569 0.0013 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 10.89 9.8583 1.0317 25.98 1.0334 0.0686 
     Matched 10.663 10.654 0.009 0.2294 0.0166 0.0017 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.5535 1.7255 0.828 26.142 0.8277 0.0764 
     Matched 1.9529 1.9462 0.0067 0.3501 0.0103 0.0016 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 84.543 58.533 26.01 21.473 26.008 0.0212 
     Matched 77.405 77.266 0.139 0.119 0.3591 0.0032 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.6421 0.6419 0.0003 0.0548 0.0003 0.0001 
     Matched 0.651 0.651 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 27.147 27.895 −0.748 −10.962 0.7477 0.026 
     Matched 27.379 27.384 −0.005 −0.0611 0.0078 0.0003 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.83 195.73 8.1 33.261 8.1614 0.0509 
     Matched 201.43 201.36 0.07 0.3014 0.1217 0.0008 
2012 RE code       
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     Unmatched 11074 11074 0 0.0616 0.249 0.0002 
     Matched 11074 11074 0 −0.0323 0.1571 0.0015 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.061 9.9603 1.1007 27.573 1.1019 0.073 
     Matched 10.902 10.891 0.011 0.2721 0.0179 0.0018 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.602 1.8367 0.7653 26.007 0.7651 0.0732 
     Matched 2.1299 2.1234 0.0065 0.3154 0.0102 0.0016 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 86.852 63.651 23.201 19.976 23.195 0.0216 
     Matched 82.432 82.187 0.245 0.2138 0.4154 0.0025 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.6251 0.625 0.0001 0.0308 0.0002 0.0001 
     Matched 0.6358 0.6358 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.954 27.723 −0.769 −11.548 0.7711 0.027 
     Matched 27.135 27.138 −0.003 −0.0538 0.0081 0.0003 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.78 196.17 7.61 32.592 7.7242 0.0474 
     Matched 201.91 201.83 0.08 0.3681 0.117 0.0007 
2013 RE code       
     Unmatched 11073 11073 0 −0.0596 0.0625 0.0003 
     Matched 11073 11073 0 −0.0086 0.1395 0.0019 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.172 10.044 1.128 28.675 1.1301 0.0757 
     Matched 10.982 10.973 0.009 0.235 0.0173 0.002 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.6066 1.7639 0.8427 27.472 0.8424 0.0798 
     Matched 2.0588 2.0526 0.0062 0.3077 0.0109 0.0018 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 87.183 62.209 24.974 20.929 24.972 0.023 
     Matched 81.25 81.086 0.164 0.1402 0.3474 0.0026 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.5996 0.5992 0.0004 0.0877 0.0004 0.0002 
     Matched 0.6022 0.6022 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.77 27.577 −0.807 −12.081 0.8099 0.0281 
     Matched 27.008 27.015 −0.007 −0.1116 0.0102 0.0004 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.91 196.02 7.89 33.349 7.9014 0.0492 
     Matched 201.7 201.63 0.07 0.3472 0.1215 0.0008 
2014 RE code       
     Unmatched 11071 11071 0 0.0428 0.147 0.0004 
     Matched 11071 11071 0 0.0462 0.1188 0.0016 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.09 9.9968 1.0932 27.594 1.0941 0.0733 
     Matched 10.935 10.925 0.01 0.2575 0.0164 0.0019 
Slope       
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     Unmatched 2.4401 1.7208 0.7193 25.745 0.7192 0.0719 
     Matched 1.9755 1.9698 0.0057 0.3004 0.0101 0.0017 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 85.573 62.776 22.797 20.161 22.789 0.0203 
     Matched 81.673 81.559 0.114 0.1011 0.3238 0.0028 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.5959 0.5953 0.0006 0.1293 0.0006 0.0003 
     Matched 0.6025 0.6025 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.894 27.668 −0.774 −11.547 0.7751 0.0263 
     Matched 27.074 27.081 −0.007 −0.116 0.0094 0.0004 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.05 196.33 6.72 28.75 6.8548 0.0427 
     Matched 201.21 201.12 0.09 0.4084 0.1205 0.0007 
2015 RE code       
     Unmatched 11073 11074 −1 −0.1631 0.1917 0.0003 
     Matched 11073 11074 −1 −0.0289 0.0994 0.0013 
Remoteness       
     Unmatched 11.219 10.087 1.132 28.832 1.1345 0.0759 
     Matched 11.06 11.051 0.009 0.2201 0.0158 0.0017 
Slope       
     Unmatched 2.5735 1.8024 0.7711 25.539 0.771 0.0729 
     Matched 2.0675 2.0606 0.0069 0.348 0.0098 0.0015 
Parcel size       
     Unmatched 89.775 64.454 25.321 21.683 25.314 0.0228 
     Matched 86.139 85.988 0.151 0.1283 0.3821 0.0021 
Tenure       
     Unmatched 0.602 0.6012 0.0008 0.1571 0.0008 0.0004 
     Matched 0.606 0.606 0 0 0 0 
Drought 
frequency 
      
     Unmatched 26.719 27.518 −0.799 −12.013 0.8012 0.0272 
     Matched 26.911 26.919 −0.008 −0.1191 0.0114 0.0005 
Rainfall 
variability 
      
     Unmatched 203.84 196.55 7.29 31.717 7.3688 0.045 
     Matched 201.96 201.87 0.09 0.4022 0.1202 0.0007 
2016 RE code       
      Unmatched 11068 11068 0 −0.0001 0.4094 0.0012 
      Matched 11068 11068 0 −0.052 0.2783 0.0027 
 Remoteness       
      Unmatched 10.821 10.062 0.759 19.06 0.7602 0.0501 
      Matched 10.719 10.713 0.006 0.1718 0.0132 0.0013 
 Slope       
      Unmatched 2.5398 1.5218 1.018 33.452 1.0179 0.101 
      Matched 2.0337 2.0293 0.0044 0.2148 0.0068 0.0011 
 Parcel size       
      Unmatched 88.434 60.988 27.446 23.285 27.438 0.028 
      Matched 84.514 84.376 0.138 0.1184 0.3627 0.0022 
 Tenure       
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      Unmatched 0.5544 0.5515 0.0029 0.5766 0.0029 0.0014 
      Matched 0.5674 0.5674 0 0 0 0 
 Drought 
frequency 
      
      Unmatched 27.152 27.457 −0.305 −4.4962 0.3636 0.012 
      Matched 27.309 27.312 −0.003 −0.0539 0.0083 0.0003 
 Rainfall 
variability 
      
      Unmatched 201.92 196.7 5.22 21.465 5.2894 0.0312 
      Matched 200.13 200.08 0.05 0.197 0.0914 0.0005 
 
 
  
Appendix I. Full results for the causal inference analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I1. Summary of the causal inference results using nearest neighbour matching (0.25 caliper) for all years. n = number of observations in sample; 
n1= number of treated observations in sample; nm = number of matched observations; nd = number of observations dropped by caliper. 
  1999FL 1999FO 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
ATT 0.0329* 0.0446* 0.0191 -0.0002 -0.0022 0.0026 -0.0081 -0.0047 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0043 -0.0058 -0.0073 -0.0065 -0.0121 
SE 0.0012 0.0013 0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 
95% CI 0.0023 0.0025 0.0018 0.0010 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0011 0.0012 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 
T-statistic 28.568 35.252 20.486 -0.4045 -2.9171 3.6888 -10.495 -8.1583 -1.8888 -0.8467 -2.3737 -7.4131 -5.0057 -4.9541 -10.627 -11.517 -13.557 -10.811 -16.923 
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.686 0.004 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.059 0.397 0.018 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
n 560244 550015 550018 550000 550015 550022 550037 552714 552586 551428 551784 549952 550796 551356 551967 552925 552540 553214 559422 
n1 52571 52375 50944 50151 50313 50307 50179 50269 50366 50239 50132 55032 50041 50064 50082 50144 50160 50270 50309 
nm 47260 48366 47134 45870 45784 46056 45792 45557 46086 46158 45939 49145 45121 44751 46069 45460 46205 46009 46225 
nd 5311 4009 3810 4281 4529 4251 4387 4712 4280 4081 4193 5887 4920 5313 4013 4684 3955 4261 4084 
*  Estimate represents the social preference effect (SP) 
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Table I2. Results of the ‘social preference’ scenario impact estimates (ATTSP) between annual ATTPC 
estimates and the counterfactual estimate of 1999FO (SPFO = 0.0446) for 2000–2004 and 1999FL (SPFL 
= 0.0329) for 2005–2016. Chi-square (χ2) df = 1. All p-values were significant at α < 0.05 following 
the Holm-Bonferroni Method. 
Year ATTSP estimate 95% CI χ2 Odds ratio p-value 
2000 −0.0254 [−0.0297, −0.0211] 8.90 0.844    0.0028 
2001 −0.0448 [−0.0482, −0.0413] 144.4 0.349 < 0.0001 
2002 −0.0468 [−0.0508, −0.0428] 360.0 0.311 < 0.0001 
2003 −0.0420 [−0.0458, −0.0381] 150.7 0.441 < 0.0001 
2004 −0.0526 [−0.0566, −0.0486] 635.5 0.213 < 0.0001 
2005 −0.0376 [−0.0410, −0.0342] 361.3 0.217 < 0.0001 
2006 −0.0340 [−0.0374, −0.0306] 185.2 0.342 < 0.0001 
2007 −0.0333 [−0.0364, −0.0301] 113.4 0.363 < 0.0001 
2008 −0.0338 [−0.0367, −0.0308] 106.8 0.299 < 0.0001 
2009 −0.0363 [−0.0394, −0.0331] 294.8 0.217 < 0.0001 
2010 −0.0342 [−0.0370, −0.0314] 119.0 0.163 < 0.0001 
2011 −0.0344 [−0.0372, −0.0315] 134.2 0.194 < 0.0001 
2012 −0.0372 [−0.0402, −0.0341] 362.2 0.114 < 0.0001 
2013 −0.0387 [−0.0420, −0.0355] 445.9 0.139 < 0.0001 
2014 −0.0401 [−0.0434, −0.0368] 543.3 0.127 < 0.0001 
2015 −0.0394 [−0.0428, −0.0360] 468.0 0.184 < 0.0001 
2016 −0.0450 [−0.0486, −0.0413] 772.1 0.138 < 0.0001 
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Appendix K. Full list of survey items included in the analysis 
 
Table K1. Description of all survey items analysed including the scale and Cronbach’s alpha (a) of 
single scores generated for multi-item scales. (Continued on next pages.) 
Variables Items Scale a 
Values  
 
  
     Economic I view my farm as first and foremost a business enterprise [1, 6] 0.747  
When planning future farming activities I only focus on how profitable they 
will be 
  
 
A maximum annual return from my property is my most important aim   
     Lifestyle The lifestyle that comes with being on the farm is very important to me [1, 6] 0.748  
Farming communities are a great place to live    
We do not make a fortune from farming but the lifestyle is great   
     Conservation The most important thing is leaving my property in better shape than I found it [1, 6] 0.743  
Land stewardship by farmers is more important than anything else about 
farming 
  
 
Managing environmental problems on my farm is a very high priority   
Place Attachment  I am happiest when I'm on my farm [1, 6] 0.644  
I feel my farm is a part of me   
Attitudes * 
 
  
     Pro-Clearing I am concerned about the rate of tree clearing in Queensland † [1, 6] 0.819  
Tree clearing should be stopped †    
People are clearing too many trees †    
People who clear trees from their property do not care about the environment †   
     Anti-VMA In my opinion, vegetation management regulations… [1, 6] 0.648  
     Are a burden to me    
     Are fair to farmers †    
     Are necessary †    
     Should be more strict †   
Good Farmer Identity Definition A 'good farmer'…   
     Profit-maximizing      Always finds a way to maximise their profits [1, 6]  
     Altruistic      Puts the needs of the community before his/her own needs [1, 6]  
     Law-abiding      Obeys laws that restrict what can and can't be done on his/her farm [1, 6]  
     Productivity-maximizing      Always finds a way to maximise the productivity of their land [1, 6]  
     Lifestyle-focused      Enjoys the farming lifestyle even if profits are low [1, 6]  
Good Farmer Self-Identity 
 
  
     ‘Good farmer’ perception I think of myself as a 'good farmer' [1, 6]  
     ‘Better farmer’ perception I am a 'better farmer' than most people in my community [1, 6]  
Relative threat of the VMA * To what degree do the following pose a threat to the property you manage?    [−5, 5] ‡  
      Drought and extreme weather [1, 6]  
      Pest species (e.g. feral cats, pigs, foxes, rabbits) [1, 6]  
      Mining activities [1, 6]  
      Your personal health and well-being [1, 6]  
      Escalating costs of running the business [1, 6]  
      Changing prices for agricultural products [1, 6]  
      Vegetation management regulations [1, 6]  
      Chemical and pesticide use regulations [1, 6]  
Trust in the government The Queensland Government has my best interests in mind [1, 6] 0.712  
I can trust the Queensland Government to always do what is right   
Security 
 
  
     Comfortable lifestyle I am confident that I can still enjoy a comfortable lifestyle while following 
vegetation management regulations 
[1, 6]  
     No threat to livelihood Vegetation management regulations are a threat to my business or livelihood † [1, 6]  
Loss Aversion  
 
  
     Possessions I get easily attached to material things (e.g. my car, my furniture) [1, 5]  
     Profits If profits become very high, I wouldn't want to return to previous profit levels [1, 5]  
     Autonomy I could not cope with losing the freedom to make decisions on my property [1, 5]  
     Land Losing some land for grazing or cropping is bad, but I would manage† [1, 5]  
Emotions to Regulations When you think about vegetation management regulations in Queensland, do 
you feel… 
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     Negative *      Angry [1, 6] 0.859  
     Depressed    
     Anxious    
     Exhausted   
     Positive      Relieved [1, 6] 0.796  
     Hopeful   
Perceived Behavioural Control How much personal control do you feel you have over tree clearing decisions 
on your property? 
[1, 6] 0.669 
 
Following the vegetation management regulations set forth by the Queensland 
Government is… [difficult to easy] 
  
Social Norms * 
 
  
     Tree clearing Most of the farmers in my community clear trees [1, 6]  
     Disobeying regulations Most of the farmers in my community follow the vegetation management 
regulations † 
[1, 6]  
Awareness of Norms I know how most farmers in my area manage their land [1, 6] 0.797  
Most farmers in my area know how I manage my land *   
Financial Strain Within the last four weeks, how often have you… [1, 5] 0.908  
     Had serious financial worries?    
     Not been able to do the things you like to do because of shortages of 
money? 
  
 
     Not been able to do the things you need to do because of shortages of 
money? 
  
Life Satisfaction Thinking about your own life and personal circumstances, how satisfied are 
you with your life as a whole? 
[0, 10]  
Social Capital  Are you an active member of the following?   
     Ag involvement      An agricultural organisation (e.g. AgForce, Queensland Farmers' 
Federation) 
[1, 4]  
     General involvement      A local community group, organisation, or club (e.g. sport, craft, social 
club) 
[1, 4]  
Trees Present  Are there any trees (including tree regrowth) currently on your property that 
are not grown or harvested for production purposes? 
Yes/No  
Clearing Purposes ** In the last 5 years, how often have you cleared trees from your property for the 
following purposes? 
  
     Relevant      Restorative purposes (e.g. thinning) [0, 4] 0.758  
     Necessary maintenance (e.g. regrowth or weed removal)    
     Infrastructure (e.g. fences, barns or sheds)    
     Fodder development or expansion   
     Not Relevant      High-value agriculture development or expansion [0, 4] 0.709  
     Pasture development or expansion   
Clearing Amount ** In the last 5 years, how often have you cleared the following amount of trees 
from your property? 
 [0, 102.5] ‡  
 
     Single trees [0, 4]   
     Less than 1 hectare (ha) [0, 4]   
     1 - 5 ha [0, 4]   
     5 - 10 ha [0, 4]   
     More than 10 ha [0, 4]  
Clearing Influences  To what extent do the following influence how you make tree clearing 
decisions on your property? 
  
     Ag prices      Agricultural or livestock prices [1, 6]  
     Droughts      Recent droughts [1, 6]  
     Regulations      Vegetation management restrictions [1, 6]  
     Profitability      Potential profitability of the land [1, 6]  
     Aesthetics      Aesthetic or attractive value of trees [1, 6]  
     Policy uncertainty      Talks of new clearing regulations in Parliament [1, 6]  
     Costs      Feasibility or costs associated with clearing [1, 6]  
Clearing Amount Relative to Others ** Compared to other farmers/graziers in your community, do you think you 
clear trees more or less than they do? 
[1, 5]  
Clearing Intentions (next 6 months) ** "I intend to engage in tree clearing on my property during the next 6 months." [1, 6]  
Voluntary Program Participation Have you participated in any of these programs? [1, 5]   
     Landcare grants for private land conservation (e.g. Sustainable agriculture, 
Restoration) 
  
 
     Land management agreements (e.g. Land for Wildlife)    
     Conservation covenant (e.g. The Nature Refuges Program)    
     Other projects or programs   
Incentives for Participation (% yes) Which of the following factors are the main reasons why you have participated 
in one or more of these programs? 
  
     Importance      The intrinsic value or importance of nature Yes/No  
     Environmental      The environmental benefits for my property or my community Yes/No  
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     Risk-aversion      To minimise environmental threats or risks to my property or family Yes/No  
     Community influence      My neighbours or other farmers in my community have benefited from 
them 
Yes/No  
     Financial      The financial benefits for my property or my community Yes/No  
Barriers to Participation (% yes) Which of the following factors are the main reasons why you have not 
participated in one or more of these programs? 
  
     Exposure      Lack of exposure or knowledge of the programs Yes/No  
     Loss-aversion      Loss of autonomy or control over my property Yes/No  
     Financial      Loss of income or market value of my land Yes/No  
     Community influence      My neighbours or other farmers in my community regret participating in 
them 
Yes/No  
     Importance      I do not think nature needs to be protected on my property Yes/No  
Demographics    
     Survey eligibility Which of the following best describes you?  [0, 1]  
          Manager      I manage a farm or other grazing or production property   
          Non-manager      I have a family member who manages a farm or other grazing or 
production property 
  
      I interact with farmers or graziers for my work   
     Years managing Approximately how many years have you managed your current farm or other 
grazing or production properties? 
[1, 99]  
     Primary decision-maker Are you primarily responsible for making management decisions on this 
property? 
[0, 1]  
     Education What is the highest level of education you have completed? [0, 1]  
      Did not complete high school   
      High school   
      Diploma or TAFE/Technical Certificate   
      Bachelor Degree   
      Post-Graduate Degree   
     Income The average person in Queensland has a total personal income of $40,000 to 
$50,000 per year. Is your personal income above, below or roughly equal to 
this average? 
[1, 3]  
      Below this average   
      Equal to this average   
      Above this average   
     Postcode (residence) What is the postcode at your main place of residence?   
     Postcode (property) What is the postcode (or postcodes) that your property is in?   
* Variables used for psychosocial clusters 
** Variables used for clearing clusters 
† Scores reversed for analysis 
‡ Scale of the generated single score differs from items’ scale; see main text for calculation 
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Appendix L. Results of model selection for all typologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. L1. Selection of the most parsimonious model predicting cluster membership. Models for (a) 
psychosocial typologies and (b) clearing typologies selected according to the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC). 
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Appendix M. Summary of participants’ responses to all variables 
 
Table M1. Comparison of the demographic and psychosocial characteristics of the entire land 
managers’ sample and the four clearing typologies identified. Continuous variables are represented 
as mean (SD) and categorical variables are represented as % (number of participants). Significant 
differences between clusters are in bold. (Continued on next page.) 
Variables Sample Inactive clearers 
Irregular 
clearers 
Perceived 
active clearers 
Active 
clearers p-value 
Values       
     Economic 4.24 (1.10) 4.08 (1.19) 3.90 (0.98) 4.57 (1.01) 4.46 (1.02) 0.023 
     Lifestyle 5.18 (0.92) 5.11 (0.96) 5.28 (0.72) 5.30 (0.91) 5.08 (1.03) 0.653 
     Conservation 5.31 (0.73) 5.26 (0.75) 5.30 (0.74) 5.39 (0.56) 5.32 (0.89) 0.860 
Place Attachment 5.29 (0.85) 5.19 (0.82) 5.31 (0.80) 5.47 (0.73) 5.23 (1.08) 0.328 
Attitudes 
  
 
  
 
     Pro-Clearing 4.64 (1.28) 4.40 (1.39) 4.24 (1.31) 5.14 (1.02) 4.79 (1.15) 0.004 
     Anti-VMA 4.61 (1.08) 4.27 (1.21) 4.46 (1.09) 4.88 (0.92) 4.97 (0.81) 0.011 
Good Farmer Identity 
Definition 
  
 
  
 
     Profit-maximizing 4.72 (1.15) 4.60 (1.09) 4.49 (1.31) 4.96 (1.07) 4.86 (1.16) 0.182 
     Altruistic 3.97 (1.21) 3.97 (1.13) 3.60 (1.17) 4.11 (1.43) 4.14 (1.06) 0.147 
     Law-abiding 4.74 (1.29) 4.71 (1.48) 4.60 (1.03) 4.63 (1.29) 5.08 (1.14) 0.177 
     Productivity-maximizing 5.07 (1.05) 5.18 (0.93) 4.71 (1.15) 5.22 (1.09) 5.05 (1.03) 0.110 
     Lifestyle-focused 4.66 (1.35) 4.50 (1.34) 4.89 (1.28) 4.74 (1.42) 4.59 (1.36) 0.475 
Good Farmer Self-Identity 
  
 
  
 
     Perception as 'good 
     farmer' 
5.20 (0.93) 5.02 (1.08) 5.31 (0.93) 5.35 (0.74) 5.22 (0.85) 0.395 
     Perception as 'better 
     farmer' 
4.14 (1.32) 4.00 (1.19) 4.40 (1.38) 4.11 (1.39) 4.19 (1.39) 0.471 
Relative threat of the VMA 0.54 (1.34) 0.15 (1.53) 0.57 (1.34) 0.87 (1.22) 0.74 (0.97) 0.044 
Trust in the government 1.41 (0.79) 1.56 (0.92) 1.34 (0.59) 1.35 (0.82) 1.31 (0.66) 0.438 
Security 
  
 
  
 
     Comfortable lifestyle 2.87 (1.60) 3.13 (1.77) 3.09 (1.46) 2.72 (1.64) 2.43 (1.28) 0.178 
     No threat to livelihood 3.18 (1.83) 3.58 (1.87) 3.26 (1.75) 2.70 (1.68) 3.03 (1.89) 0.110 
Loss Aversion 
  
 
  
 
     Possessions 2.45 (1.25) 2.50 (1.26) 2.51 (1.38) 2.47 (1.22) 2.28 (1.16) 0.848 
     Profits 3.40 (1.29) 3.52 (1.20) 3.29 (1.34) 3.53 (1.31) 3.17 (1.36) 0.527 
     Autonomy 4.40 (1.03) 4.43 (0.98) 4.43 (0.95) 4.33 (1.13) 4.39 (1.10) 0.993 
     Land 4.19 (1.42) 4.27 (1.50) 4.17 (1.25) 4.42 (1.37) 3.81 (1.47) 0.261 
Emotions to Regulations 
  
 
  
 
     Negative 3.76 (1.49) 3.28 (1.66) 3.83 (1.29) 4.09 (1.42) 4.08 (1.29) 0.029 
     Positive 1.96 (1.20) 2.10 (1.35) 1.89 (1.02) 1.91 (1.19) 1.88 (1.10) 0.899 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 2.41 (1.27) 2.68 (1.36) 2.51 (1.31) 2.13 (1.17) 2.19 (1.11) 0.128 
Social Norms 
  
 
  
 
     Tree clearing 3.18 (1.72) 2.77 (1.82) 3.66 (1.51) 2.58 (1.56) 4.15 (1.41) < 0.001 
     Disobeying regulations 2.38 (1.31) 2.43 (1.28) 2.57 (1.26) 2.30 (1.35) 2.22 (1.37) 0.465 
Awareness of Norms 4.70 (1.15) 4.44 (1.31) 4.49 (1.17) 5.06 (0.93) 4.90 (0.94) 0.039 
Financial Strain 2.58 (1.17) 2.56 (1.27) 2.96 (0.94) 2.41 (1.06) 2.44 (1.29) 0.126 
Life Satisfaction 7.64 (1.89) 7.70 (1.83) 6.71 (2.04) 8.04 (1.40) 7.94 (2.15) 0.009 
Social Capital 
  
 
  
 
     Ag involvement 2.25 (1.15) 2.00 (1.07) 2.17 (1.15) 2.56 (1.16) 2.36 (1.22) 0.091 
     General involvement 2.76 (1.26) 2.48 (1.24) 2.77 (1.24) 2.80 (1.31) 3.14 (1.20) 0.096 
Trees Present 
  
 
  
0.098 f 
     Managers with trees 89% (161) 82% (51) 97% (34) 89% (41) 95% (35)  
     Managers without trees 11% (19) 18% (11) 3% (1) 11% (5) 5% (2)  
Clearing Purposes * 
  
 
  
 
     Relevant 1.47 (0.90) 0.59 (0.51) 1.73 (0.45) 1.52 (0.54) 2.61 (0.53)  
     Not Relevant 1.09 (1.05) 0.07 (0.25) 1.26 (0.55) 1.16 (0.64) 2.54 (0.80)  
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Clearing Amount * 12.23 (21.58) 0.62 (2.12) 5.18 (8.44) 9.54 (16.86) 41.68 (26.55)  
Clearing Influences 
  
 
  
 
     Ag prices 2.42 (1.82) 1.85 (1.67) 2.17 (1.69) 2.35 (1.70) 3.70 (1.75) < 0.001 
     Droughts 2.24 (1.72) 1.73 (1.54) 2.23 (1.61) 1.89 (1.35) 3.54 (1.91) < 0.001 
     Regulations 3.10 (2.05) 2.37 (1.89) 2.74 (1.92) 3.46 (2.15) 4.22 (1.77) < 0.001 
     Profitability 3.32 (1.91) 2.50 (1.85) 3.06 (1.78) 3.57 (1.82) 4.65 (1.46) < 0.001 
     Aesthetics 2.69 (1.82) 2.31 (1.90) 2.20 (1.62) 2.70 (1.66) 3.78 (1.65) < 0.001 
     Policy uncertainty 2.56 (1.90) 2.05 (1.81) 2.14 (1.72) 2.78 (1.91) 3.54 (1.83) < 0.001 
     Costs 2.98 (1.97) 2.07 (1.78) 2.80 (1.84) 3.35 (1.95) 4.19 (1.71) < 0.001 
Clearing Amount Relative 
to Others * 2.34 (0.89) 2.05 (0.86) 1.57 (0.50) 2.98 (0.26) 2.76 (0.95)  
Clearing Intentions (next 6 
months) * 2.87 (1.90) 1.42 (0.88) 2.77 (1.83) 3.37 (1.73) 4.78 (1.42)  
Voluntary Program 
Participation 2.26 (0.76) 2.03 (0.73) 2.43 (0.76) 2.30 (0.69) 2.45 (0.80) 0.009 
Incentives for Participation 
(% yes) 
  
 
 
 
     Importance 75% (53) 73% (11) 81% (13) 62% (13) 84% (16) 0.383 
     Environmental 93% (66) 93% (14) 94% (15) 100% (21) 84% (16) 0.287 
     Risk-aversion 79% (56) 80% (12) 75% (12) 81% (17) 79% (15) 0.976 
     Community influence 49% (35) 73% (11) 38% (6) 43% (9) 47% (9) 0.198 
     Financial 56% (40) 53% (8) 31% (5) 71% (15) 63% (12) 0.095 
Barriers to Participation 
(% yes) 
  
 
  
 
     Exposure 53% (80) 49% (24) 55% (17) 59% (24) 50% (15) 0.809 
     Loss-aversion 41% (62) 37% (18) 32% (10) 56% (23) 37% (11) 0.144 
     Financial 32% (48) 35% (17) 26% (8) 37% (15) 27% (8) 0.685 
     Community influence 14% (21) 8% (4) 6% (2) 17% (7) 27% (8) 0.067 
     Importance 24% (36) 29% (14) 13% (4) 20% (8) 33% (10) 0.210 
Demographics 
  
 
  
 
     Manager 
  
 
  
 
          Manages a farm 100% (180) -- -- -- -- -- 
          Does not manage a 
          farm 
0% (0) -- -- -- -- -- 
     Years managing their 
     property 30.34 (17.46) 32.77 (16.94) 29.4 (15.11) 30.13 (17.74) 27.41 (20.02) 0.395 
     Decision-maker 
  
 
  
0.372 p 
          Primary decision- 
          maker 
72% (129) 71% (44) 63% (22) 80% (37) 70% (26)  
          Joint decisions, no 
          decisions 
28% (51) 29% (18) 37% (13) 20% (9) 30% (11)  
     Age 59.36 (13.53) 63.17 (14.12) 57.91 (10.84) 60.53 (12.76) 53.14 (13.92) 0.005 
     Gender 
  
 
  
0.111 p 
          Male 77% (135) 73% (44) 66% (23) 80% (36) 89% (32)  
          Female 23% (41) 27% (16) 34% (12) 20% (9) 11% (4)  
     Education 
  
 
  
0.609 p 
          High school 53% (93) 58% (35) 46% (16) 49% (22) 56% (20)  
          Tertiary 47% (83) 42% (25) 54% (19) 51% (23) 44% (16)  
     Income 
  
 
  
0.540 p 
          Less than $50,000 30% (52) 33% (20) 29% (10) 22% (10) 33% (12)  
          Equal to $50,000 30% (52) 23% (14) 37% (13) 38% (17) 22% (8)  
          More than $50,000 41% (72) 43% (26) 34% (12) 4% (18) 44% (16)  
     Remoteness       
          Property postcode 5.22 (3.61) 4.86 (3.85) 5.42 (2.96) 4.54 (3.06) 6.56 (4.33) 0.035 
          Residence postcode 5.26 (3.74) 4.71 (3.84) 5.41 (3.15) 4.85 (3.50) 6.56 (4.50) 0.055 
     Years at current 
     residence 35.69 (23.2) 35.15 (23.17) 36.91 (20.78) 37.98 (25.04) 32.50 (23.65) 0.788 
* Variables used to generate clusters 
p Result according to Pearson’s chi-squared test 
f Result according to Fisher’s exact test 
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Table M2. Comparison of the demographic and psychosocial characteristics of the entire sample and 
the five psychosocial typologies identified for all participants. Continuous variables are represented 
as mean (SD) and categorical variables are represented as % (number of participants). Significant 
differences between clusters are in bold. (Continued on next page.) 
Variables Sample Refusers Reluctant acceptors Neutrals Acceptors Supporters p-value 
Values †        
     Economic 4.36 (1.07) 4.40 (1.04) 4.54 (1.06) 4.43 (1.11) 4.33 (1.12) 3.90 (1.01) 0.014 
     Lifestyle 5.15 (0.91) 5.22 (0.76) 5.32 (0.88) 5.11 (0.93) 4.97 (1.07) 4.97 (0.94) 0.434 
     Conservation 5.33 (0.74) 5.12 (0.76) 5.62 (0.43) 5.44 (0.53) 5.16 (1.00) 5.16 (0.89) 0.010 
Place Attachment † 5.33 (0.82) 5.28 (0.73) 5.55 (0.67) 5.30 (0.74) 5.22 (1.12) 5.13 (0.90) 0.140 
Attitudes * 
 
 
    
 
     Pro-Clearing 4.63 (1.30) 5.39 (0.56) 5.61 (0.48) 4.35 (1.02) 4.12 (0.96) 2.66 (1.20)  
     Anti-VMA 4.61 (1.15) 5.43 (0.40) 5.32 (0.65) 4.56 (0.83) 4.15 (0.76) 2.73 (0.88)  
Good Farmer Identity 
Definition 
 
 
    
 
     Profit-maximizing 4.84 (1.16) 4.81 (1.05) 4.84 (1.32) 5.03 (1.03) 4.76 (1.21) 4.77 (1.11) 0.348 
     Altruistic 3.90 (1.22) 3.59 (1.28) 4.00 (1.30) 4.31 (1.18) 4.00 (0.98) 3.50 (1.17) 0.135 
     Law-abiding 4.73 (1.41) 4.11 (1.45) 5.06 (1.54) 4.66 (1.49) 4.76 (1.10) 5.00 (1.13) < 0.001 
     Productivity- 
     maximizing 
5.12 (1.08) 5.19 (1.02) 5.14 (1.31) 5.28 (0.96) 5.00 (0.89) 4.96 (1.04) 0.234 
     Lifestyle-focused 4.64 (1.34) 4.38 (1.53) 4.76 (1.37) 4.59 (1.32) 4.82 (1.06) 4.62 (1.42) 0.738 
Good Farmer Self-
Identity † 
 
 
    
 
     Perception as 'good 
     farmer' 
5.23 (0.89) 5.30 (0.79) 5.41 (0.82) 5.20 (0.91) 5.24 (0.72) 4.80 (1.20) 0.025 
     Perception as 'better 
     farmer' 
4.12 (1.27) 4.43 (1.36) 4.18 (1.45) 3.80 (0.87) 4.00 (1.12) 4.10 (1.33) 0.986 
Relative threat of the 
VMA * 0.42 (1.57) 1.21 (0.85) 1.49 (0.77) −0.49 (1.44) 0.50 (1.07) −1.81 (1.34)  
Trust in the government 1.50 (0.96) 1.07 (0.21) 1.08 (0.32) 1.61 (0.99) 1.81 (1.18) 2.38 (1.31) < 0.001 
Security 
 
 
    
 
     Comfortable lifestyle 2.84 (1.63) 2.08 (1.18) 1.96 (1.15) 3.09 (1.63) 3.41 (1.37) 4.58 (1.58) < 0.001 
     No threat to livelihood 3.20 (1.89) 2.95 (1.81) 1.84 (1.39) 3.88 (1.66) 3.24 (1.58) 5.35 (1.02) < 0.001 
Loss Aversion † 
 
 
    
 
     Possessions 2.43 (1.27) 2.23 (1.01) 2.44 (1.47) 2.8 (1.35) 2.24 (1.33) 2.50 (1.05) 0.694 
     Profits 3.34 (1.33) 3.30 (1.39) 3.46 (1.39) 3.56 (1.33) 3.16 (1.28) 3.10 (1.25) 0.529 
     Autonomy 4.40 (1.01) 4.47 (0.86) 4.72 (0.86) 4.24 (1.27) 4.00 (1.19) 4.40 (0.75) 0.009 
     Land 4.19 (1.40) 4.83 (1.21) 4.26 (1.55) 4.28 (1.37) 3.72 (1.28) 3.55 (1.15) 0.006 
Emotions to Regulations 
 
 
    
 
     Negative * 3.74 (1.54) 4.21 (1.23) 4.69 (1.17) 3.87 (1.39) 3.39 (1.23) 1.55 (0.59)  
     Positive 2.16 (1.34) 1.57 (0.92) 1.47 (0.81) 2.39 (1.28) 2.72 (1.34) 3.37 (1.55) < 0.001 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 2.38 (1.25) 2.07 (0.91) 1.81 (1.05) 2.28 (1.18) 2.76 (1.05) 3.54 (1.48) < 0.001 
Social Norms * 
 
 
    
 
     Tree clearing 3.04 (1.72) 3.12 (1.26) 3.12 (1.76) 1.78 (1.04) 4.37 (1.64) 2.62 (1.81)  
     Disobeying regulations 2.25 (1.25) 3.14 (0.65) 1.22 (0.42) 1.47 (0.57) 3.22 (1.48) 2.73 (1.16)  
Awareness of Norms 4.68 (1.15) 4.52 (0.95) 5.21 (1.06) 4.86 (0.94) 4.21 (1.22) 4.27 (1.31) < 0.001 
Financial Strain 2.58 (1.22) 2.77 (1.30) 2.61 (1.23) 2.74 (1.13) 2.28 (1.17) 2.47 (1.23) 0.797 
Life Satisfaction 7.49 (1.99) 7.19 (2.07) 7.67 (2.16) 7.25 (2.29) 7.82 (1.45) 7.46 (1.79) 0.586 
Social Capital 
 
 
    
 
     Ag involvement 2.32 (1.16) 2.53 (1.07) 2.33 (1.15) 2.40 (1.29) 2.16 (1.11) 2.10 (1.25) 0.134 
     General involvement 2.65 (1.26) 2.70 (1.29) 2.79 (1.26) 2.88 (1.24) 2.44 (1.29) 2.30 (1.22) 0.206 
Trees Present † 
 
 
    
0.034 p 
     Managers with trees 76% (156) 89% (39) 82% (41) 62% (24) 70% (30) 79% (22)  
     Managers without 
     trees 
24% (48) 11% (5) 18% (9) 38% (15) 30% (13) 21% (6)  
Clearing Purposes † 
 
 
    
 
     Relevant 1.44 (0.91) 1.34 (0.79) 1.77 (0.86) 1.42 (0.94) 1.50 (1.11) 0.94 (0.66) 0.006 
     Not Relevant 1.10 (1.06) 0.97 (0.84) 1.30 (1.1) 1.17 (1.24) 1.41 (1.17) 0.50 (0.75) 0.009 
Appendix M 189 
Clearing Amount † 12.39 (21.3) 11.81 (21.2) 18.14 (23.6) 10.24 (26.0) 12.64 (18.4) 4.61 (12.4) 0.005 
Clearing Influences † 
 
 
    
 
     Ag prices 2.29 (1.73) 2.52 (1.92) 2.45 (1.92) 2.11 (1.41) 2.68 (1.70) 1.33 (0.97) 0.088 
     Droughts 2.23 (1.66) 2.21 (1.72) 2.67 (1.88) 1.78 (1.40) 2.14 (1.39) 2.00 (1.64) 0.279 
     Regulations 2.92 (2.01) 2.86 (2.03) 3.94 (2.34) 3.00 (1.61) 2.68 (1.62) 1.33 (0.77) < 0.001 
     Profitability 3.24 (1.91) 3.45 (2.03) 4.09 (1.81) 2.67 (1.81) 3.27 (1.61) 1.89 (1.53) < 0.001 
     Aesthetics 2.46 (1.71) 2.41 (1.82) 2.33 (1.63) 2.33 (1.53) 2.45 (1.50) 2.89 (2.17) 0.927 
     Policy uncertainty 2.68 (1.95) 2.41 (1.88) 3.94 (2.06) 2.67 (1.97) 2.32 (1.46) 1.22 (0.73) < 0.001 
     Costs 2.97 (2.01) 3.07 (2.09) 4.28 (1.99) 2.61 (1.91) 2.59 (1.56) 1.33 (0.77) < 0.001 
Clearing Amount Relative 
to Others † 2.34 (0.92) 2.52 (0.87) 2.52 (0.87) 2.39 (0.98) 2.23 (0.97) 1.83 (0.86) 0.003 
Clearing Intentions (next 
6 months) † 2.92 (1.87) 2.90 (1.74) 3.61 (2.03) 2.83 (1.82) 3.00 (1.95) 1.67 (1.08) 0.004 
Voluntary Program 
Participation 2.29 (0.79) 2.23 (0.81) 2.16 (0.79) 2.42 (0.71) 2.27 (0.78) 2.50 (0.84) 0.300 
Incentives for 
Participation (% yes) † 
 
 
   
 
     Importance 71% (71) 74% (14) 74% (20) 70% (16) 56% (10) 85% (11) 0.488 
     Environmental 91% (91) 89% (17) 93% (25) 83% (19) 94% (17) 100% (13) 0.459 
     Risk-aversion 80% (80) 89% (17) 74% (20) 83% (19) 78% (14) 77% (10) 0.760 
     Community influence 53% (53) 37% (7) 44% (12) 61% (14) 72% (13) 54% (7) 0.201 
     Financial 58% (58) 53% (10) 59% (16) 61% (14) 61% (11) 54% (7) 0.976 
Barriers to Participation 
(% yes) † 
 
 
    
 
     Exposure 51% (107) 42% (18) 54% (27) 47% (20) 55% (26) 57% (16) 0.606 
     Loss-aversion 40% (85) 58% (25) 36% (18) 47% (20) 38% (18) 14% (4) 0.005 
     Financial 33% (70) 40% (17) 32% (16) 37% (16) 36% (17) 14% (4) 0.215 
     Community influence 14% (30) 16% (7) 14% (7) 23% (10) 11% (5) 4% (1) 0.192 
     Importance 23% (48) 26% (11) 24% (12) 16% (7) 26% (12) 21% (6) 0.828 
Demographics 
 
 
    
 
     Manager 
 
 
    
0.966 p 
          Manages a farm 80% (211) 82% (45) 78% (54) 82% (40) 77% (44) 80% (28)  
          Does not manage a 
          farm 
20% (54) 18% (10) 22% (15) 18% (9) 23% (13) 20% (7)  
     Years managing their 
     property 34.33 (21.0) 36.83 (22.4) 29.36 (20.9) 39.97 (24.9) 35 (19.26) 32.52 (15.0) 0.580 
     Decision-maker 
 
 
    
0.179 p 
          Primary decision- 
          maker 
72% (146) 68% (30) 68% (34) 62% (24) 84% (36) 79% (22)  
          Joint decisions, no 
          decisions 
28% (58) 32% (14) 32% (16) 38% (15) 16% (7) 21% (6)  
     Age 61.81 (13.7) 63.28 (12.0) 56.62 (15.7) 63.6 (13.0) 65.15 (13.4) 63.4 (10.94) 0.080 
     Gender 
 
 
    
0.748 p 
          Male 72% (191) 67% (37) 71% (49) 78% (38) 75% (43) 69% (24)  
          Female 28% (74) 33% (18) 29% (20) 22% (11) 25% (14) 31% (11)  
     Education 
 
 
    
0.889 p 
          High school 55% (145) 56% (31) 51% (35) 60% (29) 54% (31) 54% (19)  
          Tertiary 45% (119) 44% (24) 49% (34) 40% (19) 46% (26) 46% (16)  
     Income 
 
 
    
0.211 p 
          Less than $50,000 30% (78) 39% (21) 36% (25) 22% (11) 18% (10) 31% (11)  
          Equal to $50,000 30% (79) 28% (15) 30% (21) 27% (13) 38% (21) 26% (9)  
          More than $50,000 40% (106) 33% (18) 33% (23) 51% (25) 45% (25) 43% (15)  
     Remoteness        
          Property postcode † 5.12 (3.57) 4.88 (3.09) 6.92 (4.76) 4.80 (3.50) 4.81 (3.74) 3.20 (2.87) < 0.001 
          Residence postcode 5.23 (3.66) 5.28 (3.20) 6.63 (4.07) 4.62 (3.39) 5.16 (3.74) 3.30 (3.05) < 0.001 
     Years at current 
     residence 37.68 (24.0) 42.11 (24.3) 30.08 (22.4) 41.19 (24.6) 41.41 (25.8) 37.08 (21.7) 0.413 
* Variables used to generate clusters 
† Excluded from regression due to smaller sample size 
p Result according to Pearson’s chi-squared test 
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Appendix N. Detailed typology descriptions 
 
Clearing typologies 
 
Membership within the inactive clearers typology was driven by stronger pro-regulation attitudes, 
minimal influence of costs on tree clearing decisions, less participation in voluntary programs, and a 
greater perception that clearing is not the norm in their community. Inactive clearers may be less 
influenced by costs of running the farming business because the land is already extensively cleared 
or due to the characteristics of their property, such as topographic features and the spatial distribution 
of trees. Situated within an anti-clearing community, this may enhance the pro-regulation attitudes of 
inactive clearers, as there may be less relevance or burden for these land managers. The lack of 
program participation is likely due to a lack of need to protect trees from clearing or the minimal real 
benefits that could be attained under their current circumstances. 
Irregular clearers perceive more people in their community to be clearing trees. Coupled with 
significantly weaker economic values than other land managers, this may contribute to their 
disproportionately low perception of their own clearing behaviours relative to others. Irregular 
clearers’ decisions are also less influenced by the aesthetic value of trees. This may be because 
clearing occurs more out of necessity than desire, which would explain their relatively frequent, 
small-scale clearing efforts within the last five years. Interestingly, irregular clearers reported a 
significantly smaller life satisfaction score than other typologies. The potential cause of this, or it’s 
interactions with other variables, warrants further investigation.  
Perceived active clearers tend to have their properties within more urban areas, where 
clearing is not perceived as the norm, and have stronger economic values, which may explain why 
they perceive their amount of clearing to be much higher than others around them, when they ranked 
moderately low compared to the majority of land managers in this survey. Their clearing decisions 
are also less influenced by droughts, which may be a product of semi-urban living, where more 
economic opportunities and water sources may be available. Given the typology’s insignificant 
relationship with norm awareness, the relatively strong clearing intentions of these perceived active 
clearers may indicate two potential roles for them within their community: (1) they are ‘lone-wolf’ 
active clearers situated in areas under-represented in this survey, where the minimal amount of 
clearing reported is, in fact, very high in their community; (2) they represent up-and-coming active 
clearers that may have recently began clearing greater areas of trees, whose clearing history has yet 
to reflect future clearing behaviours. 
Active clearers represent the opposing typology to inactive clearers. These land managers 
may be more active due to their younger age (53 years) and therefore may have a greater vested 
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interest in protesting additional restrictions to the VMA, especially given their greater reliance on 
droughts for clearing decisions, which was a significant point of argument from rural landholders 
during the most recent VMA debate. Surprisingly, active clearers reported to be more influenced by 
the aesthetic value of trees than all other clearing typologies. This could suggest that the aesthetic 
values of nature may be most important for reducing (relatively) larger-scale clearing—i.e. some 
clearing-area threshold may exist beyond which the aesthetics can most successfully reduce tree 
clearing. 
Inconsistencies in the relationship between perceived clearing norms and clearing typology 
characteristics can be identified. Where clearing is perceived to be the norm, active clearers and 
irregular clearers are found, and where clearing is not the norm, inactive clearers and perceived 
active clearers are found. While active clearers and inactive clearers do not tend to overlap as often 
in the landscape (consistent with their reported clearing norms), irregular clearers and perceived 
active clearers are present throughout low- and high-clearing regions. Thus it is very possible that 
irregular and perceived active clearers are frequently situated alongside their more extremist counter-
typologies, while the active and inactive clearers experience minimal interaction with one another. 
 
Psychosocial typologies 
 
Refusers and reluctant acceptors primarily differed according to their perception of disobedience 
norms, and these different perceptions may partly be a product of their unique psychosocial 
characteristics. Both typologies share strong conservative attitudes and negative perceptions and 
emotions toward the VMA, yet reluctant acceptors perceive most people to still abide by these 
regulations, seemingly reluctantly. Given reluctant acceptors’ unique emphasis on defining ‘good 
farmers’ as law-abiding citizens, this potential contradiction between attitudes and norms may stem 
from these participants’ unique farmer identity, wherein there is an inherent altruistic or sacrificial 
obligation to obey regulations, regardless of the perceived threat of those regulations to their own 
security.  
Refusers, on the other hand, perceive their community to behave in alignment with their 
negative feelings toward regulations. These participants, however, are less aware of other farmers’ 
land management behaviours. It may be likely that refusers’ strong distrust in the government and 
diminished sense of security, when coupled with their strong anti-regulation attitudes and emotions, 
fuels their unique definition of a less law-abiding ‘good farmer’; given their relative ignorance to 
farmers in their surrounding community, this may result in a skewed perception that most farmers 
must be reconciling these negative perceptions with disobedient behaviours.  
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Neutrals were also more aware of others’ land management behaviours, and a key distinction 
between the two types of security measures is emphasised in this group. Whereas refusers felt less 
secure that they could live a comfortable lifestyle following the VMA—more of an indication of 
convenience—the neutrals were more secure that the VMA would not pose a threat to their 
livelihood—more of an indication of sustenance. Because neutrals recognise some inconvenience but 
very little threat to the farmers’ livelihoods, this could explain why they hold moderate pro-clearing 
and anti-regulation attitudes, yet they do not see the VMA as a threat and perceive most farmers to 
be obeying regulations and avoiding tree clearing. Though the directionality of these psychosocial 
interactions is unknown, these participants appear to see the burden regulations place on landholders, 
but they do not perceive tree clearing or disobedience to be as significant of an issue. 
Acceptors most strongly perceived VMA disobedience to be the norm in their community, 
and they were the only typology to perceive tree clearing as the norm. Interestingly, the only 
significant driver of group membership was a lower awareness of norms—the lowest of all typologies. 
Acceptors had weaker pro-clearing and anti-regulation attitudes than the average participant, and like 
refusers, the diminished awareness of their community’s land management practices may skew their 
perception of the prevalence of clearing and disobedience in their area; in this case, the perception 
that most people are deforesting and ignoring regulations may contribute to their less conservative 
attitudes and emotions, potentially seeing government intervention as a justifiable solution to a 
normalised problem. 
Supporters contrast most strongly with reluctant acceptors, having the most liberal or ‘green’ 
characteristics across attitudes, emotions, and perception of the VMA’s threat. Not surprisingly, 
membership into this typology was uniquely driven by a greater sense of security and control, as well 
as stronger positive emotions. These participants were also located in more urban areas throughout 
Queensland. Although the majority of supporters did not perceive clearing and disobedience to be 
strong norms in their community, their perception of clearing norms was lower than the average 
participant, and their perception of disobedience norms was higher. This split between clearance and 
disobedience norms is interesting, as these participants view the regulated issue (clearing) as a lesser 
concern, yet they view the disobedience of the regulations as a greater concern, relative to the majority 
of participants surveyed. Those within this typology may be more influenced by urban perceptions 
rural farmers’ outrage over the VMA, and thus the strong liberal psychosocial characteristics may 
stem from a stronger desire for government intervention amidst the perceived protest from other 
landholders. 
Overall, interesting trends emerge in the descriptive characteristics of the psychosocial 
typologies. People who were most aware of others’ land management behaviours tend to agree that 
farmers are very obedient, and abstaining from tree clearing is typically the norm. On the other hand, 
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people who were reportedly least aware of others’ behaviours have a greater tendency to believe that 
people are more disobedient and more likely to be clearing trees. When participants shared similar 
conservative typological characteristics but differed according to their law-abiding definition of a 
‘good farmer,’ there is a stark difference in their perception of obedience norms in the community. 
Identity may thus be an important moderator of perceived social norms, particularly when they equate 
their own identity with others in their area. Expectedly, people with a greater sense of security viewed 
clearing to be atypical in their community, and they were the only ones who did not view the VMA 
as a substantial threat. 
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Appendix O. Results of the relationship between typologies and clearing hotspots 
 
 
 
 
Fig. O1. Relationship between psychosocial typology and postcode clearing hotspots within the last 
five years. Land clearing rates of (a) all woody vegetation and (b) remnant woody vegetation during 
2013–2016 as percent of 400 km2 pixel area. Postcode clearing rates in (c) and (d) calculated as the 
percent area cleared within postcode boundaries and represented as low, moderate, or high. (e) 
Significantly fewer supporters resided within high total clearing postcodes. (f) No significant 
relationship between typologies and remnant clearing hotspots. Cell size of (e) and (f) is proportional 
to the observed counts within each category. 
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Fig. O2. Relationship between clearing typology and postcode clearing hotspots within the last five 
years. Land clearing rates of (a) all woody vegetation and (b) remnant woody vegetation during 2013–
2016 as percent of 400 km2 pixel area. Postcode clearing rates in (c) and (d) calculated as the percent 
area cleared within postcode boundaries and represented as low, moderate, or high. (e) Inactive 
clearers primarily resided in low clearing postcodes, and the number of active clearers residing 
within high clearing postcodes was higher than expected. (f) No significant relationship between 
typologies and remnant clearing hotspots was observed. Cell size of (e) and (f) is proportional to the 
observed counts within each category. 
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Appendix P. Results of the relationship between clearing and psychosocial 
typologies 
 
 
 
 
       
Fig. P1. Relationship between land managers’ clearing typology and psychosocial typology. A 
significantly high number of managers within the supporters typology were also classified within the 
inactive clearers typology (Pearson’s c2, a = 0.05). 
 
